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Series editor’s preface
The Law, Justice and Ecology series celebrates questioning the accepted,
unsettling the categorical and re-engaging and re-imagining possible config-
urations and interplays of law and the contexts that it both shapes and is
shaped by, or emplaced within. It is difficult to imagine a better flagship
for the series than the book you hold in your hands, Law and Ecology: New
Environmental Foundations.
The self-proclaimed ambition of Law and Ecology is to ‘set up the foun-
dations for a theoretically adventurous, politically radical, methodologically
critical environmental discipline that combines law and ecology in a way that
belongs solely neither to law nor to ecology’. The theoretically pioneering
book in your hands is an invigorating incursion into the terrain at the heart
of this series. The book is provocative and productively unsettling in its
identification of a foundational void at the heart of contemporary environ-
mental law. It is just as engaging in its construction of a less managerial, self-
satisfied, technicistic and impoverished vision of what environmental law can
become. Challenging the legal illusion of control, in this case, control over
the ‘natural’, this work focuses on carving out a space between law and
ecology in order to present to us in full the paradoxical and idiosyncratic
nature of environmental law and to construct, in short, a ‘space’ of ‘critical
environmental law’ that engages with themes at the heart of this series:
themes concerning animality, justice, spatiality, materiality and context, etc.
Taking radical questioning as its starting point, the book bravely points
towards the uncertainties and volatility of environmental law, reconceived in
this work less as a discipline than as a transdisciplinary construction or an
unfolding transdisciplinary event.
The book, in short, offers timely and vital encouragement to law’s
radical self-examination, for law to embrace its lack of stable or monolithic
foundation, and to open itself expansively to the entire ecology within which
law finds itself emplaced, that is to say, the ‘disciplinary and ontological
plane’ on which law exists. Situating law in fluctuating space or spaces in
which the human, the legal, the political, the economic, the scientific,
the artificial, the animal and the environmental coexist and interpenetrate,
it represents the perfect first publication in the series Law, Justice and
Ecology.
Anna Grear
Series editor’s preface xi

Chapter 1




This book is about a new critical environmental law. Its ambition is to set up
the foundations for a theoretically adventurous, politically radical, methodo-
logically critical environmental discipline that combines law and ecology in a
way that belongs solely neither to law nor to ecology. While it is a fact that
environmental law and ecology have been going through a co-evolution of
sorts for the past few decades,1 it is also true that the majority of the literature
dealing with the connection between law and ecology has been rather mea-
sured in its ambition and impoverished in terms of its theoretical credentials.
It has remained content with assessing instances of the connection, usually
associated with ecosystemic principles and management, while shying away
from radicalising the connection and revealing its politically pioneer potential.
While such an approach is useful and indeed fundamental for a newly socially
and ecologically contextualised environmental law, its effect might prove
counterproductive for a theoretical, as opposed to a normative, development
of environmental law. It has indeed been noted by critics2 that the literature on
law and ecology tends to emphasise how existing law already performs (rela-
tively) well through the integration of ecological principles in its dealing with
geographically determined, ecosystemically systematised areas of biodiversity,
property rights, atmospheric pollution, and so on. The above approach, how-
ever, is often associated with two basic problems: first, it is tied up to an
unadventurous normativity which, because of its goal-oriented attitude, rejects
at the outset any theoretical links whose relevance to the existing law is not
immediately evident. Second, the emphasis on ecosystemic organisation risks
giving the impression of a rather facile managerial closure of the natural
sphere and a corresponding ability of environmental law fully to achieve
such management. In other words, the literature reproduces the problems of
environmental law itself: short-term goal orientation and the legal illusion of
control of the ‘natural’.
The present book, therefore, institutes a break with the above under-
theorised, goal-oriented, disciplinary-focused environmental legal perspective.
Likewise, it will quickly become apparent that, here, we have not engaged
with whether ecological principles and processes can, do or should apply
to environmental legal thinking. Indeed, this has been successfully done
elsewhere.3 Our endeavour instead has focused on carving a space between
law and ecology in which to address the paradoxical and idiosyncratic
nature of environmental law. Across the contributing chapters, this space is
being referred to variably as critical environmental law, spatial and environ-
mental justice, animality, heterotopia, radical encounter, and so on. The above
spaces are not stabilised but volatile, they do not assert but doubt, they do not
close the discipline but open up the whole notion of a ‘discipline’.
The book constitutes an ambitious critique which at the same time
encourages the law to look outside itself, over at new theoretical areas of
influence; and look deeper into its own limited ecological position as simply
another form of social expression alongside politics, economics, technology,
science, and so on, which, however, is expected to make use of given legal
notions and mechanisms. To this effect, ecology in this volume is under-
stood in its broadest possible meaning as the disciplinary and ontological
plane on which law finds itself. For the purposes of this anthology, we
understand the law to be situated in this wider ecology, what I would call open
ecology, that combines the natural, the human, the artificial, the legal, the
scientific, the political, the economic and so on, all of which coexisting on a
plane of contingency and fluid boundaries.4 In some respects, this is the real
meaning of Barry Commoner’s first law of ecology, namely that ‘everything
is connected to everything else’.5 We put forth a processual rather than
value-based ecology and, to quote Deleuze and Guattari, ‘we make no dis-
tinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the nat-
ural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production of
industry’.6 This makes our understanding of ecology legal, just as it makes
our law ecological. The ‘production of industry’, that is the various elements
that repeat themselves in nature and humanity in the form of processes/pro-
ducts is the focus of the present connection between law and ecology. Values
that have led nowhere successfully so far, are now replaced by a study of the
processes that transcend the usual dichotomy between human/natural. In
this, we follow Guattari’s conception of three ecologies, namely a ‘mental,
a natural and a cultural ecology’:7 nothing less then, than an ethicopolitical
articulation of the connections between subjectivity, biosphere and society,8
in which the law finds itself floating about. This new, critical environmental
law we attempt to sketch here can only situate itself along other disciplines
in an open eco-logy and, in the process, both construct a new oikos (a
‘home’, eco-, from Greek oikos) that will embrace continuous material
and conceptual movement; and, at the same time, a new critical language
and rationality (-logy, from Greek logos, meaning both language and reason)
that will address the complexity of the interconnection between law and
ecology.
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But (and this is the coup of our approach) this situatedness is unhinged
from traditional ontological and epistemological boundaries. This book is a
product of the following realisation: that only some of the constituent ele-
ments of environmental law can be considered relevant for a new, critical
environmental law. We are faced with a double paradox: on the one hand, a
law that is both law and non-law, in the sense that it both employs the
habitual legal mechanisms and processes in order to deliberate, and allows
itself to be influenced, perhaps to a never before seen degree, by other dis-
ciplines; and, on the other hand, an ecology that does not focus on nature
but on the absence of nature, and its replacement with a plane of con-
tingency, whose articulations belong at the same time to the conceptual and
the material, the ‘human’ and the ‘natural’. As a result, environmental law is
looking for its identity in an empty ecology, one with neither common lan-
guage (-logy) between its parts, nor a home (eco-) about which to talk. The
eco-logy in this volume signals the collapse of both the house in which
environmental law is supposed to situate itself, and the language in which
the law is supposed to communicate. Law as existing logos (language and
rationality) is spectacularly discredited when faced with the challenges of
environmental law: traditional legal dogmatics collapse before the idiosyn-
cracies of environmental law, bastions of reason are replaced by floats of
contingency, and trusted linguistic forms manage to attract vehement cri-
tique from feminists, ecologists, spatial theorists, autopoets, corporeal mate-
rialists and so on.9 In the same vein, nature as oikos has been demolished
long ago,10 its death celebrated by a constructivism that allows little room
for manoeuvring. ‘There is nothing outside’11 is bad enough, but ‘there is no
outside’ is both worse and more accurate. To situate environmental law
within this kind of draughty ecology requires a conceptual leap that neither
traditional legal reasoning nor ecosystemic rationality can offer. This is
a realisation that deviates dramatically from the current law and ecology
literature, but one we think pivotal for the construction of a critical
environmental law.
Thus, the task of a critical environmental law is to work along its con-
nection with ecology, indeed within this open ecology of disciplinary and
ontological fluidity, and construct a new language in order to communicate
about this new home. The challenge is multiple, not least because this lan-
guage can no longer be ‘just’ a language but rather a performance of
wholehearted embracing of materiality. It is not coincidental that environ-
mental law is the most readily available means to drag law outside its lin-
guistic ivory tower and land it on the material, the social, the corporeal, the
gendered, the spatial, the animal, the molecular. These are the inhabitants of
the new home for environmental law: no longer based on the distinction
conceptual/material, environmental law becomes one with its ecology, one
gesture amongst so many others, trying both to define itself and carry on
with its job of protecting its home.
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It is clear from the above that we believe in the need to push further the
theorisation of the connection between law and ecology. The contributors in
this volume have employed theoretical currents and constructions whose
relevance for environmental law may not always be immediately apparent,
whose role in a ‘planet-saving’ mission may not be so central, whose con-
tribution does not amount to a blueprint for action. This is of course not a
failure. On the contrary, we believe that the above-constructed emergencies
have reduced environmental law to mere reaction rather than thoughtful
action, to patching up rather than taking a step back and then throwing
itself in, and indeed to a not so qualified failure in terms of environmental
protection. To a large extent, this is attributed to a lack of distance, both
ontological and epistemological, from the processes and goals of environ-
mental law. We rarely stop to assess, we have accepted as given a certain
traditional legal thinking that remains too positivist for the complexity of
environmental issues; we have unquestionably reproduced the human/natural
division and even the anthropo/ecocentric distinction; we have looked into
environmental law merely as law and not as the idiosyncratic transdisciplinary
singular construction that is.
1.2 A new critical environmental law
For the above reasons, the need to theorise is imperative: environmental law
needs both to develop its theoretical apparatus to a level comparable to that
of other legal disciplines, such as constitutional law, family law or interna-
tional law and their respective theoretical foundations; and to keep abreast
with disciplines at least formally outside traditional legal boundaries but
with which environmental law finds itself in a relation of direct connection
and reciprocal influence. It is not an exaggeration to say that science, geo-
graphy, gender studies, development studies, sociology, political theory, eco-
nomic analysis, to name a few, are directly present in the majority of
environmental laws, frameworks, decisions – in short, environmental legal
thinking. No longer can the law barricade itself against other disciplines –
and if this is true for law in general, environmental law is arguably the most
prominent example of such a change. There is no longer a clear-cut bound-
ary between environmental law and, say, science.12 On the contrary, envir-
onmental law is constantly internalising scientific findings, correctly or
incorrectly, and acts upon them. Science (at least the science used in the
production of legal thinking) is part of environmental law. In that sense, it is
of the utmost importance for environmental law to follow the theoretical
developments in those disciplines and at least be aware of what is this thing
that seems to be changing environmental law from the inside.
In epistemological terms, therefore, the present anthology attempts to deal
with the double problem of, on the one hand, an undertheorisation of the
connection between law and ecology; and, on the other, an absence of the
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kind of critical theorising that by now informs everything in and around
environmental law. All the contributors in this volume have tried to address
the former through the latter. Indeed, it would seem that critical theorising
of the kind advocated here is the only possible theorising of environmental
law at a time of fluid interdisciplinarity, increasing ecological risks and
unparalleled technological advancements. The combination of these three
factors is a most powerful and novel one, and characterises all levels of
environmental legal thinking, be this local, national, regional, transnational
or international.
But allow me to clarify that here we are not merely talking about the need
to employ interdisciplinary methodologies, formulate ecological legal
regimes, trace the conceptual movement between ecocentrism and anthro-
pocentrism or even attempt a further legal integration of environmental
ethics. These are all important issues that to a certain extent feed into exist-
ing environmental legal thinking,13 although more often than most by
appearing briefly in the first couple of paragraphs of socially contextualised
writings on environmental law and then calmly forgotten. Rather than
reiterating the need for integration of the above, we are insinuating that there
is something much more threatening nestled in the very heart of environ-
mental law, a self-destructive movement that potentially contains a great deal
of violence against environmental law (and consequently the environment)
itself. This is a multiple problem: we are currently witnessing that environ-
mental law is rapidly losing a battle of self-definition, of indeed identity for-
mation amidst threats of, first, politico-economic co-optation and, second,
epistemic fragmentation.
The first kind of threat belongs to the field of ontological understanding of
the discipline (‘What is environmental law?’), while the second to an episte-
mological understanding (‘Is environmental law a discreet legal discipline?’).
Still, the two threats are clearly linked, not only in the way they are deployed
but, more important, in terms of a potential defence against them. In short,
this book essentially argues for a solid ethical orientation of environmental
law that will enable it to resist both political co-optation and disciplinary
fragmentation. Such an ethical orientation, however, can no longer come
from a habitual employment of environmental ethics.14 While this remains
important, it is also culpable of misguiding expectations that society may
have had of environmental law. To put it bluntly, environmental law cannot
save the planet. What is more, society cannot expect environmental law to
want to save the planet. As Keith Hirokawa writes, although from a per-
spective that the present author does not share, ‘deeply held beliefs alone are
ill-equipped to achieve progress in environmental law’.15 And this is perhaps
the crux of the problem and indeed the main challenge that the present
anthology is facing. For, although environmental law is required to position
itself amidst the ecology of unbounded disciplines, non-linguistic materiality,
dead nature, human/natural/artificial hybrids and looming ecological disasters;
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at the same time, and after all its disciplinary excursus, environmental law
must always return to the employment of a legal language and house itself in
courts. Just as within the dissolved boundary between the human and the
natural, there always remains a difference that emerges across temporalities
and observational positions,16 in the same way there is a difference between
environmental law and this wide ecology.
However innovative the processes employed by contemporary environ-
mental law, the latter remains a law, still using norms and norm-producing
processes, jurisdictional boundaries, temporal limitations. It also remains
broadly adversarial, even in its newer forms of market-based mechanisms,
regulation and mediation. (There is always one that dictates and the other
that resists, there is always power involved in whatever configuration one
may care to conceptualise it.) Which means that environmental law’s margin
for ethical ecological considerations and any desire to ‘become-other’, as
Deleuze and Guattari would have it, is still inscribed within legal processes.
These processes have on their side a tried and tested sedimentation, facility
of application, path dependence, and indeed the burden of social expecta-
tions as to what the law can and should do. There are good reasons for
which these processes have remained relevant across time, and it is not our
purpose to discredit them. Rather, we aim at fully facing the foundational
paradox of environmental law, namely its residual inscription within the
boundaries of legal science and its putative gesture towards a radical extra-
disciplinarity. For environmental law is different. It is not just law (to the
extent that there is such a thing as just law). It constitutes the clearest
example of law in postmodernity, faced with insurmountable dilemmas that
range from cultural relativism to decisions about life and death in a biopo-
litical context and projected temporalities and future risk of nanotechnology.
As Brooks writes, ‘a complete re-examination of current environmental law
might … [operate] not only as a preface to environmental law, but as a
preface to the understanding of all law’.17 This is precisely the challenge
that this volume is trying to address: how, while remaining within relatively
given legal boundaries, environmental law can transcend its conservative
limitations and assume a radical stance that will not be co-opted by political
and economic interests. To put it differently, the main objective of the
anthology is to imagine an environmental law that is equally at home in law and
outside of it.
1.3 The chapters
The contributions attempt to accommodate the various, often paradoxical
needs of environmental law. The quest of identity is sometimes articulated in
terms of its disciplinary loyalty to existing legal mechanisms, and sometimes
in terms of its productive confluence or even conflict with other disciplines.
In all contributions, however, there is an underlying articulation of the
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importance of balancing out its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ demands, namely
legal ‘proper’ and extradisciplinary ones, and a general, albeit critical, faith
in its potential. It has to be noted though that this balancing out is not a
hark back to a nostalgic image of natural balance, where law finds its posi-
tion in a harmonious universe. On the contrary, conflict between these
demands, and consequently between law and ecology, appears all the time as
yet another manifestation of how the old semantics of ecocentricity can no
longer be of any help. With this renewed interest in all things legal and eco-
logical, the contributions to this volume aim at sketching the foundations of
a new legal environmental discipline.
As a continuation of this introduction, the first chapter aims to develop
further the underlying aim of the volume, namely the production of what
can be called Critical Environmental Law. Situated in the open ecology
of unhomeliness (no all-encompassing oikos) and miscommunication (no
unifying logos), I attempt to establish environmental law’s foundational
paradox: that its conceptual limits are both potentially all-inclusive (since
every societal problem can be seen as more or less environmental) and
devoid of any content (since environmental law can no longer distinguish
its ‘object’, namely environment per se). In that sense, environmental law
rearticulates the problem of the connection between the universal and the
particular. The traditional imaging of the environment as the thing that
turns (French virer) around a stable pivot (a distilled sense of pure humanity)
has been discredited in view of the collapse of the boundaries between the
natural/human/artificial. In order to address this permeability, environmental
law has the opportunity and responsibility to construct an adequate theore-
tical base for its role in environmental protection. The chapter argues for
four critical environmental positions that are necessary for environmental
law’s attempt at catching up both with other disciplines, and the demands
made to it by an ever-changing ecology. Thus, first, environmental law
must theorise itself as acentric, namely conceive of itself as only one amongst
a multiplicity of perspectives, none of which could ever be central (yet all of
them claiming precisely that); second, environmental law must de-individualise
the individual and position the human in an ecological plane beyond
anthropo/ecocentricity; third, environmental law must relinquish the (tradi-
tional ecological) ideal of unity and accept uncertainty as a structural
and constantly present inevitability rather than an invisibilised externality;
and fourth, environmental law must move beyond the illusionary construc-
tion of prescriptive idealities and focus on a measured legal description of
its own limitations. Largely following a critical reading of Niklas Luhmann’s
theory of autopoiesis, and influenced by postecological, feminist, spatial
and other radical theoretical writings, I attempt to carve a space of critique
simultaneously within and outside environmental law, a mirror of ethical
responsibility against which the law can measure its potential, its limits
and ultimately its objects of desire. In effect, critical environmental law
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is an acentric, postecological, manifold and self-aware ‘thrown-together’ of
events and spaces which become ‘solid’ and relatively permanent through
repetition.
Bettina Lange’s chapter maps the current critical environmental scene with
inspired lucidity. Since critical environmental law scholarship is not a coher-
ent, hegemonic project with determinate legal obligations, Lange attempts to
look into its principal influences, which she then categorises as external and
internal critiques of the law – the former coming from critical legal studies
and the latter from socio-legal studies. They both aim at destabilising the
usual liberal theoretical foundations of law’s autonomy especially in relation
to the political sphere, while determining its limits as a tool of environmental
regulation. According to Lange, critical environmental law asks further core
questions, such as how environmental law stabilises or disrupts existing
social orders, and how existing social orders can be transformed in order to
achieve more sustainable forms of living. As a result, critical environmental
law contextualises itself in the intersection between politics, economics and
the law, situating thus itself within the wider ecology of social relations,
subjectivity and sustainability needs. Lange’s critical space between law and
ecology is determined by what she calls a ‘Foucauldian-inspired discourse
analysis’, namely a theoretical approach that can be associated with empirical
research techniques, and as such not a grand systematic methodology. Lange
applies the basic Foucauldian tenet of discursively constructed agencies and
institutions to the specific area of EU administrative authorisation of trans-
genic agricultural products. This approach helps transcend essentialist con-
ceptions of actors, institutions and practices, reveals the inbuilt ambiguity of
the scientific and legal discourses, and allows an impressive possibility for
the analysis of emotion discourses and their undercurrent impact. This
approach claims not to marginalise the material by reducing the social world
to language, but, based on analogy, it studies the material as analogous to
the linguistic. In this sense, Lange’s work addresses the main challenge of
this book, namely the critical task of situating the law in a multidisciplinary,
processual ecology in such a way that the law both engages with its envir-
onment in an ‘illimitable’ way and at the same time remains a contained,
limited entity.
After starting with an overview of the traditional understanding of law
and ecology as the marriage of the two different rationalities of the ecosys-
temic and the legal, Jo Goodie quickly broadens the scope of what is con-
sidered ecological. Her chapter focuses on the ethical import that instability,
variability and uncertainty have for the critical environmental legal dis-
course, thereby expanding both the concept of the ecological and that of the
environmental legal (to include science, subjectivity, common sense, social
values, morality, cultural conceptions and so on). Goodie presents an
impressively multifaceted understanding of toxic risk litigation that draws
from the literature as well as her personal experience as an Australian
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plaintiff’s solicitor in the field of toxic tort litigation. Beginning with the
haunting proclamation that ‘legal understanding of the environment is con-
tingent’, the author builds a meticulous classification of the way in which
environmental hazards are legally interpreted in toxic tort claims. She con-
structs four (non-exhaustive) categories of legal interpretation of toxic risk:
insurantial, scientific, clinical and commonsense. Through an elaboration of
the above Goodie shows how, in the current ecological (in the broader sense
adopted here) context, the law struggles within itself with a host of differ-
entiated and often incompatible rationalities that must perforce converge
into the delivery of a court decision. This multi-factor approach distances
itself from simple causality and even probabilism and enables the court to
construct a moment of decision where the various rationalities simulta-
neously underpin and obstruct each other. The process demonstrates at the
same time the resilience of the law (in its guise as environmental law) to
remain law (‘a disinterested, yet authoritative, arbiter on risk’) by success-
fully integrating the vocabulary and techniques of risk calculation; and the
inability of the law to distance itself from imparting blame and indeed guilt
in the form of punishment for people who are judged to be inadequately
risk-aware and risk-averse. The last feature is a symptom of the law’s assimila-
tion of the common sense (whose common sense?): as Goodie writes, the ubi-
quitous vocabulary of risk has replaced the notion of sin, and the court feels
entitled to ascribe moral culpability to the ‘irresponsible’ while deculpabilising
the ‘victim’.
When John Paterson begins his chapter on the precautionary principle by
quoting the reaction of the French Academy of Science condemning the
proposed constitutional incorporation of the principle as ‘catastrophic’, he
points precisely to the paradox of the precautionary principle as an ambi-
tious but by definition ambiguous principle that floats in an ocean of differ-
entiated perspectives, conflicting interests and levels of implementation and
judicial control. Paterson delivers a step-by-step analysis of the status of the
principle, first, as scientific; second, as operational in terms of policy; third,
as justiciable; and fourth, as relevant in terms of practical consequences.
Drawing on philosophy of science and systems theory, Paterson builds a test
of plausibility of the hypothetical harm and reasonableness of the proposed
response, that attempts to accommodate both societal and judicial uncer-
tainty, while retaining the fluidity yet relevance of the principle. In that sense,
Paterson’s chapter addresses the space of uncertainty that characterises con-
temporary environmental jurisprudence that finds itself in the cusp between
science, regulation, economy and legal demands. Thus, the principle is found
to be ‘scientific’ – with all the caveats that such an epithet entails – since it
entails decisions made under conditions of ignorance. It can also be made
operational, provided that the difference between the various systems that
have a stake in such a decision (such as law, science, politics, economy) is
internalised by each system as an observable ignorance, namely as a thing
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that cannot be fully understood by any system, yet this inability of full
understanding is taken into consideration by each system as a positive and
calculable value. Paterson illustrates the above in a detailed analysis of judicial
decision-making as it appears in the European Court of First Instance case
of Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council, which results in observing both the
difficulty that the law has in distinguishing between risk and ignorance, as
well as its difficulty in handling the boundary between procedural and sub-
stantial matters, which becomes particularly subtle in cases of potential
precautionary principle application.
Alain Pottage treads an alluring ground of paradoxical ecology by focus-
ing on the interfolding of material and instrumental technologies in the
context of the regulation of biotechnology. In a Luhmann/Deleuze-inspired
text that is equally at ease with the multiple ecologies of this volume and,
impressively, with the technicalities of GMO, Pottage offers a future-arresting,
almost prophetic account of the way in which biotechnology affects sociality.
The text begins with the way in which biotechnological artefacts, such as
GM crops, become the actual means rather than simply objects of environ-
mental regulation, and specifically the Transcontainer. This aptly named
regulatory instrument aims at developing GM crop plants that are biologi-
cally contained through the inscription, into the very texture of the plant, of
its genetic tracing (namely, its identificatory event, its ‘birthmark’ as it were)
and its temporal containment (in the sense that the yield of the particular
seeds are limited in order for the farmer to return every time to the seed
producer for more). The author questions the EU policy of crop coexistence,
not merely on the usual grounds of economic expedience but significantly
on account of its policy of tolerance of 0.9 per cent ‘adventitious’ GM con-
tent in what is otherwise considered (and, importantly, labelled as) non-
GMO. It becomes quickly obvious that the difference between GMO and
non-GMO is one of degree rather than one of kind. This is only part of
the broader coexistence initiative that employs the already well digested col-
lapse between the ‘artificial’ and the ‘natural’, or in this case the ‘grown’ and
the ‘made’, and observes it (interprets it/uses it) as an always already occur-
rence. This legitimising realisation augurs what Pottage calls the ‘regulatory
ecology’ of a material and regulatory assemblage that does not distinguish
between categories of being (GMO/non-GMO) but between methods. These
remain open to a multiplicity of interpretations that differ radically between
actors and discourses, such as those of the politician, the campaigner, the
producer, the distributor, the testing agency and the consumer. A related and
equally fascinating side of coexistence brought forth in the text is the way the
spatial (in the form of crop segregation and buffering) coexists with the
genetic containment in this complex ecology of landscape/human factors/
economic vectors. This spatiality, however, is bound to be minimised in the
face of increasingly more efficient genetic containment – and this posits the
question: how irreversible and indeed how ‘alien’ will future forms of this
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paradoxical ecology be? An ecology already with us and somehow never
fully here, never fully apprehended and certainly never even remotely
‘contained’.
Karen Morrow’s contribution continues the critical environmental project
by developing the ecofeminist perspective with a view to a truly inclusive
polity. Morrow’s approach is neither narrowly feminist, nor narrowly ecological,
but open in its inclusiveness and ready to embrace broader understandings
of ecology and gender. In that sense, Morrow’s contribution stands squarely
within this book’s critical ecological project of locating the law in the plane
of ecological processes and offering perspectives that attempt to revolutionise
concepts of inclusion. Her chapter begins with an analysis of the WCED
Brundtland Report in terms of its ‘partnership’ approaches to governance
and civil society participation. While this is welcomed, it has admittedly led
to some issues, such as the overreliance on NGOs in terms of their presumed
ability to talk for the people, as well as the possibility of the public delegat-
ing both responsibility and activism to professional NGOs. This is hoped to
be counteracted by an emphasis on a more inclusive participation agenda,
which shall be highly political, knowledge-based and embodied. Morrow’s
inspiration comes from the work of Lorraine Code, whose concept of eco-
feminism refers to a broad church indeed. Code’s ‘ecological thinking’ includes
the traditional ecofeminist goals of identifying and tackling patriarchy, but
goes beyond that by developing practices, policies and theories which are
not male-gender biased, and which look at humans as ecological beings. In
that sense, Code’s project includes inclusive decision-making processes and a
strong critique of scientific certainty. To that, Morrow adds the practice of
what she calls ‘quotidian epistemology’, namely an embodied, evidence-
based body of observations that will help produce ecologically informed,
inclusive decisions. Morrow remains a believer in resistance movements
against the given power- and control-based rationality, and the chapter urges
us to think precisely of such possibilities.
In an incantatory mode, Piyel Haldar talks of future, salvation, sover-
eignty and exception as observed through a scholarly and often lyrical study
of Christian bestiaries, namely catalogues of both actual and imaginary
animals employed in Christian literature in order to educate the faithful.
Haldar situates environmental law in a legal, philosophical, cultural, religious
and scientific textual omniana, trying in this way to establish the particular
sovereignty that determines the nature of environmental law. Two apparently
competing sovereigns emerge: nature, or as Haldar calls it, ‘a sort of green
sovereign that emerges from the earth itself ’, and the Law, who appears and
eventually reverses the sovereignty of nature over man. With the Law, nature
is excised and in its place a sovereign environment is installed – this is what
the author calls the passage from ‘the verdant to the desiccated’. The envir-
onment now needs the law to order and maintain the distance between man
and nature. Nature is thus reduced to a cipher for the law, a sort of resource
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for the perpetuation of man’s higher position. This primacy of law over
nature, argues Haldar, is rooted in a Christian hermeneutic that constructed
a logos, by inception higher than animality. Indeed, it is precisely this kind of
Christian religious thinking that turned man against nature, thus establishing
the primacy of law over nature. The need for deciphering nature in order to
maintain the primacy of law becomes abundantly clear in the examples that
Haldar employs from a range of bestiaries that span the post-pagan to the
later medieval, and include natural histories, mystical zoography, general
animal symbolism, as well as werewolves, unicorns, onocentaurs and jacalus.
But the end purpose of deciphering both the actual and the fabulous
becomes quickly apparent: through the didactic construction of man’s nor-
mative behaviour towards his environment, the bestiaries present the only
way of future salvation. This is the paradox of animals, at the same time
subservient to the law and without original sin. This paradox, like the
donkey leading Christ into Jerusalem, leads man to salvation. In that sense,
nature’s subjugation is presented as the necessary and justified means in the
face of a known, mapped-out future that promises redemption. Bestiaries,
therefore, are not unlike environmental law, which looks with hope into an
all-justifying future point of salvation, while consuming itself into all sorts of
present exceptions.
Antonia Layard and Jane Holder weave an intricate conceptual, spatial
and social canvas on which they rehearse their main preoccupation with the
conceptualisation and application of Environmental Justice. Their chosen
political/legal/spatial context is the European Union, and their conceptual
tools are the EU notions of solidarity and territorial cohesion. What appears
as mere background, however, takes centre stage in the authors’ attempt to
sketch a different, spatially defined, ecologically just environmental law. In
that sense, their project of bringing forth environmental justice through the two
legal tools of solidarity and territorial cohesion is a remarkable addition
to an ecologically situated law, indeed a critical environmental law. Begin-
ning with a rather measured claim that location should not be a dis-
advantage, which the authors consider to be the common core of the above
concepts in the context of the EU, the chapter proceeds with a profound
understanding of both the practicalities and the theoretical potentialities of a
European environmental law that goes beyond the rhetorical and actively
engages with the specificities of a locality. Indeed, the spatial situatedness of
environmental law and the related struggle for spatial justice is one of the
pivotal notions of the argument. This, coupled with the relatively new and
inchoate concept of territorial cohesion opens up avenues of questioning and
re-evaluating of the relation between space and territory. Is there a European
territory of the kind that would imply a stable and agreed model of Eur-
opean society? Does it transcend national or even physical boundaries? Can
environmental law meaningfully limit its application to such boundaries, or
must it expand by applying a different, non-causal understanding of locality
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(as some recent court cases seem to be pointing at)? Where does the ethical
obligation for solidarity between member states stop? Balancing between a
realistic stance (‘There is no imminent prospect of an Ecotopian state’) and a
critically radical position (‘This more holistic, integrative approach to cohe-
sion is clearly compatible with a philosophy of social environmental justice’),
the chapter eventually closes in on the importance of a spatially embedded
social legal presence that takes advantage of, while at the same time spear-
heading the quest for the European holy grails of integration and harmoni-
sation. From normative to descriptive, environmental justice is a measurable
potentiality and one that can become central to territorial cohesion and
solidarity.
Andreas Kotsakis’s contribution focuses on Foucault’s idea of
heterotopias, namely ‘the dark underbelly of utopias’: as opposed to what
utopias are often considered to be, namely places of unquestioned order,
heterotopias are actual, lived-in places of unsettling, anti-foundationalist
critique, rife with uncertainty, discontinuity, difference. Through the three
heterotopic environmental instances of natural reserves, local communities
and ethno-botanical institutions Kotsakis constructs a ‘heterotopology’, that
is, a method of analysis of space that takes into account the need to con-
struct a critical environmental law in the face of law’s spatial turn. For this,
the author follows Foucault’s famous proclamation that ‘the present
epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space’ and rides along the
quest for a spatially aware environmental law that will finally open up and
attempt to understand spatial juxtaposition, superposition, simultaneity and
dispersion as determining parts of environmental legal thinking itself. Along
that vein, Kotsakis assembles an ecological canvas of multiple locations,
inhabitants, narratives, discourses and processes, on which he attempts to
situate his vision of a critical environmental law. Heterotopy proves to be an
invaluable tool to apply the kind of critique that takes nothing for granted.
Thus, natural reserves constitute what the author calls ‘crisis heterotopias’,
namely the salvaging space, not so much of nature, but of an incessant
global urban development that is enabled to carry on ‘elsewhere’. Or ethno-
botanical institutions, much favoured by current biodiversity regimes, that
are found to be ‘heterotopias of deviation’ and in which only the stake-
holders in conservation and development are admitted, rather than right
holders, property owners or raw material producers. And finally, sustainable
communities – the golden cudgel of the era of sustainability – which are seen
as yet another heterotopia of deviation, this time freezing rural identities that
obey a logic of nostalgic relics on which global economic growth blossoms.
Perhaps the most important offering of environmental heterotopias is their
ingrained memory of all these narratives that sooner or later fall out of
favour – all the more important since heterotopias remain lived-in places.
And as Kotsakis writes, ‘a failed place is harder to hide than a failed legal
agreement’.
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Mark Halsey’s chapter is a widely ranging lament for the loss of nature
through legal, political and economic partitioning. Based on Gilles Deleuze’s
theory, but with important insights from Foucault, Virilio and others, Halsey
examines world heritage areas and big protected trees as manifestations of
the divide between what is worth preserving and what can be disposed
of. This is the legal divide between, on the one hand, protected areas and
species, and, on the other, all other spaces and beings not deemed worthy
of legal protection. In what reads like a gallery of rogues, Halsey describes
how the world is partitioned into categories of varying protection value,
thereby bulldozing over what Deleuze calls ‘the difference borne by the
individual’, namely each being’s irreducible, never to be repeated difference.
By designating a national park or a big tree an object of legal protection on
account of its individuality, the law denies the importance of all other parts
of nature as excess. This is what Halsey calls an ‘encounter’ with the ‘mon-
strous’: when faced with the protected giant tree, one encounters something
‘both magnificent and abhorrent’, both splendid in its individual difference
and monstrous in its violence of presence, which relies on the perdition of
millions of other trees not deemed worthy of protection. Such encounters
force us to think beyond the boundaries of given thought, pushes us into the
‘acategorical’, the one that cannot be contained by either law or the repre-
sentation of nature as a categorisable, legally manipulated object. And
through its legal designation, the ‘monstrous’ retains its sovereign, exclu-
sionary power to marginalise everything else that either comes under its own
category (something like Noah’s ark, where one specimen of every species is
to be saved), or under any other, not ‘important’ category. Halsey deals with
several intertwined themes of conceptions of the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’, of
the various truth discourses, of the difference between the geological and the
industrial speed; but at the end, like Deleuze, he returns to a plane of eco-
logical immanence where the difference becomes both unique (for each
being/space/discourse) and somehow obsolete (since the boundary between
the natural and the human/artificial has collapsed).
Notes
1 Brooks et al., 2003; Turgut, 2008.
2 See Hirokawa, 2002: 225, who notes that the literature ‘seeks to alter the shape and
operation of environmental law by making legal arguments that already existing
law compels the proposed changes’. This is generally a North American approach
to law and ecology, and one that is explicitly focused on mainly US jurisprudence.
3 Brooks, 1991: 13.
4 The idea of ecology put forth in this book, although conceptually not necessarily
subscribed to by all contributors, is directly influenced by Guattari’s, 2000, notion of
ecologies, as well as his work with Deleuze, 1986, 1987. According to this, ecology
does not refer to the science of ecosystems but to the plurality of machinic assem-
blages that construct the plane of immanence. This understanding of ecology
embraces the technological, scientific, natural, human, artificial, and so on, not only
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without differentiating, but purposely dissolving the distinctions. Although such
inclusive ideas have been successfully rehearsed in the wider ecological debate (e.g.,
Baarschers, 1996: 14, who equates ecology with ‘an attitude, a world-view’), there is
a difference between a vaguely or even contextualised ethical/ecological view, and
the kind of ecology that combines the material and the conceptual without dis-
tinction and transversed by continuous movement. For two excellent contributions
to the connection between Deleuze and ecology see Herzogenrath, 2008, 2010.
5 Commoner, 1971: 33.
6 Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 4; in that sense, one can talk about ecophilosophy –
see Papuzinski, 2009.
7 Guattari, 1995: 20.
8 See Genosko, 2010, for an excellent analysis.
9 See indicatively Verchick, 2007; Delaney, 2003; Holder and McGillivray, 1999;
Cairns, 2003; Tarlock, 2004. This is more than a ‘Galileo problem’ as Cassuto,
2004, puts it, namely that the environment or indeed environmental law could
ever affect a pretence of objectivity. For even when environmental law is forced to
affect precisely such a pretence its effect becomes all too apparent.
10 Merchant, 1980.
11 Lyotard, 1993.
12 See Adelman, 2008.
13 See for example, Gorovitz Robertson, 2008.
14 Although innovative applications of environmental ethics do promise a certain, if not
way out, at least way of seeing things differently. This is perhaps the greatest con-
tribution of environmental ethics. On its own, however, it is unable to deal with the
kind of increasing uncertainty present in environmental law, not least because of its
continuing reliance on a human nature that can be changed from within and
according to ecological urgencies. It is characteristic, for example, that Christopher
Stone’s, 2007, observations on ethics and international environmental law conclude
with the following, rather disheartening to the present reader, sentence: ‘Ultimately,
international environmental ethics may be less about human welfare or even the
environment than about the unavoidable molding of ideal human character.’ If even
at the arena of international law, arguably the least human-centred legal discipline,
the focus of ethics remains the ideal human character, it seems obvious that the
connection between ethics and contemporary concepts of agency is still far away.
15 Hirokawa, 2002: 227.
16 This is a difference not between subject/object but between observer/observed, and
even that only at specific moments when the distinction is momentarily frozen.
This is what Hanjo Berressem, 2010: 70, in his excellent hybrid language of
Deleuzian and autopoietic topologics, calls ‘radical paradoxical logic’.
17 Brooks, 1991.
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Chapter 2
Towards a Critical Environmental Law
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
2.1 Introduction
On the one hand, environmental law encompasses, actually or potentially,
everything that may ever be encompassed by law in general. On the other
hand, and simultaneously to the above, what we commonly refer to as the
legal discipline of environmental law does not really exist. These two seemingly
contrasting propositions, namely both non-existence and all-inclusiveness of
environmental law, are one and the same thing. What seems mere sophistry, is
actually, I argue, the foundational paradox of environmental law. With the
boundary between human and environmental/natural collapsed, environ-
mental law is left in a limbo of indifference (what would be its point?) and all-
inclusiveness. The repercussions of such a paradox go beyond the rhetorical
and touch upon the delineation of the field of environmental law, its object
and objective, its limits and most importantly, its limitations. The paradox and
its repercussions are the focus of the present chapter. However, I do not
attempt to resolve the paradox, find a way out of it or indeed clarify the con-
ceptual area in which environmental law applies. On the contrary, the purpose
of this chapter is to expose the paradox and build on it. In so doing, I am
conscious of the fact that I am making environmental law’s work harder. I want
to think that I render visible a complexity that is consistently marginalised by
environmental law’s mainstream theoretical and applied attempts, and
expose the limitations of environmental law as well as its weighty and in
some respects unique responsibility.
This is a strategic move. Amidst the tension between the opposing and rather
aggressive sides (‘environmental-law-includes-everything and environmental-
law-does-not-exist’), I want to carve a space for what I call Critical Envir-
onmental Law. This space must remain a space of tension and self-generating
undecidability, nowhere permanently anchored and flirting equally with the
all or (better: and) nothing of environmental law. The term ‘space’ is meant
in the most literal sense possible. It is an actual space of critique within
environmental law, which situates itself away from barren debates on
anthropocentricity versus ecocentricity, proof of causality, measurements of
harm and even differing prioritisation of temporalities (present versus future
generations). Instead, the space of Critical Environmental Law is grounded
on three ‘catching up’ necessities, namely three issues in which environmental
law lags behind other disciplines and in which it needs to catch up if it wants
to retain its relevance: first, the need to ‘decentre’ environmental law and to
construct a theoretical approach that will not succumb to the usual hier-
archical centralising but will wake up to its possibility of functional acen-
tricity; second, the need to accept the fragmentation of environmental law
with special emphasis on the collapse of the human as an individual (namely,
undivided) and its replacement with hybrid connections between the human,
the natural, the spatial, the artificial, the technological; and, third, the need to
land environmental law on a theoretical grounding of difference rather than
unity. These three elements define the way in which Critical Environmental
Law is to be shaped and practised. In what follows, I attempt to sketch those
elements within the context of environmental law, and relate them in parti-
cular to the theory of autopoiesis, namely the sociological theory developed
by the German theorist Niklas Luhmann. This is with a view to show that
environmental law is a potentially decisive tool in these new turnings and
tidings we are currently witnessing, and that such an opportunity is accom-
panied by a deep responsibility. To address this, environmental law is in need
of radical theoretical elaboration. In this respect, autopoiesis represents an
ideal if rarely suggested bedfellow for environmental law. Before that, how-
ever, a brief explanation of why I consider that in the heart of environmental
law there lies an unsolvable paradox.
2.2 The paradox of environmental law
To start with the bravado of the type ‘environmental law does not exist’ is
not a denial of the existing body of legislature and jurisprudence that deals
with environmental causes. Rather, it points to the impossibility of defining
any cause as environmental in a manner that would exclude claims from
other branches of law. In support of this, it has been said that environmental
law ‘is not an organic mutation of the common law, or more generally, the
western legal tradition … As a result, environmental law remains largely
unintegrated into our legal system; thus, it is vulnerable to marginalization
as support for environmentalism ebbs and flows’.1 Its reliance on envir-
onmentalism aside, environmental law remains a sui generis branch of law,
hazy yet urgent, undefinable yet omnipresent. Take a simple example: pol-
lution is variously claimed by property law, landlord and tenant law, plan-
ning law, public law, commercial law, intellectual property law, criminal law,
administrative law, and then regional and international law, European Union
or federal law, civil law, financial law, regulation, policy, soft law, agendas
and declarations, preambles and protocols. And of course by environmental
law too. But does anyone else apart from environmental lawyers care about
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this categorisation? And if so, is this just an identity quest for the lost girls
and boys of the environmental legal lobby? Please indulge for a moment my
suspicion that there is something else, a tad more important at stake here.
The other side of the same problem is an overcompensation in terms of
claims of problems on behalf of environmental law in order to make sure
that eventualities are covered. This has the potentially useful but more often
debilitating consequence of considering everything more or less environmental.
It would hardly be out of place to suggest that everything can eventually be
regulated by this conceptually expansive branch of law that swallows up
large chunks of local, statal, regional, international and supranational legal
agendas and is left wanting ever more. Arguably, this happens for good rea-
sons. Environmental law is potentially the only law that in the current con-
ditions remains ‘relevant’ – a relevance not only because of its close
connection to the survival of the human species but also because of such
issues as quality of life, health, poverty, gender equality, intra-personal rela-
tions, adequate housing, societal organisation, urban development, interna-
tional commerce, and so on. But this means that environmental law
potentially embraces every aspect of life that remains relevant to what really
matters. The same can be put from the point of view of risk. Seen from one
perspective, the advancement of technology equals the multiplication of
risks,2 and if risk precaution is environmental law’s most valiant radical
representative,3 environmental law plays a potentially limitless role in the
determination of ‘acceptable’ technology. And it would not be far-fetched to
say that regulation of technological effects is to a large extent the main
challenge of our society. Since technology increasingly mediates the relation
among humans, and between humans and everything else (natural, artificial,
technological) by even altering the connection between means and object of
regulation,4 legal processes that can be considered environmental find themselves
popping up everywhere with more or less intensity.
The same paradox can be put from the perspective of time: environmental
law’s temporality is one of a paradoxically imminent yet distant all-embracing
horizon. Environmental protection matters tend to make their presence felt
with unprecedented urgency, imposing deadlines concerning global survival,
health and quality of life. While these present themselves in the present, they
usually refer directly to the future. The temporality of environmental law is a
hydrocephalous one, with the future weighing massively over present decisions –
the most obvious example of which is the concept of intergenerational
equity. Such a distribution of juridical weight requires of environmental law
unprecedented degrees of flexibility that are accompanied by an uncomfortably
intense and counterproductive checking for consistency.
The reasons for this paradoxical dis/appearance of environmental law are
multiple: environmental law is considered a relatively new, relatively uncrys-
tallised legal discipline, whose limits are both more flexible and tested sig-
nificantly more intensely than those of other legal disciplines. This is the
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direct consequence of the combination of inadequate epistemic distress and
superabundant urgency: as yet there are few sustained attempts at the
establishment of an extended, theoretically rich debate on the precise nature
of environmental jurisprudential underpinnings. No doubt, this omission is
also prompted by the idea that theory is counterproductive in the face of
such acute and urgent problems.5 The paradox is accentuated by the intensely
fragmented societal presence of environmental law: calls for reliably consistent
responses come from social domains as diverse as science, transnational poli-
tics, global economics, ethics, environmental philosophy, geography, and so
on. Take the example of sustainable development, a concept that incorpo-
rates the handling of the conflict between economy and environment from
within the law.6 As a consequence, environmental law finds itself in a prac-
tical continuum with policy and regulation. This is supplemented by an
extensive use of the concept of soft law which deliberately oscillates between
binding and non-binding law.7 It is far from surprising, therefore, that
environmental law provokes social reactions that range from support
and fanaticism to indifference and hostility. It has to play along and resist
(un)fashionable environmentalism, persistent economic weighing (and,
equally, remuneration, since both protection of the environment and protec-
tion against the protection of the environment are lucrative), avid inter-
nalisation of environmental issues by the political system, unsettling
internalisation of scientific uncertainty, ethical reflection that urges towards
paradigm shifts of the kind established law is unable to perform, and so on.
Perhaps the most important reason for the perpetuation of the environ-
mental legal paradox is its intense connection to science.8 The establishment
of thresholds, for example, is only a minor theme compared with the formid-
able task of risk prevention in view of lack of exhaustive scientific information.
The inherent necessity of environmental law – more than any other legal
branch – to internalise scientific data demands ephemeral decisions and
constant re-evaluation of already established problem-solving methodologies.
The ephemeral nature of environmental legal decisions is further demanded
by the role that economic considerations play in decision-making, in the
form of technology transfer, exploitation of biodiversity, and pollution allo-
cations, amongst other mechanisms.9 ‘Environmental problems are char-
acterized by the need to reduce their inevitable uncertainty through the
constant generation and application of new knowledge. They often do not, as
do many other areas of the law, display a repetition of similar fact pat-
terns.’10 However, it is not only the patterns that change. The scientifically
recommended way of evaluating such patterns changes also. Environmental
law is a showcase of Murphy’s description of the future in the era of statis-
tical positivisation: ‘[t]he future is reconstituted as inherently revisable sta-
tistical projections on a screen’.11 The in-built need for revision of statistics
renders shaky the connection between present decision and future stability:
‘it makes little sense to agonise over today’s decision when it is likely to
Critical Environmental Law 21
require revision tomorrow’.12 This, however, seems a major failure of envir-
onmental law, at least in comparison with other legal branches. Put from a
temporal perspective, the main function on the law is to fix over time the
expectations that society has of what is permitted and what is not.13 The
inability of environmental law to deliver such certainty as adequately as
other legal branches do, seems to target precisely the ability of environ-
mental law to become or even to be law. However, I argue that environ-
mental legal volatility and inherent uncertainty are not a malfunction: they
are simply inalienable attributes in view of the irreducible complexity of
environmental law’s subject matter.
Thus, we have the paradox: environmental law is both a cut through other
legal specialisations, itself undefined and undefinable; and inclusive of all
other legal specialisations, claiming a space of direct or indirect ‘integration’
in every legal decision, and eventually mediating every relation between the
human and whatever else is left on the other side. While this may under
certain conditions be a paralysing predicament, I opt for the time being to
leave it unresolved, in full tension and in rather febrile potential for the
identity of both the discipline and its lawyers.
2.3 What environmental law?
Etymologically, environment comes from the word environs, in its turn
coming from the French words en (‘in’) and virer (‘to turn’). This implies an
inside that stands erect and an outside that surrounds this inside and turns
around it.14 Environment is the ‘thing’ that surrounds ‘us’, the dervish-like
outside that whirls like a frilly skirt around a stable pivot. But the pivot
remains not only stable, fixed and unyielding but significantly ‘central’. This
can imply only one thing: that one can do away with the frills and stick to
the thing in the centre. This centre, however, is occupied by an impoverished
understanding of the human form: divorced from the animal except in the
form of dependence, separated from the artificial except as technological
(rather than natural) evolution, distanced from any sort of hybridity except
as monstrous aberration, the human in the centre is a theoretical distillation
of such conceptual purity that one would be hard pressed to find anything
comparable in the real world.
So it is the environment that is expected to skip and turn while the central
theoretical construction, that of a purified human, remains imperiously
stable. There are two fundamental problems with this formulation. The most
obvious one is the implicit causality, where movement is understood as the
precondition of stability. To put it differently, the turn is needed in order for the
pivot to remain pivotal. The way the environment whirls around the human is
a precondition for human centrality, indeed a resource (to use the environ-
mental parlance when referring to the environment) for an adequate existence.
In the eye of the storm, there is quiet. But there is no connecting
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transgression between the two: human and non-human, human and resource,
human and nature. All mendacious dichotomies that betray a simplicity
in conceptualising human nature. Where does human end and natural
start? Where does technology begin being evolutionary? When are disasters
natural?
The other problem revealed in the etymology of the word environment is
the assumption of a centralised geography, one that understands the observer,
the utterer, the actor (in other words, the parameters of locating the mode of
locating) as the centre of the environment. The thematisation of the surround-
ings by the only one who has the linguistic ability to express difference
(namely man, in the fullest gendered bias of the term) is reminiscent of
Galileo’s trial, where the earth had to be torn out of the centre of the uni-
verse, leaving an unbearable absence for the religious system of the era.15 In
Galileo’s mind, the static centre was replaced by a movement. Eppur si
muove! ‘Yet it moves!’ For a brief moment, the turning has rolled over and
flooded the inside, making the latter collapse under its own gravitas. But,
even out of the ruins, a local universe was established in its proper syntax of
centre and surroundings: thus, ‘our’ anthropomorphic planets and ‘our’ sun.
Order restored and stability re-established, albeit in a celestial body nearby.
And with this example in mind, one looks for the centre.
But things are changing.16 Environmental considerations become integrated,
environmental law is claiming a field, the purity of the human is strongly
doubted. The environment is in a process of relocation, away from the per-
iphery as the surrounding frills, and right on the gesture of transgression
between human and natural. However, the reasons for the change may be
less benign, less ‘ecofriendly’ than one would hope. It is not as if environ-
mental law was born enlightened. It too has looked for its very own centre.
But the quest has yielded nothing but a void, or better, a series of questions.
Can the national valiantly occupy the centre? Would a move to the regional/
supranational/international prove more satisfying? Even more fundamen-
tally, is really law in the centre of environmental law? Could one not argue
with conviction that science, economy or even politics are in the centre of
environmental legal decisions? And what about the centrifugal pulls of
anthropocentricity and ecocentricity? The answer to these questions is
deceptively simple: none of the above moves is in itself satisfying. So what is
one left to do? Move away from the concept of the centre altogether. It is the
case that environmental law has been pulling itself off the grand delusion of
the centre from its very (non-)beginning, from the heart of its paradoxical
foundation. And this pulling away would have been much more obvious and
eventually successful if environmental law was not tied down to some traits
that seem to characterise every legal discipline, such as the need for systematic
unity, for binding decisions of the binary kind, for a reliable reproduction of
societal expectations, for consistency and constancy. But environmental law is
different from other legal disciplines, its nature inevitably oscillating between
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law and non-law (science, economy, politics, media), between knowability
and impossibility to know, between more or less risk, between present and
future generations. No doubt some of these idiosyncratic features can be
encountered in other legal disciplines too. However, their accumulation
brings about an intensification of uncertainty that renders environmental
law a truly sui generis discipline. One of the characteristics of such a nature,
therefore, is also environmental law’s inherent marginalisation of the concept
of the centre. Environmental law decentres the centre, responding to a new-
fangled and profoundly unsettling discovery: that whatever was thought
to occupy the centre around which the environment was required to turn
and twist has long departed, leaving behind a barren nostalgia. Hence envir-
onmental law’s simultaneous all-encompassing presence and disciplinary
emptiness.
The other reason for the change is the fragmentation of the environmental
subject. The artificiality of the division between human and natural as imposed
by natural disasters on the one hand and climate change, on the other, is
rapidly losing ground. At the same time, the traditional insistence on subject/
object distinction has been dramatically banalised by such ecological radical
thinking as Christopher Stone’s proposition that trees should have standing.17
To link it with the previous comments about the etymology of the term
‘environment’, the separation between movement and stability is no longer
impermeable. Environmental law has already observed the transgression
between external movement and internal stasis, between environmental
offering and human receiving. Again, this awareness is less ecologically driven
than necessity-dictated. Regardless, the changes are already taking place and
environmental law finds itself at a point of ‘turning’, of ‘environing’, as it
were, of spinning around itself in order to locate its new role, its function.
Perhaps the most advantageous (because of its anti-foundational effect) fea-
ture of environmental law over other legal disciplines is its unique position as
a ‘luxury’ item that comes decidedly after survival, development, economic
viability, etc., and simultaneously a matter of life or death in terms of
nuclear catastrophes, climate change and rising sea level, environmental
health, GMOs and so on. This superfluity and necessity seem to span pre-
cisely the scope of its action: environmental law is a law that, on the one
hand, looks into itself, its legal construction and identity as a system that
can be relied upon to produce consistent decisions; and, on the other, looks
outside itself, desperately trying to accommodate concepts, operations, geo-
graphies and temporalities that have never hitherto been part of any legal
description. Environmental law seems to be attempting to bridge the dis-
tance between the inside and the outside, stability and mobility, what is
being surrounded and what is around.
‘What is the line that separates the inside from the outside, the rumbling
of the wheels from the scream of the wolves?’18 asks Italo Calvino, in full
knowledge that the line is never anywhere to be found except on the other
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side, in a space of invisibility, absence, paradoxical coagulation. This is the
space of opportunity as well as responsibility. Environmental law is a major
potential tool for such an environmental revolution – because these changes
suggest nothing less than that. The way environmental law operates within
society (reversing, decentring, fragmenting) is already in itself an event of
transgression – and one can only hope that this is not a short-lived moment,
but one that will capitalise on its momentum and remain appropriately
destabilising. But such an opportunity brings along a foundational respon-
sibility. Not so much a responsibility for environmental action. That too, of
course. But fundamentally, this is a responsibility for a radical theoretical
reconfiguration of environmental law, one that will no longer rely on the old
semantics of environment as resource, of the human as centre, of the logo-
centric idolisation of public participation, of illusionary discursive consensus,
of causality proven and best means measured. Only a radical rethinking that
will distance itself from the above and live up to the challenge of environ-
mental degradation will bring the kind of environmental action that is
required, targeting the root rather than the symptom and assisting environ-
mental law in its crystallisation as a truly radical legal discipline. This,
I argue, is what Critical Environmental Law is about. I shall now approach a
discussion on how to conceptualise a Critical Environmental Law through the
theoretical tradition of autopoiesis.
2.4 The autopoiesis of environmental law
Autopoiesis means ‘self-creation’.19 The process is complemented by an ele-
ment of continuous self-generation. Autopoietic production is circular, and
the product is autopoiesis itself. Thus, life is autopoietic in that its produce is
further or more life. Although of biological beginnings,20 autopoiesis revo-
lutionised the sociological theoretical arena by applying itself to social sys-
tems, such as law, economy, politics, religion, and so on.21 Saying that law is
an autopoietic system manifests an indifference towards law’s beginnings,
with a consequent reluctance to engage in how, when or why law becomes
law. Likewise, to designate environmental law as an autopoietic system
embodies the urgent desire to deal with the present, the topology of ‘here’
and the responsibility that stems from such dealing. Indeed, in autopoiesis,
the most relevant moment is the present. All systems operate in the present.
The past is included in the form of memory while the future in the form of
expectations, both of which are exclusively present operations. At the same
time, the specific temporal focus dictates a spatial focus. The topology of
autopoiesis is a grounded, geographically expanded, material and corporeal
presence, with a strong sense of the uncertainty, multiplicity of directions and
disorientation that are brought in with the spatial discourse.22
In that sense there is no ‘historical’ foundation in autopoiesis, no centrality
from which everything originates, no necessary precondition (such as the
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human in the centre) for the existence of the system. But if there were one,
that would be the paradox. The autopoietic paradox is the distinction
between system and its outside. This outside in autopoiesis is called envir-
onment, and enables the system to define itself in contradistinction. So, at
least prima facie, the environment is whatever is not system. The autopoietic
system remains closed to its environment, in that the latter is a terra incog-
nita for the system, a space outside the limits of the self, the nest of a radical,
sometimes threatening sometimes simply indifferent otherness. The interest-
ing double entendre of the term should not go amiss. Just as environmental
law deals with an indefinable, rather vague and certainly uncontrollable
(natural) environment, in the same way an autopoietic system deals with an
(autopoietic) environment that is neither known nor knowable to the system.
The parallels are deeper than just terminological. Just as environmental
law’s foundational paradox of all-yet-nothing informs both the way the dis-
cipline is developed and the kind of theoretical elaboration pursued here, in
the same way an autopoietic system both is and is not a system. It has
nothing focal, central or fixed about it and its environment does not ‘turn’
around it. It is unfortunate that the term ‘system’ gives the impression of
systematicity, of normative promise and unfailing consistency, of a method,
itself systematic, that produces systematised units of formed boundaries. But
an autopoietic system is nothing of the sort.23 If, faithful to its etymology,
the term denotes a syn (‘together’) and histanai (‘to set up’, ‘to stand’), a
togetherness that has been set up (is this setting up arbitrary? and who has
set it up? itself ? without discernible origin?), an assemblage of sorts without
promise of future form, consistent boundaries, identifiable characteristics or
positive functions; if a system is a machine in the Deleuze–Guattari sense
that is nothing but connections and operations in a constant process of what
they call deterritorialisation, namely the becoming other than itself, always at
another stage which engulfs and is engulfed by its otherness:24 if a system is
all that, that is, if a system is not, then an autopoietic system is indeed a
system. Conversely, if as Derrida points out, ‘by “system” is meant … a sort
of consequence, coherence and insistence’,25 namely a continuation provided
by a responsibility to a fractal lucidity that always returns, then, again, an
autopoietic system is a system.
An autopoietic system, therefore, is an unpremeditated thrown-together of
events which become ‘solid’ and relatively permanent through repetition. It
is a snapshot of an eventful moment with a specific topology and limits,
which, however, are bound to change at the next snapshot opportunity. Like
an amoeba, a system spreads and contracts, every time including more or
less of its environment (and thus converting it into system) depending on the
situation. This is precisely how environmental law is to be conceptualised.
There is nothing central, focal or fixed in the concept and practice of envir-
onmental law. Rather, every act, process, piece of legislation or decision is
disrupted by the law’s environment, namely the conditions under which these
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are formed and the impossibility of knowing precisely those conditions. The
environment, both for autopoiesis and environmental law remains uncharted
and unknowable. Yet, or because of that, it embodies the object of desire for
the system, the tender protégé of environmental law which simultaneously is
the exploited field of cognitive and material expeditions for more raw matter,
more energy, more technology, more information. The environment brings
together (without ever managing to reconcile convincingly) the desire to
possess and the desire to protect against possession.
It is obvious from the above that the definitional ambiguity of the concept
of the environment can be explored in a parallel mode within both the eco-
logical and the autopoietic discourse. This is consolidated by the impossi-
bility of finding an exact location for the environment (in its double
meaning) in relation to the system (namely environmental law). Although
the environment is the system’s material object of ‘study’, it remains outside
the system. Although it remains outside the system, it helps define what a
system is from within the system. This can only be expressed in a paradox:
the environment nests both inside and outside the system, in a demonic
bilocality that irritates the system without declaring its topology, and con-
tributes to the autopoietic construction by planting an excess of uncertainty,
complexity and angst within the system. The irreducible ecological com-
plexity establishes in the system an increasing amount of uncertainty. What
is more, it is an uncertainty that does not have a traceable origin. If the
environment remains unknowable to the system, anything that comes from
the environment appears as a symptom of the system itself without traceable
external source. This recalls autopoiesis’s biological roots: on the level of
cells, any irritation from outside is perceived as internal symptom. In the
same vein, fever is the symptom through which we perceive that an organism
is reacting to an external virus. The same construction applies to environ-
mental law: the object of environmental law is its environment. Of course,
the environment is replicated inside the law, cut down in legal chunks that
can be swallowed by the system, reduced to a resource. Environmental law
does the best it can in order to manage, to control its environment. But even
then, in the fissures between the impossibility of fixing societal expectations,
the ever changing nature of the data involved, the ethical connotations of
any present decision, the future effects and the urgency of such decisions: even
then, environmental law is not immune to the effects of the uncontrolled
uncertainty that rushes in, a legal angst that no chopping up of the environment
in bite-size legal information can ever assuage.
It is obvious that such an insistent need for constant balancing cannot
produce fixity. On the contrary, ‘insistence leads to difference; that is, to the
impossibility of identification and totalization’.26 It produces the difference
between the system’s continuous attempt to describe itself and a continuous
interruption by its environment which establishes a permanent dysfunction in
the system: ‘this dysfunction not only interrupts the system but itself
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accounts for the desire of the system, which draws its élan from this very
disadjointment, or disjunction’.27 The system clings onto its environment
with a longing whose object is precisely the maintenance of this difference,
and renders this disjunction its beloved symptom. Indeed, this is the desire of
the system: to maintain its impossibility of ever becoming a ‘system’ (and on
the other extreme of desire, for ever to become its environment). In this
respect, the environment of the system is the system’s self-‘deconstruction’.
As Luhmann admits, ‘something always has to be left unsaid, thereby providing
a position from which to deconstruct what has been said’.28 The unsaid is
folded in the other side of the garrulous system, and at the same time within
the system itself.
2.5 Four critical autopoietic positions
Having explained albeit too briefly the autopoietic paradox and how it can
without a conceptual leap be applied to environmental law, I would now like
to present four basic positions of autopoietic theory that can inform the
present conceptualisation of environmental law. These positions further ela-
borate the ‘catching up’ necessities for environmental law as mentioned in
the opening section of this chapter, essentially bringing environmental law up
to date with some of the recent theoretical developments in humanities. This
I opt to do through the theory of autopoiesis, or at least my reading of it,
which is influenced by poststructuralism and post-ecologism. This reading
does differ from autopoiesis the way Niklas Luhmann has sketched it by
placing a differentiated focus on specific issues and processes. It is therefore
best to talk about a critical autopoiesis, which is better suited to deal with a
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First, autopoiesis is acentric. It specifically decentres the centre by displa-
cing its centrality to always another centre, itself debilitated by the rupturing
continuum between system and environment. This can be put in two ways:
on the one hand, the environment of the legal system consists of all other
social systems such as politics, media, economy, science, and so on. While
law sees an issue from its own legal perspective, the same issue is seen by
other systems in their respective perspective. Thus, the opening of a nuclear
power plant is as much a legal matter as it is an economic, political, media-
related matter. If the law looks into EIA and planning issues, economy will
look into national and regional effects, politics will look into local opposi-
tion and national interest, and so on. However, no one perspective is central,
since all complement each other. There is no überperspective that can deliver
the final judgement. Even if economics seems to be the flavour of the day, it
is still not able to decide unilaterally.29 The other way in which the autop-
oietic acentricity can be put is from the point of distinction between system
and environment. A system can be the centre of autopoiesis because it
includes within its boundaries its environment. This is the only way in which
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the system can address the challenges of its environment, since otherwise it
remains closed to it. The system reproduces a version of the environment but
in a way that it fits in with the system’s own understanding of possibilities.
Still, in being internalised by the system, the environment dilutes the system
from the inside, decentres it by demonstrating its own limits. The system
realises its impossibility to act, becomes conscious of its own limitations.
Second, autopoiesis de-individualises the individual. This is arguably the
greatest thorn of autopoietic theory. Social systems such as law, politics, etc.,
do not consist of human beings and their actions, but of anonymous, mechan-
ical processes that lie beyond the control of humans. Luhmann’s anti-humanist
gesture that seemingly degrades the human to a cog in society’s wheels is
quickly revealed to be a gesture of acentric pluralising. Thus, the non-divided
nature of the individual is mobilised under ‘more complex and less restrict-
ing’ conditions than those of systemic structure, based not on the liberal
conception of the individual’s abilities but on the freedom of ‘irrational and
immoral behaviour’.30 This seemingly odd reversal of freedom is nothing but
an antidote to the rigidity of social systems. It follows that any positioning of
agency that attempts to make a difference will have to take into account its
prior projection on to the empty canvas of systemic operations.31 This is
simultaneously more and less empowering than it sounds at first. It is more
empowering in that it frees the individual from the limitations of systemic
closure: only from such a position can the human factor be understood in its
relation to systems as a possible instance of resistance against the system. It
is less empowering in that it denudes agency from illusions of societal con-
trol: the structures that determine an individual’s fate is both inside the
individual (thus for example, capitalism can finally be moved firmly to the
level of desire, as Lyotard has suggested32) and well beyond her control. This
however complicates the frequent assertion of structures ‘controlling’ the
lives of individuals and makes the process both ambidirectional and deprived
of control: both guilt-free and guilt-ridden. Once this has been established, then
one can talk about, say, agency, protest movements or revolt as a way that
breaks into systems. But this will be already grounded on the de-individualising
multiplicity of the human.
Third, autopoiesis begins and carries on with difference. A system is not a
system but simply the arbitrary snapshot of an assemblage of processes at
the specific present moment. The next moment, the system will have internalised
a different chunk of its environment and will have expanded or contracted its
topology accordingly. Any attempt at essentialising what is a system is des-
tined to fail. Any beginning is arbitrary, any origin is constructed, any per-
spective is yet another, any boundary is fluctuating. On this shifting ground,
autopoiesis relies on the difference that every time makes the difference:
whether it is the always different boundary between system and environment,
the always different understanding of an issue depending on the systemic
perspective, or the always elusive nature of continuous self-generation which
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autopoiesis itself embodies, difference can never be reduced to an arbitrary
unity; and when it is, such as when the legal system must take a decision that
necessarily privileges one solution over the maintenance of difference, the
other possibilities remain contingent, for ever haunting the system from the
inside.33
Finally, autopoiesis discredits prescription. Luhmann keeps repeating that
autopoiesis only describes and can never prescribe. This is because it does
not have space for transcendence, for another utopian society, for a reality
where things are better. Autopoietic reality is what there is and everything,
from capitalism to communism to revolution to apathy, is inscribed in it. This
may sound unduly claustrophobic, but it delivers from the illusions of easy
solutions, facile impressions of control between systems, populist expecta-
tions for immediate change. Autopoiesis does not say that things do not
change. It simply says that they take much longer than currently politics
allows us to believe. Further, not only autopoiesis cannot instruct solutions
of influence, intervention and control, but it significantly trivialises prescrip-
tion. Autopoiesis remains conscious of the fact that it is just one description
amongst many. A fundamental tenet of the theory is the return to the
awareness of its contingency, of its temporal validity, of its finite innovative
potential and eventually its ability of being combined with other perspec-
tives.34 This insistence on returning to description means that any unfolding
of the paradox – autopoiesis’s most luscious object of desire – remains a
description orchestrated according to the means of the system in which the
paradox is unfolded.
To sum up, autopoiesis promotes a theoretical paradigm that is acentric,
fragmented, non-human centred, against delusions of facile solutions, control
or influence between systems, and always returning to a description of rea-
listic dimensions coupled with an awareness that it is only one theory amongst
others. This epistemological humility encourages the constant reassertion of
difference rather than unity and identity, and its continuous reconfiguration
in the face of environmental changes. In what follows, I attempt to ‘translate’
these in the language of environmental law, thus describing the way I see
environmental law’s evolving in the face of a fundamentally uncertain and
unknowable environmental reality.
2.6 Four critical environmental positions
An autopoietic description of environmental law builds precisely on the
ability of the theory to accommodate uncertainty. While this is readily
accommodated by mainstream environmental legal theory, it poses sig-
nificant issues when the mechanics of uncertainty extend to the traditional
bastions of legal unity, human agency, and perceived mission (rather than
function) of the environmental legal system. Thus, the four critical autopoietic
positions listed above are readily translated into what I call Critical
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Environmental Law: first, the autopoietic decentring of the centre, with its
consequent pluralist paradox of multiple thematising (non-)centres, is in
perfect accord with environmental law’s understanding as a multi-layered,
global, fragmented discipline, characterised by links that follow the trans-
boundary nature of pollution. The radical potential of an autopoietic descrip-
tion in this respect is the realisation that all these centres remain isolated
within their constructed difference with their environment – in other words,
from mere pluralism to a radical acentricity. Against the prevalent concept of
environmental interlinkages on the level of agents and actions, an autopoie-
tic description of environmental law throws into relief the closure and con-
sequently the miscommunication between the various centres by rendering
their boundaries visible. The effect of an acentric autopoietic description is
the abandonment of the paradigm of direct influence and intervention across
differentiated ecological spheres, and its replacement with an indirect eaves-
dropping on the other side’s mechanisms as part of the difference between
system and environment. This can lead to either an enhancement of the
applicability of the concept of ecological self-organisation,35 a more pluralist
network application,36 or indeed a search for other ways in which even the
concept of the environment as a whole should be formulated in order to
capture the elusive centrality of ecological considerations.
Second, the autopoietic displacement of the individual as an undivided
whole and its replacement with the difference between system and environ-
ment further contributes to the acentralisation of environmental thinking. It
does so by relinquishing the dry dualism between anthropocentric and eco-
centric legal protection and extending the blurring between the ‘natural’, the
‘human’ and the ‘artificial’ in line with biopolitical readings that point to
precisely this kind of fragmentation and reinstitute a post-humanist form of
continuum/rupture, referring variously to human/non-human nature, and to
the way in which these differences are conceptualised.37 The beginning of
this line of thought can be traced in deconstruction – thus Gayatri Spivak:
‘identity [is] disengaged in terms of who was and who was not human. That’s
why all these projects, the justification of slavery, as well as the justification
of Christianization, seemed to be alright; because, after all, these people had
not graduated into humanhood, as it were.’38 This has been transposed into
ecological thinking, with a pioneering ecofeminism, especially through the
writings of Val Plumwood and Catherine Merchant,39 whose ecocriticism of
pre-existing binarisms has had a measurable effect on feminist theory as a
whole. Thus, Donna Haraway has famously declared that ‘the boundary
between human and animal is thoroughly breached’ and cyborgs, oncomice
and coyotes are post-humanist dimensions of more traditional feminist
bodies that transcend the natural/cultural, organic/mechanical, physical/non-
physical and so on divides.40 In a non-dissimilar vein, although from a different
point of view, Bruno Latour talks about ‘hybrid networks’ between social,
informational and ecological systems,41 and the ‘pluriverse’ consisting of
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collectivities of humans and non-humans that redefine democracy as something
that can be found either side of the boundary.42 Likewise, Katherine Hayles’s
digital subjectivity is built on a discontinued and inherently unpredictable
conception of the human,43 while, closer to autopoietic things, Gunther
Teubner refers to the legal role of private actors, incidentally via the example
of rats.44 From a different perspective, Giorgio Agamben locates the homo
sacer, the bandit and the werewolf right there, on the threshold between
continuum and rupture: ‘what had to remain in the collective unconscious
as a monstrous hybrid of human and animal, divided between the forest
and the city – the werewolf – is, therefore, in its origin the figure of the man
who has been banned from the city … a threshold of indistinction and of
passage … who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to neither’.45
It is obvious that, in view of all this, Luhmann’s relegation of the human outside
the system opens up an avenue of differentiated but unprioritised inclusion of
the ‘natural’ (‘artificial’, ‘human’, and so on), the systemic reference to which
empties out a space of absence within the system that accommodates precisely
the impossibility of ever comprehending the environment.
Third, an autopoietic description can begin only with difference. The
initial problem may be that unity (ecosystemic, ecological, and so on) is a
staple starting point of the ecological discourse, in combination with a unifying
centre and a homeostatic goal.46 Autopoietic difference ruptures this con-
tinuum, both in terms of communication and temporalisation, and renders
any perspective (the ecological included) simply yet another perspective. The
awareness of ‘just another perspective’ is a deep trauma to ecological think-
ing which describes itself as the only available unity that can make a differ-
ence in the face of urgent environmental issues. Assuming one unitary
überperspective and messianically inviting society to follow, is something that
Luhmann could not easily accept, despite his arguably sympathetic position
to the ecological cause.47 Luhmann’s description includes the environmental
perspective but in a status always parallel to that of other positions, such as
the economic, the political and the scientific. This does not preclude prior-
itising one over others but entails a continuous awareness of other perspec-
tives and their way of internalisation of the ecological problem. The radical
contribution of autopoiesis to the environmental issue is the continuous
deferment of origin to further instances of difference, rather to a unitary
illusion of ecological harmony, often expressed in the form of community
nostalgia.48 At the same time, autopoiesis presents a system – in this case,
the environmental legal system – with an awareness of illusion of any identity
the system may construct for itself. This means that uncertainty becomes a
structural and constantly present inevitability rather than an invisibilised
externality in view of the illusion of identity.
Fourth, the autopoietic preference for description over prescription is yet
another indication of the awareness of limits and limitations of the various
systems. The overly prescriptive nature of environmental discourse, even in
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its legal theoretical aspect, urges towards a rushed search for short-term
solutions that misunderstands the capacities of the various systems involved
in the complexity of ecological protection. While environmental problems
are not discounted either by Luhmann,49 or indeed by this text, they are
contextualised within and through an acentric system (be this law, politics,
science, economy). In this sense, environmental problems are contextualised
but not relativised: each systemic description is compromised only by the
realisation of its own limitations that emerge in the system. In other words,
any prescription can only work from within the system, in full respect of
(and therefore, doubt, resistance, revolt against) the system’s limitations.
And this is where critique should be located. In the instant version of
Critical Environmental Law, critique is always from the inside, balancing on
the paradox between distance from and propinquity to the object of critique.
What is the object of critique of a Critical Environmental Law? And who is
to exert it in an acentric, non-human, almost non-systemic environmental
law? The two are interchangeable: the same processes that apply themselves
to a supposedly balanced protection of the environment, in the acentric,
cross-checking, non-definitive manner of autopoiesis, are the ones who both
criticise and are criticised. Critique can turn only towards itself, in a veritably
autopoietic twist, and criticise itself. Critical Environmental Law is a branch
of law that keeps on doubting its given nature as law – for what is law? And
how can law comprehend the tidal waves of environmental uncertainty that
push the system from all sides? Further, Critical Environmental Law keeps
doubting its conceptualisation of the environment. What is the natural? How
to differentiate between that and everything else? Indeed, why differentiate?
Who decides what is worth protecting? How much environmental ethics can
reasonably be internalised by the environmental legal system without the
latter losing its ‘legal’ affiliation? The above questions could not of course be
attempted within the ambit of the present text. But the seeds of doubt and
critique can be planted. The concept and practice of an environmental legal
responsibility are embodied precisely in the need to find an adequate theoretical
approach (and arguably not one but several, even contrasting and incompa-
tible) that will adequately address the environmental uncertainty with which
environmental law is required to deal.
The above perfunctory application of autopoiesis to environmental law
and ecological thinking at large seems to have the paradoxical effect of
‘dispersing’ and ‘diluting’ environmental values while reasserting systemic
limits and limitations. Although they may initially seem contrary to some of
the basic tenets of current ecological thought,50 they represent a way for
a potentially more efficient environmental protection which relies on societal
internalisation of the environment in a way that simultaneously ‘debilitates’
the notion of environment and reinforces the awareness of systemic limitations
such as law, politics or economy. Let me, therefore, sum up epigrammatically
the reasons for which an autopoietic approach to environmental law
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is justified: first, autopoiesis is an adequately complex theory to describe
the complexity of a newly emerging yet highly technical legal discipline;
second, autopoiesis conceptualises systems in a grounded way that, while
describing potentialities, marks systemic limitations. This is particularly
relevant to a system, like environmental law, whose object is constantly
redefined in ways in which the system has no control over. Third, the
autopoietic mistrust towards prescriptions that encourage control and inter-
vention is particularly apposite to an otherwise aggressively abused branch
of the legal system, whose services are variously internalised in order to fit
in with more pronounced priorities, such as economics or politics. This
does not mean that autopoiesis can change the way legal reality is, but
merely the way it is understood and contextualised. And finally, by plunging
in and out of the particularity of systemic perspectives, autopoietic abstrac-
tion enables the interdisciplinarity that is needed for any adequate descrip-
tion of environmental law.
Notes
1 Tarlock, 2004: 217.
2 Beck, 1999.
3 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 1999.
4 See Pottage, in this volume.
5 There are several texts that deal with the issue, some (e.g., Delaney, 2003; Teubner
et al., 1994; Gillespie, 2002; Halsey, 2006; Holder andMcGillivray, 2001; Stallworthy,
2008) more successfully than others. Still, they do not amount to a critical mass,
namely a mass that can confidently question itself.
6 Smith, 1994: 1079; see also Richardson and Wood, 2006.
7 The concept originates in international law – another discipline which, even at
this stage, is failing to fix expectations normatively. According to Teubner, 1996,
lex mercatoria is another form of soft law, hence his and his contributors’ efforts
to amplify its autopoietic ambit.
8 Flournoy, 1994.
9 See Carolan, 2008.
10 Tarlock, 2004: 220.
11 Murphy, 1997: 161.
12 Farber, 1994: 791.
13 Luhmann, 2004.
14 Originally, the word ‘environmentalism’ was meant to contribute to the nature v.
nurture debate. See http://www.etymonline.com.
15 Serres, 1995, for an account of the trial from an environmental point of view.
16 Holder and McGillivray, 2001.
17 Stone, 1974.
18 Calvino, 1993: 33, my translation.
19 From the Greek words auto, which means ‘self ’, and poiesis, which means ‘creation’.
The term was coined by Maturana and Varela, 1972.
20 Maturana and Varela, 1972.
21 Luhmann, 1995, 2004; Teubner, 1993.
22 This is a reading of autopoiesis rather than Niklas Luhmann’s more traditional
understanding. See Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2009.
34 Law and ecology
23 See also Schwanitz, 1995, for a comparison with Derrida.
24 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987.
25 Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 3.
26 Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 4.
27 Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 4.
28 Luhmann, 1993: 769.
29 An epiphenomenon of this acentrity is the theory’s polycontexturality, namely the
pluralist multiplication of function centres whose centrality is consistently displaced
through parallel interweaving of isolated contextures, first by their context,
namely their environment, and second (which is simply another level of the first)
by other ‘centres’. See Günther, 1973.
30 Luhmann, 1995: 212.
31 See Paterson, 1996.
32 Lyotard, 1993.
33 This is what I have called the waste of the system, which, just like material waste,
becomes accumulated and obstructs society with its expanding uselessness, in the
same way autopoietic waste remains within the system as the memory of forget-
ting. See my Absent Environments, 2007.
34 An example of this is the autopoietic flirtation with deconstruction, regularly
appearing in the folds of Luhmann’s texts, and frequently pointed out and
explored by commentators: Teubner, 2001, 2009; Fuchs, 2001; Stäheli, 2000;
Moeller, 2006; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2009; to some extent, Ladeur, 1995.
35 Teubner et al., 1994.
36 Ladeur, 1994.
37 See Foucault’s, 2003, monsters, and indicatively see further Ruddick, 2004;
Sharpe, 2007; Braidotti, 2006.
38 Spivak, 1991: 229.
39 Plumwood, 1993; Merchant, 1980.
40 Haraway, 2004: 32.
41 Latour, 1993; for a contextualisation of hybridity see Grabham, 2006.
42 Latour, 2004.
43 Hayles, 2005.
44 Teubner, 2006; see also Baxi, 2007, especially 197 ff., for rights and the posthuman.
45 Agamben, 1998: 105.
46 To a large extent influenced by open systems theory, e.g., Odum, 1971; see also
Blühdorn, 2000.
47 Luhmann, 1989.
48 See my dealings with ecological community in 2007: chapter 5.
49 As King and Thornhill, 2003: 194, note, the motivation behind Luhmann’s ecological
engagement can be said to have been ‘a sincere and deeply felt concern for the
predicament of the planet and the future of humankind’.
50 The implications of the connection are explicitly demonstrated in Blühdorn, 2000.
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Chapter 3
Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis
A contribution to critical environmental law
scholarship?
Bettina Lange
3.1 What is critical environmental law scholarship?
This chapter1 suggests that Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis – a
theoretical framework and set of empirical research techniques – can further
develop critical environmental law scholarship.2 Critical environmental law
scholarship is not a unified, hegemonic project. It is informed by and con-
tributes to the development of various theory fragments, drawing, for
instance, on Marxism, feminism3 and post-colonialism.4 It does not seek to
build one grand overarching social or legal theory.
If one were to categorise the research that has contributed to the develop-
ment of critical environmental law scholarship, two main strands stand out.
First, critical environmental law scholarship has built on the critical legal
studies (CLS) tradition5 that provides external critiques of the foundations of
liberal legal theory and thus some of the key instrumentalist and ideological
claims of environmental law.6 For instance, from a Marxist CLS perspective
it is questionable whether the main purpose of environmental law is to pro-
tect the natural environment, or whether its key function is to legitimise
capitalist relations of production based on the exploitation of nature by
reining in the pollution side effects of unsustainable economic growth. CLS
also provides a critical gloss on the nature of environmental law. It critiques
its reification, i.e. the idea that existing environmental legal relationships are
inevitable, natural, material, and pre-given rather than socially constructed.7
Moreover, CLS suggests that environmental law cannot be conceived of as a
coherent, stable and principled body of law that consists of determinate, clear
and specific legal obligations. For every legal principle a counter-principle
can be found. For instance, while the polluter pays principle suggests that
the costs of damaging environmental impacts should be borne by those who
cause them, the precautionary principle may require that state subsidies are
paid to polluting companies in order to prevent environmental impacts.
These contradictions within legal doctrine are considered to flow from the
fundamental tensions at the heart of liberal political theory: citizens’ freedom
is both facilitated but also threatened by their relations with other citizens.8
Hence, a CLS perspective that searches for alternative, egalitarian9 visions of
democratic governance can inform critical environmental law accounts that
highlight the distributional impacts of pollution and the legal rules that seek to
control it as well as the social justice aspirations of sustainable development.10
Second, critical environmental law scholarship has also built on socio-legal
studies. They provide internal critiques that question in detail law’s own specific
and partial constructions of the social world on the basis of empirical data11
and social theory.12 Socio-legal studies thus question the gap between ‘the
rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ of environmental law while often taking legal concepts
and doctrine as the starting point for their research.13 Hence, socio-legal
analysis has highlighted that not just the formal legal rules, but also the
micro-dynamics of interactions between various actors in environmental law,
such as regulators and regulated as well as citizens shape the meaning and
consequences of environmental law obligations.14
While some critical legal scholars have criticised socio-legal studies for
borrowing concepts from other disciplines, for instance through the ‘law and
psychology’, ‘law and economics’ or ‘law and anthropology’ approaches,15
this interdisciplinary orientation of socio-legal studies16 is particularly relevant
for further developing critical environmental law scholarship. Various neigh-
bouring social science disciplines can help to analyse the specific contexts in
which law, including environmental law, operates, such as the mind, markets
and community. The contexts can act as constraints but also facilitators of
environmental legal regulation. Hence, the interdisciplinary orientation of
socio-legal studies enables to perceive limits to the instrumental use of law. It
also helps to answer the question what type of environmental legal rules are
most appropriate for addressing specific environmental problems. For
instance, transaction cost analysis can inform choices – with reference to the
criterion of allocative efficiency – between different legal concepts, such as
negligence or strict liability torts, statutory environmental standards or
trading schemes – that all seek to internalise the costs imposed by the nega-
tive externality of pollution. Hence, socio-legal studies add another layer of
critical analysis that draws on social science techniques in order to question
how environmental law constructs and sometimes regulates the social world.
They therefore complement CLS which focuses on the poverty of liberal
legal theory as the main ideological lens through which to conceive of social
relations in the modern polity, including its environmental law.
But critical environmental law scholarship can be defined not just through
reference to the two strands of legal critique that have contributed to its
development, critical and socio-legal studies. It can also be defined through
reference to a core set of questions that it seeks to address. First, it inquires
into how environmental law stabilises or disrupts existing social orders. For
instance, critical environmental law scholarship askswhat systems of production
and consumption are maintained or challenged through environmental law
rules. How does environmental law contribute to the exercise of power in
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contemporary society? Who benefits and loses from environmental law’s
allocation of private rights and liabilities, public powers and duties? Critical
environmental law scholarship thus can also contribute to debates about new
modes of governance.17
Asking questions about the relationship between environmental law and
social order can also involve rethinking key building blocks of social theo-
retical analysis, such as space and time. For instance, critical environmental
law scholarship has drawn on legal geography in order to understand how
environmental ‘regulatory space’18 and geographical space transform each
other.19 New insights into the acceleration and extension of social orders
over time and space are provided by accounts of international environmental
law.20 For instance, carbon trading regimes extend social relations over space
by setting up economic exchange relationships that span different parts of
the developed and developing world. But this expansion of social relations
over greater distances through globalising environmental law, and its foster-
ing of ‘interconnectedness’ on a global scale, are balanced by advocacy of
‘localism’ through environmental law. An example of the latter are argu-
ments for the management of local natural resources by citizens who live
close to them, for example through ‘river basin democracy’, and nuisance
actions, i.e. rights of litigation for neighbouring landowners in cases of
environmental damage.21
A second core question addressed by critical environmental law scholar-
ship is whether key tenets of liberal legal theory provide valid assumptions
for understanding environmental law. A belief in the autonomy of law, in
particular the separation of law from a political sphere, and a belief that
environmental justice flows from adherence to the rule of law, are ques-
tioned. Hence, critical environmental law scholarship develops a contextual
understanding which traces intersections between politics, economics and the
law.22 It also draws attention to the ambiguous role of private property in
environmental protection. While the protection of private property rights
underpins nuisance actions and emissions trading which have made an
important contribution to environmental protection, it is also a significant
obstacle to the development of interventionist public law powers that restrict
private property rights of corporations and individuals for the purposes of
environmental regulation.
Thirdly, critical environmental law scholarship asks how existing social
orders can be transformed in order to achieve more sustainable forms of
living. It therefore highlights that the social orders which environmental law
stabilises are not universal, objectively given, transhistorical or unalterable.
Instead, by mobilising the sociological imagination both for analysis and
critique, critical environmental law scholarship reminds us that existing
social orders can be transformed. Some critical environmental law scholar-
ship thus links to political thinking about green utopias.23 Having outlined
key elements of critical environmental law scholarship the next section will
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explore the contribution of Foucault’s ideas about power/knowledge and
agency to this academic project.
3.2 Foucault on power/knowledge and agency: a new
framework for thinking about key analytical problems
in environmental regulation?
There is a small but growing environmental law literature that draws on
Foucault’s radical critique of modernist conceptions of human agency, law
and power.24 This section argues that Foucault’s ideas on power/knowledge and
agency provide an innovative framework for thinking about two key analy-
tical problems in environmental regulation. The first concerns difficulties
in identifying who actually is an ‘actor’ in environmental regulation and
whether postmodernist or modernist perspectives can best account for
agency in environmental regulation. On the one hand, environmental law
empowers social actors, for instance through the granting of formal legal
rights and powers. But, on the other hand, it is often difficult to know who
actually is an ‘actor’, given that economic and political structures in which
environmental regulatory regimes are embedded can restrain agency. A
modernist structure–agency dualism seems to be, for instance, appropriate to
capture the activities of large corporations which appear to break with
impunity environmental law standards, as in the case of the oil trading
company Trafigura that dumped illegally toxic waste in the Ivory Coast and
sought injunctions to stop media outlets, including the Guardian newspaper
and the BBC from reporting on the matter.25 A modernist conception of
agency pits environmental NGOs against corporations and governments that
carry out environmentally damaging activities.26 Environmental legal actors
are either powerful or powerless. Their agency is an innate quality of their
existence as well as restrained or facilitated by economic, political and legal
structures. But such a modernist understanding of agency seems increasingly
limited for analysing agency in environmental regulation. Agency is often
dispersed within a network of environmental actors rather than simply located
inside of corporate, public or individual legal actors. Contemporary envir-
onmental regulation is often characterised as network governance with
agency being hardly visible and becoming decentred.27
Foucault’s work can capture some features of the changing nature of
agency in environmental regulation. His work goes beyond phenomenological
approaches to agency, that refer to social actors’ ideas and motivations which
then become translated into specific behaviour. From a Foucauldian per-
spective human consciousness and its interpretative processes are no longer
core to an analysis of how social actors understand the social world and how
they act within it. Organisational forms (i.e. a public body or corporation
that become involved in environmental regulation) cannot illuminate or
obscure who is an ‘actor’ in environmental regulation; rather, it is discourses
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that now become central sites for understanding agency. Defined as historically
contingent fields of knowledge expressed in talk and text, discourses construct
agency.28 They include ‘frames and cognitive schemata’.29 Discourse is not
determined by the characteristics of an objective, separate world. In the
absence of a correspondence theory of truth, it is rules of discourse them-
selves that enable speakers to generate statements and objects of discourse.
Hence, agency is no longer the expression of a creative, autonomous subject.30
It is neither pre-given, nor inherent in social actors. Discourses both enable
agency and restrict what can be thought and said about a topic at a particular
point in history. The construction of agency is one of the effects of the power
of discourses as illustrated by the following example.31
It has been argued that information asymmetries can help to explain why
regulated companies can exercise significant power in their relationship with
environmental regulatory authorities.32 The regulated often know more than
the regulator about the technical details of their operations. But by themselves
information asymmetries cannot explain why some actors are more influential
in shaping the formation and implementation of environmental regulation
than others. It is only because engineering and environmental science dis-
courses are dominant that information asymmetries can become influential,
for instance in negotiations over conditions in site licences issued for indus-
trial installations under the Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention
and Control (IPPC) (2008/1/EC). According to Article 12 (a) of the IPPC
Directive, ‘techniques’, for the purposes of the ‘best available techniques’ stan-
dard, include not just the hardware of an installation but also its systems for
managing the installation, such as staff training, management structures and
maintenance routines. But in practice IPPC licences focus on conditions that
regulate the technical aspects of the installation.33 The dominance of engi-
neering and environmental science discourses among regulators and regulated
is one reason for the limited exploration of how approaches to staff man-
agement may contribute to enhanced environmental performance of instal-
lations. For instance, greater participation in decision-making by employees
may enhance perceived levels of responsibility for environmental protection
and thus reduce accident rates. When engineering and environmental science
discourses are dominant in framing interactions between regulated and reg-
ulators information asymmetries, i.e. the unequal distribution of technical
knowledge about the regulated installation, will have a bearing on who can
exercise what degree of agency during the negotiation of environmental
obligations.34 Hence Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis provides an
opportunity to transcend essentialist conceptions of legal actors. Instead
individuals are perceived as subjects who are constituted within discursive
structures which can be subject to change.35
Moreover, Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis can also address a
second core analytical issue in environmental regulation, the ambiguous
status of scientific knowledge in environmental regulation. This ambiguity
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flows from the association of scientific knowledge with potentially contradictory
tendencies in environmental regulation. On the one hand, environmental law
increasingly relies on scientific knowledge. Yet, on the other hand, citizens’
trust in science is declining.36 Moreover, reliance on science in environmental
legal decision-making is often considered to reflect unresolved contradictions
between, on the one hand, a scientific, technocratic and, on the other hand,
a democratic approach to environmental governance.37 But the science–
democracy dichotomy may be misleading and, in fact, different conceptions
of public administration informed by varying visions of what constitutes a
‘good’ and ‘just’ constitutional order may be the source of tensions between
different roles for science in environmental regulation.38
Foucault’s ideas on power/knowledge provide a lens through which this
ambiguous status of scientific knowledge in environmental legal decision-
making can be understood. From a Foucauldian perspective, the status
of scientific knowledge is ambiguous because scientific discourses are impli-
cated in power relations. In fact for Foucault there is a dialectical relation-
ship between power and knowledge because power plays a role in the
production of knowledge, and power relations ‘produce the truths we live
by’.39 A Foucauldian perspective therefore questions a reified conception of
science which generates expectations of a clear role for scientific knowledge
in environmental regulation. Instead it generates rich, detailed descriptions
of the variety of different scientific discourses40 that are actually invoked
in environmental legal decision-making, including the silences of scientific
knowledge that arise from a lack of scientific certainty or simply lack of sci-
entific knowledge in the regulation of environmental problems. From a
Foucauldian perspective there is not one unified conception of scientific
knowledge. Rather, different scientific knowledges produce different effects
of power. For instance, abstract, applied and advocacy knowledge can be
distinguished. Advocacy science such as scientific claims mobilised in
support of particular lines of argument, produce different effects of power
than undisputed scientific facts.41 Hence, Foucauldian-inspired discourse
analysis seeks to understand the effects of power of discourses by uncovering
the detailed practices, tactics and strategies of scientific knowledges. Dis-
courses generate effects of power, for instance by stabilising and fixing par-
ticular systems of meaning and thus closing off alternative ways of thinking
about or discussing a particular issue.42 Laclau and Mouffe who have further
developed Foucault’s ideas on power/knowledge suggest that hegemony is
exercised by determining the identities of objects and social practices
in specific ways.43 But the fixing of meaning is never complete because a
social sphere in which relational meaning is established is always open.44
To summarise, Foucault’s emphasis on discourse enables to think differently
about agency and power/knowledge, which helps to address two core analy-
tical problems in environmental regulation, how to account for decentred
and obscured agency in increasingly networked forms of environmental
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governance and how to explain the ambiguous role of scientific knowledge in
environmental regulation.
But in order to argue that Foucault’s ideas about agency and power/
knowledge can address – from a critical perspective – key analytical pro-
blems in environmental regulation, it is also necessary to rebut concerns
about his wide conception of discourse. Foucault’s notion of discourse has
been criticised as being too amorphous and therefore as difficult to oper-
ationalise for empirical research and as having limited explanatory power.
This criticism can be addressed in two ways. First, in Foucault’s work itself
discourse is bounded and anchored into ‘social reality’ by being related to
non-discursive practices, including institutions. Some commentators have
detected a narrowing in Foucault’s conception of discourse from his earlier
archaeological analysis of madness, the clinic and scientific discourses, to his
later genealogical work.45 In his genealogical accounts of power and the
development of the power/knowledge concept in the 1970s, he perceives dis-
course as less self-contained and inquires into how discourses are shaped by
non-discursive practices.46 For instance, non-discursive practices can struc-
ture the conditions for the production of statements, that are key elements of
discourses.47 Moreover, the concept of discourse starts to take more concrete
shape by being related to institutions. Institutions appear in Foucault’s ana-
lysis as institutional sites from which discourses are enunciated. The rules for
the formation of discourse vary according to the particular institutional sites
from which discourses emanate.48 These institutional sites help to generate
discourses because there is no longer a humanist subject that speaks or
writes discourses. These institutional sites are understood in post-structuralist
terms. Hence they are not fixed stable social structures, or ‘unified subjects’49
that fulfil specific functions or result from transhistorical forces, such as the
state. Institutions – mediating the discursive exercise of power – also feature
in Foucault’s definition of governmentality:
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections,
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit
very complex, power that has the population as its target, political
economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as
its technical instrument.50
(Emphasis added)
Second, recent perspectives on discourse developed in the context of political
science research into governance and regulation seek to rein in an amor-
phous concept of discourse by further developing the idea that discourses are
framed by institutions. This entails, however, being less true to Foucault’s
postmodernist vision of discourse. Schmidt and Radaelli’s ‘discursive institu-
tionalism’51 reverts back to a linguistic understanding of discourse, defining it
in terms of ‘language, narrative or communicative action’,52 including
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ideational elements such as ‘values’ and ‘policy ideas’.53 Their account renders
an understanding of how discourse accomplishes social action more specific
by tying it to the operation of institutional forces in social life. They paint a
subtle picture of a dialectical relationship between institutions and dis-
courses. They suggest that institutions shape the contents of discourse, what
people talk about, but also the communicative processes through which dis-
course is mobilised, i.e. who can talk to whom, for instance during public
policy-making.54 Institutions are defined widely, not just as organisational
structures, but as including the rules that arise from specific cultures and
that are path-dependent and interest-based, yet can be subject to change.55
Different political-institutional settings frame discourse differently.56 But
discourses can also stabilise or transform institutional frameworks.
Their argument, however, seems a little unclear once one looks at the
potential mediating role of ideas in this dialectical relationship between
institutions and discourses. On the one hand, ideas seem to be part of dis-
courses. They ‘constitute policy narratives, discourses and frames of reference’
which can help actors to redefine their interests and redirect their actions
within institutions.57 But ideas also seem to take on a more free-floating,
independent role because they are perceived as capable of ‘redefining eco-
nomic interests’ and ‘reconfiguring interest-based political coalitions’ in their
own right.58 To summarise, while it is possible to address criticisms that
Foucault’s conception of discourse is too wide, in particular by linking the
operation of discourses to institutions, it is still necessary to address criti-
cisms that Foucault’s work can not account for the role of law in modernity,
in order to make a case that his ideas contribute to the development of critical
environmental law scholarship.
3.3 Can Foucault’s work provide a framework for
understanding modern environmental law?
It has been suggested that Foucault’s work hardly accounts for the role
of law in modernity. One of the most persuasive and recent rebuttals of
this criticism by Golder and Fitzpatrick59 argues that those who criticise
Foucault for neglecting the role of law in modernity have misunderstood
his conception of law.60 This section builds on Golder’s and Fitzpatrick’s
argument, though it is sceptical of their suggestion that Foucault’s work
can be interpreted as placing law at the centre of social bonds in the post-
modern society. This section argues that Foucault’s work provides for an
understanding of law that is particularly suited to develop critical environ-
mental law scholarship, through its emphasis on norms and its critique of
instrumental law.
Foucault’s analysis of law in modernity has been criticised in various ways.
It has been suggested that Foucault associated state law wrongly mainly with
what he calls the ‘classical age’ (1650–1800) and that his notion of law is too
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narrowly focused on repressive state law. He is also thought to have insuffi-
ciently theorised law in modernity, because his work, such as Discipline and
Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality points to the
declining significance of regulatory state law.61 From the eighteenth century
onwards – according to Foucault – bio-power, exercised over whole popula-
tions, also with the aid of knowledge produced by the modern social sci-
ences, takes over as the main form of regulation. It relies also on
individualising and normalising disciplinary powers62 exercised mainly over
the body.63 Hence, at the very least, Foucault decentres law by turning it
simply into one among a range of governance techniques.64
But this decentring of formal state law chimes with trends in con-
temporary environmental regulation where state law ‘command and control’
regulation is just one among a range of regulatory techniques, that increas-
ingly involve private actors and non-law tools, such as environmental man-
agement standards and codes of conduct. More importantly, Foucault’s
concept of ‘norms’ provides new ideas about intersections between law and
a social sphere, and constitutes a new angle for critiquing instrumental
conceptions of law.
According to Golder and Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s conception of law has
two facets. It can, firstly, be determinate but, secondly, also responsive to its
environments.65 From this perspective, law cannot be pinned down in a specific
location but oscillates between a space of determinate meaning, on the one
hand, and openness towards a range of other, including disciplinary, techniques
of power, on the other hand. This further develops CLS’s idea that law is
radically indeterminate, and turns this into an empirical issue, rather than
just a theoretical assumption. According to Foucault, state law can have
many facets and being sometimes determinate is one of them.
Hence, Foucault suggests that in modernity law operates more and more
as a norm and assumes regulatory functions that are exercised through
administrative, bureaucratic apparatuses. François Ewald’s interpretation of
Foucault’s work further pursues this line of argument. Ewald considers law
and norms as interdependent. He suggests that normalisation also draws on
legislative schemes, and law often formulates bureaucratic norms that ‘qua-
lify, measure, appraise and hierarchize’.66 This ‘social law’67 no longer relies
on abstract, universal principles.68 What is legal or illegal is defined with
reference to notions of ‘social normality’, derived from the customs and
habits of a given social group at a particular moment in time.69 Hence the
law becomes a politicised instrument of government and plays a significant
role in resolving conflicts about the allocation of resources and access
to political decision-making.70 Norms are grounded in society itself, not in
a ‘fixed, transcendent’ sphere of values.71 They ultimately reflect society’s
relationship with itself.
This understanding of ‘norms’ chimes well with contemporary environmental
law, in which not just environmental principles matter. The bulk of statutory
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pollution control regimes for instance, is made up of technology norms that
refer to a ‘norm’, such as ‘the best available techniques’ or ‘best practice’
environmental management standards. Ewald’s interpretation of Foucault’s
ideas about law also provides a basis from which to critique the significant
reliance on technology, management and scientific norms in environmental
law. Their limitation in driving behavioural change flows from the theoretical
assumption in Ewald’s work, i.e. that they are socially embedded. They describe
rather than prescribe behaviour in relation to environmental obligations.
Moreover, Golder’s and Fitzpatrick’s conception of Foucault’s law as
relational provides a new angle from which to criticise instrumental conceptions
of law, a staple of socio-legal studies and a key element of critical environ-
mental law scholarship. Golder and Fitzpatrick suggest that Foucault’s law is
not just a determinate and contained entity, but is also ‘illimitable’ and thus
responsive to what lies outside current legal propositions. It is open to
transformation.72 To recognise law as being open to a social sphere is a well-
worn claim of socio-legal studies. But Foucault’s perspective adds a twist
because he understands a ‘social sphere’ in postmodernist terms as a ‘space
of dispersion’73 that opens society up to the possibility of alternative social
formations.74 This is different from a modernist conception of a social sphere
as bounded, stratified and structured. Foucault’s account allows law to
become an instrument of a range of powers, but through its responsive
nature, including resistance to various forms of power, law is also always in
flux and open to change, which prevents it from being deployed in a strategic
and instrumental manner.
To summarise, the criticism that Foucault has insufficiently considered the
role of law in modernity can be rebutted. In fact his work provides for an
innovative conception of norms, law’s openness to a social sphere and its
limited instrumentality. Most importantly, his ideas point to the significance
of empirical research for developing critical accounts of law. Hence the next
section analyses administrative authorisation procedures for transgenic agri-
cultural products in the European Union on the basis of Foucauldian-inspired
discourse analysis.
3.4 Analysing environmental authorisation
procedures through the lens of Foucauldian-inspired
discourse analysis
There are many types of discourse analysis75 and many interpretations of
Foucault’s ideas and hence there is not just one specific meaning of ‘Foucauldian-
inspired discourse analysis’. I use the term ‘Foucauldian-inspired discourse
analysis’ in order to refer to a loose theoretical framework that is also asso-
ciated with a set of empirical research techniques. It is therefore an approach
rather than a specific methodology. Foucault himself did not intend to
develop a unified grand social theory or a systematic methodology.76 He
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sought to develop analytical accounts of the operation of power that are
situated in particular local social practices.
One of the key features of Foucauldian in comparison to other types of dis-
course analysis is its anti-realist stance. It works with a performative under-
standing of language where linguistic expressions of discourse do not just
represent the social world but actively construct it. Meaning arises from differ-
ences between terms, such as science and politics, and not as the result of any
correlation between linguistic terms and objects located ‘out there in a real
social world’, such as a political system or ‘science’.77 Hence, Foucauldian-
inspired discourse analysis does not seek to explain discourse with reference
to underlying social structures, such as material conditions, or power relations,
that are considered to be obscured by discourse. In fact discourse analysis
marginalises social structures in its analysis and even fragments the very
idea of a social structure78 in line with poststructuralist fluid conceptions
of social structures.79 But whether and how Foucauldian-inspired discourse
analysis can contribute to the development of critical environmental law
needs to be analysed also with reference to specific fields of environmental
regulation. The next section therefore seeks to apply some of Foucault’s ideas
to an analysis of EU authorisation procedures for transgenic agricultural
products.
3.4.1 A critical account of EU authorisations for transgenic
agricultural products: from democratic deficits to disciplining
emotion discourses
Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis can help to identify an interesting
research puzzle in relation to the administrative authorisation of transgenic
agricultural products in the EU. So far critical accounts have focused on the
political structures underpinning EU GMO authorisations and their glaring
democratic deficit.80
According to Regulation 1829/2003/EC81 and Directive 2001/18/EC82
transgenic agricultural products, such as genetically modified (GM) seeds,
plants as well as human food stuffs and animal feed, imported into the EU
from third countries or produced within the EU, need to be authorised in
order to be sold or legally released into the environment. Directive 2001/18/
EC and Regulation 1829/2003/EC provide administrative authorisation pro-
cedures for this purpose. Both pieces of EU legislation seek to protect human
health and the environment, with Regulation 1829/2003/EC pursuing also
the protection of animal health, consumer interests and the functioning of
the internal market. Scientific discourses are key to the assessment of the
risks posed by transgenic agricultural products in these authorisations.83 At
the heart of these scientific discourses are a risk assessment of the genetically
modified organism carried out by the applicant biotech company which is
evaluated in a separate report by a national competent authority under
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Directive 2001/18/EC or a safety assessment carried out by the European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) under Regulation 1829/2003/EC.
Both Regulation 1829/2003/EC and Directive 2001/18/EC distinguish
between a first scientific phase of risk assessment and a second political
phase concerned with risk management. Risk management decisions are
taken by a Regulatory Comitology Committee. But in particular in relation to
authorisations under Directive 2001/18/EC member states do not arrive within
the required time-limit of three months at qualified majorities because they are
split in their support for and opposition to transgenic agriculture. Moreover,
some member states abstain from voting in response to national public opinion
being opposed to GMO agriculture. If member states cannot achieve quali-
fied majorities in the Regulatory Committee or the Council, the decision
about the authorisation of a specific transgenic agricultural product reverts
back to the Commission.84 Hence, the Commission becomes the final deci-
sion-maker in relation to its own proposal for the release of a transgenic
agricultural product. In most of the so far authorised GMO products85 the
Commission has put forward and decided upon its own proposals about the
authorisation of transgenic agricultural products.
This democratic deficit is further compounded by the fact that provisions
for public participation at the EU level in GMO authorisations are weak.
The legally non-binding preamble 46 to Directive 2001/18/EC suggests that
EU citizens’ comments should be taken into account when the Commission
proposes a draft decision on the GMOapplication to the Regulatory Committee.
Regulation 1829/2003/EC does not spell out how EU citizens’ comments, for
instance on EFSA’s scientific opinion should be taken into account in Com-
mission draft decisions. Article 7 (1) of the Regulation enables the Commis-
sion to consider ‘any other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under
consideration’ and this may well include EU citizens’ comments. But the
Regulation does not impose a duty upon the Commission to consider EU
citizens’ comments when making its draft decision.
These legitimacy problems become apparent through a macro-level analysis
of the formal EU legal framework and the political dynamics underpinning
EU GMO authorisations. But an examination of EU GMO authorisations
on a micro-level through a Foucauldian lens opens up a different perspective
and enables to trace more subtle democratic deficits. They involve privileging
some and marginalising other discourses that frame arguments for and
against the authorisation of transgenic agricultural products. In particular
emotion discourses based on trust that affirm science-based legal regulation
are privileged, while emotion discourses that mobilise fear about the impacts
of transgenic agricultural products as well as emotion discourses that appeal
to empathy with those who may benefit from transgenic agriculture are side-
lined. These emotion discourses matter, even though scientific discourses about
the risks posed by transgenic agricultural products to human health and the
environment that rely on experimental data derived from field trials and lab
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tests on animals, are at the heart of EU GMO authorisations. From a
descriptive perspective, emotion discourses can be defined as talk and text
and thereby knowledge – generated as part of submissions in EU GMO
authorisations – that draws on emotion terms. Hence, emotions are analysed
as the topics and concerns of talk, not as its causes.86
For instance, EU citizens’ comments on EFSA scientific opinions contain
the following emotion terms: ‘Frankenstein foods’, ‘superweeds’ and ‘super-
pests’ as well as ‘suicide seeds’ in order to refer to sterile GM seeds.87 These
emotion terms express strong evaluations of GMO products and their legal
regulation. They constitute a break in register with non-emotionalised argu-
ments such as descriptive statements that focus on ‘factual information’.
From a functional perspective, emotion discourses involve arguments that
express or seek to generate an emotional response in other participants in
authorisations, such as anger, fear, empathy or trust. They may rely on
emotion terms, but do not have to. For instance, some arguments seek to
generate fear about the potential health or environmental impacts of GMO
products. Other arguments, in particular those raised by citizens during EU
GMO authorisations, express anger about the perceived arrogance of bio-
technology companies to press ahead with a risky new biotechnology, the
long-term effects of which are considered as not sufficiently understood. Also
empathy is expressed in relation to farmers from developing third countries,
such as Argentina, that will be able to access the EU as an export market if
the sale of their transgenic agricultural products is authorised. Empathy is
also voiced in relation to those who suffer from food shortages in the devel-
oping world and who may benefit from a second ‘green revolution’ based on
transgenic agriculture. But emotion discourses are also invoked by scientists,
applicant companies and administrators working for the Commission and
national competent authorities. They involve appeals to trust in data, science
and regulatory regimes.
A preliminary analysis of EU GMO authorisations under Regulation
1829/2003/EC and Directive 2001/18/EC that so far have been completed for
twenty GMO products88 suggests that emotion discourses invoked by mem-
bers of the public and those emotion discourses that seek to mobilise fear
about the impacts of GM products are marginalised. They are not referred
to in the reasons given by the Commission in the preamble to its Decision
about the authorisation of a transgenic agricultural product. Their influence
on final decision-making seems to be limited given the fact that the over-
whelming majority of Commission Decisions grant GMO authorisations. A
Foucauldian perspective directs attention to this management of discourses
and considers it as key to understanding the exercise of public powers
through EU GMO authorisations. Most importantly, it helps to identify a
research question that provides an angle for understanding EU GMO
authorisations that is different from existing accounts: why are some emotion
discourses valorised and others marginalised and how is this achieved? This
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research question opens up the internal dynamics of EU GMO authorisa-
tions for analysis. It seeks to understand how ways of arguing for and
against transgenic agricultural products become disciplined. In particular,
Foucauldian discourse analysis enables to develop four hypotheses.
3.4.2 Four hypotheses for explaining the disciplining of emotion
discourses in EU GMO authorisations
Disciplining emotion discourses through distinctions between ‘normal’
and ‘abnormal’ emotion discourses
First, the differential treatment of various emotion discourses may not be so
much the result of a ranking of different types of knowledge claims, but rather
a matter of distinguishing between ‘abnormal’ and ‘normal’ emotion dis-
courses.89 ‘Normal’ emotion discourses are associated with the affirmation of
scientific arguments for and against the authorisation of transgenic agri-
cultural products. ‘Abnormal’ emotion discourses question in emotive terms
scientific arguments or generate non-scientific arguments, such as arguments
based on socio-economic or ethical considerations, in emotive terms. This
distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ emotion discourses provides an
innovative framework for understanding risk regulation, which in the litera-
ture is often characterised in terms of distinctions between scientific and
non-scientific discourses.90 Moreover, a Foucauldian perspective draws
attention not so much to the ranking of discourses but to the creation of
effects of power of discourses according to whether they are classified as
‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ according to the standards of the communication
scenario in which they are invoked.
Valorising ‘normal’ emotion discourses through associated distinctions between
‘expert’ and ‘lay’ participants in EU GMO authorisations
Whether a particular emotion discourse is valorised or not depends also on
whether it becomes associated with a ‘lay’ participant or ‘expert’ role. Emo-
tion discourses that invoke trust in scientific data, science itself and reg-
ulatory procedures for controlling potential risks posed by transgenic
agricultural products generate roles for scientists and administrators, such as
to facilitate EU GMO authorisations. These emotion discourses create
subject positions that can be taken up by scientists and administrators in
EU GMO authorisations. In contrast to this, emotion discourses that ques-
tion scientific arguments and raise socio-economic or ethical arguments
in emotive terms generate roles for lay participants in EU GMO author-
isations, in particular citizens during EU and national public participation
procedures. Hence, by generating distinct roles of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ parti-
cipants a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ emotion discourses
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becomes further reinforced. This questions the differentiation in some of the
risk regulation literature between ‘expert’ discourses associated with non-
emotive scientific discourses, on the one hand, and ‘lay’ discourses linked to
emotive, non-scientific discourses, on the other hand.91
Valorising ‘normal’ emotion discourses in order to manage accountability
and legitimacy deficits of EU GMO authorisations
Emotion discourses that invoke trust in scientific data, science itself, and reg-
ulatory procedures may be valorised because they stabilise and facilitate
existing procedures for EU GMO authorisations and thereby help to manage
their current accountability and legitimacy deficits. This hypothesis is grounded
in the idea that discourses generate effects of power and constitute social action.
The management of accountability and legitimacy deficits through ‘normal’
emotion discourses matters not just from a ‘good governance’ but also from a
legal perspective. Significant delays in decision-making in relation to EU GMO
authorisations and rejections of applications on other than scientific grounds
can be in breach of international trade law, in particular the GATT and SPS
agreement.92 Accountability and legitimacy deficits arise not just from the fact
that the Commission mainly decides on its own proposals but also from more
specific aspects of EU GMO authorisations. They are highlighted in written
submissions from EU citizens in response to EFSA’s scientific opinion. For
instance, they criticise what they perceive as EFSA’s insufficient scrutiny of
biotech applicants’ risk assessments of transgenic agricultural products. They
also criticise EFSA’s acceptance of very basic post-release monitoring plans
put forward by biotech applicant companies. EU citizens’ submissions have
also highlighted that the authorisation procedure under Directive 2001/18/
EC is based on a risk assessment of the transgenic agricultural product car-
ried out by the biotech applicant company which has a commercial interest
in a favourable outcome of the authorisation. Accountability and legitimacy
deficits are also raised by citizens during national public participation phases
in relation to GMO authorisations. For instance, some citizens have com-
plained that their national competent authority had already drafted and sent
its national assessment report to the Commission and EFSA before the time
period for consultation with citizens – as laid down in national law – had
expired.
Valorising ‘normal’ emotion discourses in the context of the predominance
of scientific discourses in EU GMO authorisations
The fourth hypothesis suggests that the valorisation of ‘normal’ emotion
discourses that invoke trust in data, science and regulatory procedures flows
from the predominance of scientific discourses in EU GMO authorisations.
Scientific discourses are predominant because they have a clear institutional
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focus, in particular EFSA, and they are amplified through institutional interac-
tions between the Commission and EFSA.
EU GMO authorisations rely to a significant extent on scientific and
technical discourses. A Foucauldian perspective can help to explain further
why and how this is the case. Discourse is relational in the sense
that its meaning is established through its differentiation from other dis-
courses.93 Hence, an account of the dominance of technical and scientific
discourses in EU GMO authorisations has to include an analysis of how the
process of arguing for and against transgenic agricultural products is struc-
tured in such a way that socio-economic and ethical considerations are
sidelined.
Socio-economic arguments address potential negative distributional
impacts upon small farmers who cannot afford GMO seeds and plants. They
also refer to limited choice for consumers between conventional, organic and
transgenic agriculture and threats to the economic viability of separate con-
ventional and organic agricultural production, due to risks of contamination
of conventional and organic crops with GM crops.94 EFSA rejects socio-
economic arguments raised by member states and EU citizens in response to
its scientific opinions on specific transgenic agricultural products on the
grounds that consideration of these is beyond its jurisdiction.
But the Commission may be required to consider them. One of the pur-
poses of Regulation 1829/2003/EC is to ‘ensure the effective functioning of
the internal market’ (Art. 1(a)).95 Moreover, Article 7 (1) of Regulation
1829/2003/EC ranks on an equal level three factors for the Commission to
take into account when preparing its draft decision on the authorisation of
the GMO agricultural product: EFSA’s opinion, any relevant provisions of
Community law and ‘other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under
consideration’. The Regulation suggests that the Commission is ‘taking into
account’ these three factors when writing its draft decision. This may be
interpreted as a requirement to consider ‘other legitimate factors’. But in
practice the Commission marginalises these, such as socio-economic argu-
ments.96 But not just socio-economic also ethical arguments are sidelined in
EU GMO authorisations.
The EU legal framework enables to some extent the consideration of
ethical arguments for and against the authorisation of GMO agricultural
products. Article 29 (1) of Directive 2001/18/EC addresses the consideration
of ethical issues of a general nature in relation to biotechnology. But ethical
issues in relation to the authorisation of specific transgenic agricultural pro-
ducts are not explicitly referred to.97 Article 33 (1) of Regulation 1829/2003/
EC, however, provides a power for the Commission to consult either upon its
own initiative or upon the request of a member state the European Group
on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, ‘or any other appropriate body
it might establish’ in order to obtain its opinion on ethical issues. But in
practice the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies is
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not consulted in relation to specific GMO applications, only in relation to
wider issues, such as the general topic of ‘ethics of modern developments in
agriculture technologies’.98
To summarise, technical-scientific discourses are dominant in EU GMO
authorisations also because they are differentiated from socio-economic and
ethical arguments, which are sidelined. But this relationship between different
discourses in EU GMO authorisations is in flux. In December 2008, France,
holding the Council presidency, launched an initiative to reform current EU
GMO authorisation procedures, so that greater weight would be placed
upon socio-economic considerations.99 The Commission has responded by
commissioning environmental consultants to prepare reports on the current
working and possible reforms of EU GMO authorisations.100
In order to understand how and why technical-scientific discourses are
currently predominant in EU authorisations, they need to be considered in
the context of the institutional structures in which they are invoked.
Scientific knowledge relied upon during EU GMO authorisations is
embedded in political governance structures. The EU legal framework
determines to a significant extent who produces scientific knowledge, whose
scientific knowledge should count and at what level of governance scientific
knowledge should be produced. The discourses generated during
EU GMO authorisations are therefore also the outcome of interactions
between key EU institutional actors. Regulation 1829/2003/EC provides for
an EU-wide, centralised risk assessment carried out by EFSA at the
EU rather than national level also in order to overcome member states’
distrust of each others’ risk assessments.101 This particular multi-level gov-
ernance arrangement under Regulation 1829/2003/EC generates a specific
type of technical-scientific discourse. It indicates a preference for harmonised
and consensus-based knowledge rather than an open recognition of a plur-
ality of different scientific views of risk in the various member states. Institu-
tions thus generate their own disciplinary practices for the generation of
knowledge.102
Also the inter-institutional relationship between the Commission and
EFSA is significant. EFSA is the main site of technical-scientific discourses
in EU GMO authorisations. Its organisational identity is premised upon the
idea that it does not take into account other, such as socio-economic or
ethical, considerations in its risk assessments.103 In practice, the Commission
seldom departs from EFSA’s mostly favourable opinions in relation to specific
transgenic agricultural products for which authorisation is applied for. To
conclude, the current dominance of scientific-technical discourses in EU
GMO authorisations has to be understood in relational terms as a differ-
entiation from ‘other’ socio-economic and ethical discourses and within the
context of institutional interactions, in particular between EFSA and the
Commission. But what can Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis tell us
about the legal dimension of EU GMO authorisations?
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3.4.3 What can Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis tell
us about the legal dimension of EU GMO authorisations?
As discussed in section 3.3 above, Foucault’s work has already been recog-
nised in theoretical academic commentary as contributing to understanding
the role of law in modernity. This argument can be further strengthened if it
can be shown that Foucault’s ideas can also frame qualitative empirical
analysis of ‘law in action’. This chapter has suggested that a Foucauldian
perspective can unpack how legal actors and EU legislation for the authorisation
of transgenic agricultural products are discursively constructed.
More specifically, a Foucauldian perspective can highlight two facets of EU
law in relation to GMO authorisations. First, to a limited extent, EU legal
provisions for the authorisation of GMOs reflect a juridical conception of
power, defined as ‘a threshold between two fields of activity’104 with the
threshold either being crossed or not. Distinctions between legality and illeg-
ality, for instance, express such a juridical conception of power. The catego-
rical distinction in the formal EC law framework between either authorisation
or rejection of a GMO is a further example. Second, EU GMO authorisations
reflect a key characteristic of Foucault’s conception of modern law, its opera-
tion as a ‘norm’. Norms are an expression of disciplinary power. They ‘may
be a maximum which one may hope to achieve’ or one may deviate from.105
Article 4 (1) (a) of Regulation 1829/2003/EC and Article 4 (1) of Directive
2001/18/EC require that a transgenic agricultural product must not impose
adverse effects on human, animal health and the environment before it can
be released into the environment or sold on the EU market. Given limited
knowledge about the long-term impacts of transgenic agricultural products,
in practice authorisations can only indicate different degrees of safety. EU
GMO authorisations are thus based on safety as a norm.
This ability of a Foucauldian perspective to capture both the juridical and
norm dimension of law matters, because it can further explain how and why
GMO administrative authorisation procedures are stabilised and facilitated
by law in the light of a potentially glaring democratic deficit. The move
towards ‘norms’ of safety – and thus disciplinary practices for the control of
risky biotechnology – diverts attention away from the legitimacy and
accountability of the authorisations themselves. Moreover, legitimacy and
accountability are governance concepts that are associated with the exercise
of juridical power, which is sidelined in EU GMO authorisations.106
3.5 Conclusion: The potential and limitations of
Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis to contribute
to critical environmental law scholarship
This chapter has argued that Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis can
help to generate a critical account of EU GMO authorisations by turning
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the spotlight on an under-researched aspect: the disciplining of emotion dis-
courses invoked in authorisation procedures and in particular the valorisa-
tion of ‘normal’ emotion discourses that invoke trust in data, science itself
and regulatory procedures. More empirical research needs to be done that
examines the rules of formation of the various discourses invoked in EU
GMO authorisations. In order to harness a Foucauldian perspective for the
project of critical environmental law scholarship it is also necessary to tackle
two potential limitations.
First, law is an obvious field in which to apply Foucault’s interest in
understanding systems of thought mediated by language. But his approach
may unduly narrow the focus on linguistic manifestations of social phenomena
even though discourse analysis can also be applied to historical events, policies,
ideas as well as organisations. But these other social phenomena are accessed
through the study of their linguistic manifestations like policy documents,
speeches, reports and interviews. Hence, discourse analysis sidelines ‘beha-
viour’ or ‘action’107 and thus participant observation, otherwise a major research
technique in qualitative empirical research which has real potential to con-
tribute to critical scholarship because it allows to collect data about what
social actors actually do rather than what they say they do. But discourse
analysis does not reduce the social world to language-based phenomena. It
simply suggests that a whole range of social phenomena can be understood
as analogous to linguistic systems.108 Discourse analysis therefore looks for
systems of signification not just in linguistic but also other social systems.109
Second, perhaps one of the most powerful criticisms of Foucauldian-
inspired discourse analysis questions its explanatory and critical power on
the grounds that Foucault is merely interested in tracing ‘contingent asso-
ciations’ or ‘conjunctions’ in order to explain the social world.110 It is not
entirely clear what form of explanation the tracing of ‘contingent associa-
tions’ involves but it seems to suggest a departure from unravelling ‘causa-
tion’ in the social world. The potential of Foucauldian-inspired discourse
analysis to provide a critique of law and the social relations that underpin it
may be limited due to its relativist stance. Whether a statement should be
considered as true or false, as valid or invalid cannot be decided with refer-
ence to some ultimate values or fundamental structures or primary meaning
but is relative and specific to the particular discourses within which it is
invoked. There is no essentialist basis for a superior set of ‘fundamental
values’ in discourse analysis.111 Hence for some it is questionable whether
Foucault’s anti-humanist stance can help to develop a progressive, critical
agenda in environmental law scholarship. It is clear, however, that Foucauldian-
inspired discourse analysis can contribute to one of the core aspirations of
critical legal scholarship: to develop non-essentialist accounts of the opera-
tion of law. To abandon the search for underlying political or economic
structures that could explain the operation of environmental law also opens
up space for change in environmental law.
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Chapter 4
The ecological narrative of risk and
the emergence of toxic tort litigation
Jo Goodie
4.1 Introduction
Legal understanding of the environment is contingent; it is shaped by the
law’s interface with a range of non-legal discourses and ideas. Attempts to
govern the environment have stretched and unsettled legal orthodoxy. The
environment, as a legal object, is not simply a physical space; it is a con-
tingent and instrumental object, determined by human activity, social values,
and legal and non-legal calculations. The environment does not fit readily
into any of the usual categories pertaining to legal rights and interests.
The ‘environment’ acquires its meaning through the continuous inter-
change of the many differently located understandings and attempts to define
and articulate environmental entities, ideas and problems. Since the mid-
twentieth century, ecology, in synthesising ethics and ecological science, has
become the dominant means of understanding the environment and envir-
onmental health.1 Although it began to emerge much earlier, from the mid-
twentieth century an environmental way of thinking has shaped the ways in
which humans live, work, and recreate. In turn the environment has been
defined and limited by patterns of individual and collective consumption.
These patterns of consumption have placed certain environments at risk, and
have created toxic environments that have become an object of ‘risk anxiety’.
This chapter considers the law’s delineation of toxic environments, through
an analysis of how the common law has assimilated the vocabulary and
techniques of risk calculation in the legal assessment of environmental harm
and hazard in toxic tort litigation. The chapter consists of seven main sections.
The first of these, section 4.2, outlines the emergence of an ecological nar-
rative through which the notion of environment is articulated and acted
upon. The second, section 4.3, considers how risk, which is itself the product
of a complex of rationalities from the scientific and economic through to the
anti-materialism of ecologism, is central to the ecological narrative. A het-
erogeneous range of risk calculations, vocabulary and techniques have been
taken up to articulate and delimit the characteristics of specific environments,
and to shape the manner in which we interact with, and within, those
environments. Section 4.4 discusses the significance of toxic tort litigation, a
modern variant of common law actions in negligence and nuisance, initiated
by plaintiffs exposed to one of the ubiquitous, but often hidden, toxic
hazards of the post-industrial society. The remaining four sections 4.5–8,
analysing how environmental hazards are interpreted, understood, acted
upon (or ignored) by the law in toxic tort claims, consider the insurantial,
scientific, clinical and commonsense practices of risk.2
4.2 Ecological narrative
Modern environmental understanding has emerged through the application
of technical scientific knowledge, rendered more meaningful through various
interpretive frameworks of ‘environmental sensibility’, which treat the environ-
ment, not as a thing, but as a dynamic process of which humans are a part,
which has a history, an economy, and a power to transform and be trans-
formed. The ecological narrative through which the environment has been
identified and become an object of legal attention embraces two distinct
rationalities, the moral agendas and discourse of ecological ethics, and the
economic model of scientific ecology.3
The emergence of the life sciences and biological discipline comprised
various features that impacted upon the calculation, description and under-
standing applied to the environment, in terms of the explanation or pro-
blematisation of nature. Whereas the Nature of the Enlightenment scientist
was a wholly material world of things, the ecological narrative, through
which contemporary understanding of the ‘environment’ is constituted,
emphasises the relationships and interactions between things. Initially, ecological
science theorised and modelled natural systems as tending towards equilibrium;
this quite mechanistic and rational understanding began to shift in the 1970s in
the face of chaos theory and alternative modelling. A ‘new ecology’ emerged
which understands the operation of natural systems in terms of ‘the possibility
of instability, variability and uncertainty’.4 Epidemiologist Tony McMichael
argues that unlike the traditional scientific disciplines contemporary ecological
science:
embraces the complex interplay between animate and inanimate com-
ponents; it studies dynamic, non-equilibrial and non-linear processes. …
To an ecologist the world is neither deterministic nor randomly unpre-
dictable; rather, it is a world of contingent probabilities within mutually
adapted, self-ordering systems.5
Since the mid-twentieth century, ecology, which synthesises a body of ethical
thinking as well as a specifically ecological science, has become the pre-
dominant means by which the environment and environmental health are
interpreted and understood.6 As well as underwriting and inspiring the ethic
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of environmentalism, this ecological rendering of the environment has had
practical and political significance. It has identified the ‘environment’ as a
special focus of government, rather than a physical space that is simply the site
of public health interventions or population resource dilemmas. The scientific
conceptualisation of the ‘eco-system’ and the theoretical and technical focus of
ecological science upon ‘energy flows within a closed system’ has shaped and
modelled our practical scientific engagement with the natural world.7 While
Humboldt, Darwin and their peers first observed and attempted to map the
natural world as a complex of discrete yet interconnected ‘environments’, their
scientific investigations, and many of those that followed, were inherently lim-
ited by dependence upon large-scale physical observation and data collection.8
Ecological systems modelling has allowed the pragmatic investigation of the
interconnectedness of the global environment by simulating the various func-
tions and activities of specific ecosystems, making it possible to efficiently
conduct macro-calculations of environmental conditions, the impact of
resource exploitation or levels of degradation caused by industrial develop-
ment. Such scientific knowledge in combination with other knowledges,
especially from the social sciences, has led to certain problematisations of the
environment, notably the extent of human dependence upon and the limita-
tions of human capacity to control the natural world or the hazards pro-
duced by human activity. The extent and pervasiveness of anthropogenically
produced environmental hazard is uncertain: while scientific investigation
may have initially identified toxins accumulating in the environment, the
capacity of science to readily identify the source and extent of environmental
harm and toxic risk is limited and often compromised by the ‘parochial
methods and models’ of science itself.9 This uncertainty persists across
dimensions; environmental risk is not confined by ‘geographical (or jurisdic-
tional) boundaries, temporal (or limitation) links and social (duty) relationships
between those creating the harm and those who are victims of it’.10
4.3 Disclosing the ‘risk’ environment
Risk has become an idiom through which the environment is made ‘thinkable’
and ‘amenable to political deliberations’. The refiguring of environmental
uncertainties as probabilities; as ‘risks’ that can be calculated and managed, sus-
tains the moral, as well as the highly rationalised and technical, aspects of con-
temporary understandings of the environment.11 Paul Rutherford argues that:
the relationship of society to the natural environment is conceived in
terms of the language of security and risk; ecological hazards and insecurity
must be addressed by putting in place behaviours that minimize risk.12
The ‘risk idiom’ produces its own form of what Michel Foucault would
call ‘bio-political’ and ‘bio-economic’ reality which shape the ambition (and
The ecological narrative of risk 67
the limits) to control ecological hazards and maintain environmental secur-
ity.13 In various ways, modern environmental governance is shaped by ‘risk
calculations’, these calculations are heterogeneous; the technologies through
which risk is articulated are not uniform, and the domains of risk-based
governance are diverse and underwritten by similarly diverse conceptions of
risk.14 Eco-systems along with environmental and human health are mapped
and governed through specialist calculations as varied as epidemiology,
environmental impact assessment, and protocols for ‘scoping’ corporate
greenhouse gas emissions,15 which evaluate the ‘risk-weighted consequences’
of activities and resource use that have the potential to impact on environ-
mental well being. This form of ‘regulatory ecological science does not so
much describe the environment as both actively constitute it as an object of
knowledge and, through various modes of positive intervention, manage and
police it’.16 It is these types of calculations and methodologies that are taken
up by environmental administrators (as well as tribunals and courts when
there is dispute) to make informed calculations of environmental wellbeing.
In pointing to the significance of risk as a means of understanding and
acting upon the environment, I am observing, as many governmentality
theorists have done, that the institutional spread of risk-focused governance has
produced certain approaches to understanding and acting upon the environ-
ment.17 The predominance of certain forms of scientific risk methodology has
not excluded other types of environmental assessment. Risk analyst Aynsley
Kellow argues that ‘[e]nvironmental issues inevitably entail questions of both
morality and practicality … There is no objective scientific basis for public
policy in general and environmental policy in particular.’18 Shifts in societal
attitude to risk increasingly impact upon legal attitudes and processes, the
governmentality approach adopted here facilitates a closer examination of how
the law engages with and assimilates various discourses and practices of risk.
4.4 Toxic tort
In the wake of the possibility of identifying the effects of exposure to toxic
substances and tracing their synergistic effects, the common-law principles of
negligence and nuisance, originally developed in the nineteenth century in
response to the new hazards of the industrial age, have been adapted (in the
form of toxic tort) to offer a remedy in the face of a new set of previously
unknown hazards.19
Toxic tort litigation is one of the fora in which factors which ‘make the
environment an important concern for individuals’ are articulated.20 It provides
a vehicle for discerning the relationship between body, hazard and environ-
ment.21 Actions in toxic tort endorse and articulate risk anxiety, particularly
in those instances where the litigation gives publicity to latent hazards and
the risk of exposure to those hazards, which had previously been little known
in the public domain.22 As Ulrich Beck observes:
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Dangers, it would seem, do not exist ‘in themselves’, independently of
our perceptions. They become a political issue only when people are
generally aware of them; they are social constructs which are strategically
defined, covered up or dramatized in the public sphere with the help of
scientific material supplied for the purpose.23
Through its key processes of investigating, judging and reporting on the
effects of toxic exposure or the hazardous nature of certain environments
and environmental practice, toxic tort litigation reveals the pervasiveness of
certain environmental risks.24 Toxic tort litigation goes beyond simple iden-
tification of a hazard and the risk associated with exposure to that hazard.
Indeed the court relies on the application of risk technologies to translate the
circumstances of a plaintiff’s exposure into a justiciable form. It is the incor-
poration and reliance upon scientific forms of evidence, such as the actuarial
forms of risk assessment of the epidemiologist and the engineer, that have
allowed the courts to assume a role of disinterested, yet authoritative, arbiter
on risk. But the court does more than consider risk in these technological
terms: a closer consideration of toxic tort litigation reveals that while parties
must be able to point to objective, technical or scientific risk assessment
which support their claim or defence, the success of a plaintiff’s or defen-
dant’s case will also be determined by evidence of other non-scientific, and
quite subjective, calculations of risk. The focus of the litigation is the plain-
tiff’s situated and particular experience of a defined local environment, as
well as commonly held attitudes to managing environmental risk, which
assumes the plaintiff, not just the defendant, is an informed and ‘rational’
individual, both risk aware and averse.
Pat O’Malley’s25 depiction of the three manifestations of risk in the legal
domain is useful in delineating how risk operates in toxic tort litigation. The
harm caused by exposure to a toxic hazard is the object of the litigation, the
purpose of which is to assign responsibility for the management of risk
taking; techniques of risk assessment are employed in the litigation to determine
the limits of legal liability; and the risks revealed and assessed through the
litigation are assigned moral value, the application of the principles of
negligence or nuisance either privilege or seek to limit those risks. It is
through the litigation’s multi-layered assessment of the risk that the envir-
onment is situated as a ‘complex moral problem invoking notions of value
and responsibility’.26
4.5 Insurantial practices of risk
Jane Stapelton observes that the increasing ‘public policy reliance’ on
a prudential response to risk has been paralleled by ‘a general broadening
of the catchment of situations recognised by the courts as giving rise to
tort entitlements’.27 The prevalence of liability insurance has transformed
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the law of tort in one other respect as well. It has tended to marginalise
individual responsibility as a factor determining the outcome of a claim.
Morton Horwitz argues that ‘[l]iability for injury has become just another
cost of doing business, which could be estimated, insured against, and
ultimately included in the price paid by the public’.28 If one is talking
about the standard personal injury claim then Horwitz’s assessment of
the trajectory of tort litigation is reasonable. John Fleming observes that
a defendant’s insurance may very likely undermine any deterring or punish-
ing effect.29 But examination of toxic tort litigation highlights the continu-
ing significance of individual responsibility as the basis for determining
liability.
The availability of liability insurance allows the system of tort law to
function but does not make redundant the legal assessment of toxic harm,
namely how it came about and what injuries it caused. François Ewald holds
that the law and insurance each provide a means of assigning responsibility
and making compensation for loss, and that the rationality of each may be
applied to the same object to different ends. He says, ‘Insurance and law are
two practices of responsibility which operate quite heterogeneous categories,
regimes, economies; as such, they are mutually exclusive in their claims to
totality.’30 The fundamental difference between the two is that the juridical
focus on the occurrence of an event is singular and moral. By contrast, the
insurantial approach eschews any question of moral responsibility, and
instead factors the probability of such an event occurring and recurring in a
predictable rule-like fashion.31
Insurers may have a capacity through the rule of subrogation to dominate
the litigation process, but they do not litigate as if factors beyond their own
actuarial calculations are irrelevant. Courts must weigh up competing
accounts of the type of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed. These accounts
come from the parties themselves, as well as from experts who provide tech-
nical assessments of the degree of risk to the plaintiff of the particular toxic
exposure, and also from other lay witnesses, such as workmates, whose role is
to provide the court with a real appreciation of the environment in which the
plaintiff was exposed to risk.
4.6 Scientific practices of risk
Expert scientific evidence relating to causation, and the risk presented by
exposure to a particular toxin, toxic event or environment, is an integral part
of all toxic tort litigation. It provides the evidence of possibility which courts
use to map a global picture of the potential hazards to which a plaintiff may
have been exposed. Unlike tort litigation of the nineteenth century, which
was premised on the assumption that there is usually a single line of causation
linking the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury, in contemporary
toxic tort establishing a causal nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and
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exposure to a toxic environment is much more complex. In toxic tort cases,
the model employed to determine the actual cause of the injuries is not
based on direct causality but on a ‘multi-factor’ approach which understands
‘the problem of health in a broader context’ whereby ‘disease can be attrib-
uted to exposure to a variety of toxins as well as the lifestyle and patterns
of consumption of plaintiff themselves’.32 Through the application of such
an approach, ill health, disease or injury suffered by the individual is inher-
ently referable to the health of the broader environment. The emergence of
toxic tort as an identifiable class of litigation has followed developments in
science which have allowed the causes of certain diseases and the side effects
of exposure to certain types of chemicals and other toxic substances to be
identified.33 Although these advances in scientific diagnostics and epide-
miology have allowed the possibility of attributing legal liability, establishing
that there is a causal link between the toxic exposure and the injury is often
speculative at best:
In most toxic tort cases, one or more of these elements is contested …
the state of knowledge with respect to many toxic agents is extremely
imperfect … what is known about a chemical from the general scientific
literature almost always has to be supplemented by knowledge acquired
about particular individuals and communities of claimants.34
The identification and delineation of a toxic environmental hazard is multi-
layered. As Valverde et al. observe, conceptions of risk are by necessity
conflated in toxic tort litigation.35 Scientific evidence must be strategically
framed by other types of evidence. Evidence such as epidemiological calcu-
lations of risk is not created for legal purposes; rather, the parties and the
court itself must translate, and consequently transform, the evidence before it
can be usefully taken up in the litigation. Indeed, the Australian courts freely
acknowledge:
The pragmatic assessment of probable cause as a basis for tortious liability
cannot be wholly constrained by the scientific and philosophical purity
of epidemiology, which essentially depends upon a comparison of the
data obtained in controlled circumstances.36
Jenny Steele notes that the court employs a decision-making model which
‘constructs a moment of decision which may be purely hypothetical’
(knowledge of the risk which exposure to the toxin presented at the time of
the plaintiff’s exposure) ‘and uses this to draw the “right” conclusion’ (whether
the defendant should have known of the risk and whether the exposure is
likely to have caused the injury).37
That approach to evaluating and positioning epidemiological accounts of
risk is apparent in the leading case of Seltsam v McGuiness (hereinafter
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Seltsam). The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that epidemiological
studies ‘should be regarded as circumstantial evidence which may, alone or
in combination with other evidence, establish causation in a specific case’.
The court recognised epidemiology’s ‘potential utility’ in toxic tort cases,
because it may be able to ‘fill the gap’ where ‘medical science cannot deter-
mine the existence or non-existence of a causal relationship for purposes of
attributing legal responsibility’.38 In Chief Justice Spigelman’s words, epide-
miological calculations of risk combine with other evidence like ‘strands in
the cable’, allowing the court to infer a causal nexus between the plaintiff’s
injuries and the toxic exposure as a matter of ‘commonsense’.39 But whose
commonsense? What counts as common sense in toxic tort litigation? The
manner in which scientific disciplines, such as epidemiology, conceive of and
articulate risk, necessarily impacts upon the court’s conception of the risk,
Jasanoff observes that the exercise of the court’s discretion (its ‘common
sense’) is inevitably shaped by the degree to which ‘judges are swayed by
their perceptions of what “science” is and who is a “scientist” when they
certify an expert’s credibility’.40
The degree to which a court aligns ‘legal causation with scientific causa-
tion’ not only determines what type of science will count in the litigation,
but it also impacts upon the significance and weight attached to other
forms of non-scientific evidence.41 Debate about the proper interpretation of
the US Supreme Court’s ruling on the standards that should apply in
determining the admissibility of scientific expert evidence in Daubert v
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (hereinafter Daubert)42 demonstrates
how assessments of risk such as those produced by epidemiologists are
not neutral elements in the legal assessment of risk. Daubert reforms have
locked out plaintiffs who have based their claim on ‘reliable, but not ideal,
scientific evidence’.43 Edmunds and Mercer point to the failure of one of
the first cases relating to the risk of mobile phone use, in support of the
argument that:
Daubert-inspired quests to establish scientific truth … may assist in dis-
couraging ongoing legal scrutiny of intransigent scientific controversies
involving uncertain risks.44
The debate regarding the proper interpretation of Daubert is more than just
what type of science is to be recognised in the court room. Rather, it con-
cerns ‘the social and moral viability of particular technological choices’.45 The
trajectory of the Daubert ruling has been to shift the court’s attention away
from a holistic focus, in which the ‘scientific evidence supports a claim
framed in lay terms’, towards what Karen Morrow in her analysis of British
and Irish nuisance cases has labelled a ‘harder’ approach to causation,
in which the evidence of the plaintiff is marginalised in favour of scientific
evidence.46
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4.7 Clinical practices of risk
The main consideration of much risk commentary in the social sciences is
how risk is produced by collective anxiety and politics,47 or as a function
of certain forms of scientific or actuarial calculations.48 When legal com-
mentators consider the function of risk assessment in litigation, their focus
also tends to be on actuarial or other scientific calculations of risk. It is a
literature that is rarely interested in how the individual actually copes with,
engages with, or is affected by risk.
The clinical approach to thinking about risk, which is prevalent in public
health programmes, is taken up in this argument because of its focus on
the relationship between expert assessments of risk and the individual as
an individual (rather than simply as a member of a risk prone population).
The clinician, working on the basis of ‘probabilistic indicators of future
conditions’ or ‘risk’ to a certain type of patient’s health, develops a programme
of intervention aimed at minimising these risks.49 Despite the broader risk
discourse within which any toxic tort litigation takes place, the individual
litigating parties are the primary focus of the court.50 It is the courts’
appreciation of the parties’ personal and quite specific experience and
exposure to risk, and their behaviour in the face of such exposure, which in
large part determines the outcomes of a toxic tort suit. It is suggested here
that the clinical risk approach highlights the manner by which the toxic tort
litigation constructs a certain type of legal subject, in as much as the success
of the plaintiff’s case will be in part determined by whether the plaintiff
is able to situate themselves as risk averse or irresponsible in the face of
known risk.51
4.8 Commonsense practices of risk
We tend to understand risk in terms of its common or everyday meaning
rather than as an actuarial calculation or an object of scientific analysis. In
its common, everyday sense ‘risk’ is a term used to describe danger or
hazard.52 Risks of this kind are not statistical calculations but sociocultural
constructs. Such ideas of risk often have their genesis in a scientific predic-
tion of risk, but have been developed to encompass an array of popular
knowledge, beliefs and practices that are not limited by the confines of sci-
entific discourse.53 There are two principal ways in which everyday or com-
monsense understandings of risk impact on the evaluation of a toxic tort
claim: first, the plaintiff’s particular experience of the toxic exposure and its
consequences (matters to which the court pays considerable attention) are
necessarily shaped by common or everyday understandings of risk; second,
risk in its commonly understood sense is assessed in terms of moral culp-
ability and blame, which imposes responsibility to be risk averse on the
plaintiff as much as the defendant.
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Robert Lee argues that: ‘the public experience of risk is not one of
unthinking acceptance of a position expounded by experts, nor is it a simple
choice between expert positions’.54 Research by cognitive psychologists has
demonstrated that,
‘lay’ people evaluate health and environmental threats according to a
different set of criteria than may be reflected in expert assessments. …
the risk perception of lay members of the community appears to be
influenced by various contextual factors that lie outside the realm of
scientific research.55
These factors include: familiarity with a technology, the degree of control
which can be asserted over it, and the potential for the application of the
technology to have catastrophic effects. Notwithstanding the trend in some
post-Daubert litigation in the United States, these everyday calculations of
risk resonate in toxic tort litigation as well: the risk the toxic exposure
exposed the plaintiff to is not judged according to scientific evidence alone.
Sheila Jasanoff observes that in toxic tort litigation the courts tend to
favour a holistic (or medical) to a reductionist, or toxicological model of
illness. The holistic view focuses on the suffering individual and asks
whether, given the totality of circumstances, this person could have been
affected in the stated way by the stated exposure … this approach pre-
sumes that issues of general or specific causation must be addressed
together, within the context of the plaintiff’s lived life.56
In Chappel v Hart the Australian High Court candidly observed that causa-
tion is ‘a question of fact resolved as matter of commonsense and experience,
the conclusion is often reached intuitively’.57
Fear, or what Mary Douglas would label the plaintiff’s ‘risk anxiety’, is
not an accepted basis for a toxic tort claim. The plaintiff must prove actual
physical, mental or economic damage.58 Nevertheless, evidence of how the
plaintiff has responded to toxic exposure, and the risks that exposure pre-
sents, are part of the particulars of the case which impact on the court’s
‘intuitive’ and ‘commonsense’ assessment of the plaintiff’s claim. For exam-
ple in the case of Maddalena v CSR Ltd and another, the significance the
court placed on the plaintiff’s subjective appreciation of the consequences of
his exposure to asbestos is apparent in its judgment for the plaintiff; the
court quoted from the transcript of expert psychiatric testimony which
highlighted and detailed the plaintiff’s anxiety and fear in the face of a risk
increasingly made real:
In my opinion Mr Maddalena lives in fear of death from mesothelioma
as a result of his undoubted heavy exposure to asbestos some twenty-five
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or so years ago. He has watched his brother and numerous colleagues
die severe, painful and lingering deaths. He suffers from chronic fear. …
He cannot be described as cancerphobic because the term phobic
implies no real reason for such a belief. I believe that he has compelling
reality and emotional reasons for his belief. … There has been further
accretion of anxiety and fear since the objective demonstration of left
lung pathology in the early 1990s.59
Whereas the technical calculations of epidemiological risk are treated as
objective rather than moral assessments by the courts, everyday notions of
risk are a basis for ascribing moral culpability. The fact that expert calcula-
tions of risk tend to produce an amoralisation of the dispute does not
necessarily preclude non-expert understandings of risk also informing an
assessment of liability.60 Together with an expectation that the individual will
monitor him or herself and be risk-averse, risk in its commonly understood
sense has become inextricably linked with blame.61 Risk, in modern society,
has come to replace the old-fashioned (and in modern secular society now
largely discredited) notion of sin as a term that ‘runs across the gamut of
social life to moralize and politicise dangers’.62 The knowability of risk,
underpinned by the scientific capacity to identify hazardous activities and
substances, imposes responsibility not only on hazard creators but also upon
potential victims of such hazards. While the focus of an action in tort is the
extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury, Peter Cane
observes that the conduct of the plaintiff is also significant:
Tort law is concerned with people’s responsibility for their acts and
omissions. And because it deals with interactions between people, it
contains principles relevant not only to the conduct of injurers but also
to the conduct of victims.63
The very fact that toxic tort actions are necessarily premised on what
Cane labels the ‘correlativity’ of the parties, may make them an uncertain
prospect if a plaintiff is not able to convincingly argue their moral claim to
compensation. Lee, developing Cane’s analysis, contends that liability in tort
is determined in the context of certain assumptions about socially appropriate
conduct; tort law is a means of enforcing ‘social rules’.64 As former Australian
High Court Justice Michael McHugh has observed, the application of tort
doctrine ‘depend not only upon the ascertainment of facts but on a moral
and social evaluation of those facts’.65 For the toxic tort plaintiff, who has
been the victim of exposure to a lethal toxic substance in circumstances
where others, who had responsibility for their well-being, knew the plaintiff
was at risk, the opportunity of a ‘day in court’ is an opportunity for the
moral rightness of their claim to be recognised. Plaintiffs have often been
prepared to take their case to trial, even in the last months of their life,
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because they wished to salvage something from their untimely death. Com-
pensation to provide some sort of economic security for their family is no
doubt important, but a public vindication that they, and people like them,
have been unnecessarily and sometimes callously harmed seems in many
cases to be a prime motivation, or at least justification for choosing to liti-
gate rather than settle. It is not being argued here that a court deciding a
toxic tort suit necessarily frames its decision solely in terms of the moral
culpability of the parties. However, blame and responsibility are central to
the discourse within which the case is argued and considered.
The allocation of blame and the finding of liability are influenced by sub-
jective assessments of the moral character and reputation of the litigants. Rabin
has observed that there are two different types of plaintiffs in toxic tort litiga-
tion, those who are characterised as victims and those who are seen as irre-
sponsible.66 Credit is not only at issue in criminal cases; lawyers representing
plaintiffs harmed by exposure to toxic substances or hazardous activities use the
tactic of the public trial for plaintiffs who have acted responsibly and as far as
possible protected themselves against harm. A test case plaintiff is not an indi-
vidual who has voluntarily courted risk. Liability in toxic tort cannot be
assessed outside the context of the broader cultural values about risk taking.
On this point, the relative success of two of the most ubiquitous categories of
toxic tort, tobacco and asbestos litigation, is instructive. The difference between
the relative successes of the asbestos and tobacco toxic tort litigation does not
lie in the scientific evidence, as there is a wealth of evidence available regarding
the toxic nature of exposure to both asbestos and tobacco. The relative success
of each type of tort is founded in the circumstances in which each type of toxic
exposure typically occurs – that is, on the individual’s attitude to risk and the
care and responsibility the individual has taken for him or herself. A plaintiff
who has been exposed to asbestos has usually not been in a position or cir-
cumstance that allowed them to voluntarily limit their exposure, or even
know that they were at risk. By contrast, a smoker plaintiff can be readily
characterised as irresponsible, as someone who has not heeded health warn-
ings. Rabin observes this is the case even though the plaintiff could call
expert evidence relating to the health effects of smoking or the addictive
nature of smoking to support their case. Expert evidence loses its persuasive
power and becomes abstract and esoteric in the face of more compelling and
real evidence of how the plaintiff actually lives and how they have failed to
quit smoking despite being aware of the health warnings about tobacco use.67
This focus on the credibility of the plaintiff operates in other toxic tort
litigation as well. In their study of several actions relating to the toxic con-
tamination of land and urban housing Toffolon-Weiss and Roberts observe
that many of the plaintiffs in those cases were poor and with limited access to
quality health care. As a result they had only a limited appreciation of the
factors that posed a risk to health. The credibility of these plaintiffs’ claims
can be readily undermined because the plaintiffs:
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may have been exposed to dangerous work and lifestyle factors that are
often presented by the defense as alternative causative factors. Govern-
ment and corporate officials do not take the symptoms of these people
seriously. They attribute the poor health of these communities to
unhealthy lifestyles (e.g. eating fatty foods, smoking, drinking alcohol
and taking drugs). … Further, middle class jurors’ own prejudices may
affect their judgments when viewing poorer individuals with different life
experiences.68
Karen Morrow’s analysis of the nuisance cases in Ireland and England
shows a similar approach. Farmers who complained that their health and
that of their livestock was affected by toxic emissions had to counter claims
that their illness was attributable not to the defendant but to their own
unhealthy lifestyle and poor farming practices.69 In some cases the causal
link between the toxic emissions and damage the plaintiff suffered may well
have been tenuous, but the point is that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed
unless she or he can demonstrate they have been risk-aware and risk-averse.
4.9 Conclusion
The environment is made ‘thinkable’ and amenable to different types of legal
deliberations through the figure of risk. Analysis of toxic tort litigation provides
the opportunity for examining the nexus between the conceptualisation of
risk and the legal domain. In judging a toxic tort case the court assesses
evidence of the environmental conditions that caused harm to the plaintiff
and considers how the plaintiff and others typically functioned in that
environment and what sort of calculations they made of any environmental
risk; it is in assessing this evidence that a certain form of environmental
space and problems are revealed or identified by the litigation. But as Steele
observes common use of the term ‘risk’ obscures the significance of the dif-
ferent forms of risk assessment in toxic tort litigation.70 There are at least
four interrelated conceptions of risk operating – the scientific, the insurantial,
the clinical, and everyday or commonsense notions of risk. The clinical
approach to thinking about risk commonly employed in public health pro-
grammes is taken up because it allows the analysis to focus on how scientific
and technical calculations of risk are conflated with everyday or common-
sense notions of the actual risk posed by certain environmental hazards. This
clinical perspective also highlights the significance of the plaintiff’s ability to
situate themselves (or not) as appropriately risk averse in the face of known
risk; blame and responsibility frame the court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s
claim.
Typically when legal commentators consider the function of risk assessment
in litigation their focus tends to be only on actuarial or other scientific cal-
culations of risk. Everyday or commonsense notions of risk have not been
The ecological narrative of risk 77
the focus of academic debate. They are of course harder to pin down, and
not as readily drawn upon as scientific calculations of risk to persuade courts
on fine points of causation. Certainly many toxic tort suits fail, and other
potential actions are thwarted, by a lack of definitive scientific evidence
establishing a causal link between the plaintiff’s injuries and their exposure
to an environmental hazard. The scientific evidence, or at least its ‘objectivity’,
is, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos observes, ‘a pedestal on which a presumption
rests for the comprehension of risk’.71 Non-scientific, everyday under-
standings of risk play a critical role in how the court comprehends the risk to
which the plaintiff was exposed and deserve closer analysis. My own experience
as a plaintiff’s solicitor,72 working in the early 1990s on these kinds of cases,
was that despite the requirement to adduce expert evidence, the particulars of
any plaintiff’s claim are scrutinised by the court through the lens of everyday
or commonsense understanding of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s conduct
in the face of risk. Toxic tort litigation reveals and reports the existence of
environmental hazards in a manner which tends to focus on the impact of
the toxin on the plaintiff personally, and publicly delineates the harm they
have suffered; it allows the articulation of the real, rather than simply
theorised or projected, experience and consequence of toxic exposure.73
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Chapter 5
The precautionary principle
Practical reason, regulatory decision-making




When it was proposed to incorporate the precautionary principle into the
French constitution as part of an environmental charter, the reaction of the
scientific establishment in France was radically against it. The Academy of
Science and the Academy of Medicine called on the government ‘to avoid
including the PP in a constitutional text because of the potential catastrophic
consequences for scientific development, technological innovation, public
health, economic welfare and even environmental protection’.1 Such reac-
tions, however, have not prevented its incorporation in a growing range of
legal instruments impacting upon environmental law and public health, from
international treaties, through national constitutions (including the French)
to domestic legislation and regulation. The long-standing conceptual debate
about the principle has accordingly more recently been supplemented by
discussion of its implementation to produce a series of related questions
about its nature and practicability:
 Is the precautionary principle scientific (as opposed, for example, to
ideological)?
 If so, can it be made operational in policy and regulatory settings?
 If so, can its implementation be subjected to meaningful judicial review?
 If not, does that call the practical usefulness of the principle into question?
This chapter considers these questions, reviews the competing answers that
have been suggested and concludes by defending a stronger role for the
courts in reviewing precautionary decision-making than has heretofore been
evident in many jurisdictions.
In section 5.2 a positive answer to the question of whether the precau-
tionary principle is scientific is ultimately offered, drawing on the work of
David Resnik in the field of the philosophy of science.2 The question of the
operability of the principle in practical policy and regulatory contexts is then
considered in section 5.3 on the basis of one of the key disputes between the
WTO and the EU. While this demonstrates that there can be strongly con-
tested understandings of the principle in the absence of sufficiently clear defi-
nitions in key legal texts, a systems theory reading of the situation cautions
against any too simplistic idea that a clearer definition would resolve such
problems. While the precise approach to the implementation of the precau-
tionary principle proposed by Resnik would undoubtedly assist in the making
of precautionary decisions, the inevitable presence of functionally differentiated
social systems in such contexts ensures that a unique and indisputable answer
remains out of reach. A reflexive reading of Resnik’s approach is accordingly
offered as an indication of the limits of what may be hoped for in situations
where a decision under ignorance (that is, where it is impossible to assign
probabilities to different choices) must be made. This reflexive reading then
offers a potential answer to the question raised by Elizabeth Fisher and
Ronnie Harding with respect to the appropriate model of administrative
constitutionalism that should underpin the implementation of the precau-
tionary principle.3 This is important in considering the extent to which the
precautionary principle is justiciable, which is considered in section 5.4.
Drawing on an analysis of one of the key statements on the principle by the
European courts, the difficulties that have beset judicial review of precautionary
decision-making are highlighted, while at the same time the potential for the
courts to engage in meaningful review is pointed out. The conclusion drawn
in section 5.5 is that, while there would rightly be concern about any shift
away from the currently deferential attitude of the courts in many jurisdictions
when it comes to the review of precautionary decisions by the executive,
there is actually much to welcome where such a shift takes place within the
context of the adoption of a suitably sophisticated approach to the imple-
mentation of the principle, both by the executive and by the courts. What is
offered is by no means a magic bullet, but it does have the potential to
ensure that, in the context of functional differentiation, all concerned keep in
view the fragmented nature of the problems that precautionary decisions are
required to respond to as well as the dangers inherent in assuming that there
are simple unitary answers.
5.2 Is the precautionary principle scientific?
In the context of environmental law the precautionary principle needs to be
understood as a component of the overarching concept of sustainable
development. The key definition of this concept is to be found in Agenda 21,
the preamble to which describes the document as setting out a dynamic
programme that ‘marks the beginning of a new global partnership for sus-
tainable development’.4 The preamble further states that the implementation
of this programme is to be carried out ‘in full respect of all the principles
contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’5 and it
is among those principles that the precautionary principle is to be found.
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The precautionary principle has been defined in a variety of different ways in a
variety of different domestic and international political and legal settings since
its first appearance as the ‘foresight principle’ in Germany in the 1970s,6 but
the Rio Declaration formulation is the one most often referred to. There it is
provided that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.7
The apparent common sense of the basic idea contained in that definition
can make the controversy that surrounds the precautionary principle difficult
to understand. But the controversy is no less real for all that. The various
criticisms directed at the principle have been grouped under five headings by
a team at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. Their review of
the literature reveals that the critics are concerned that the principle (1) is ill-
defined, (2) is absolutist, (3) leads to increased risk-taking, (4) is a value
judgement or an ideology, and (5) is unscientific or marginalises the role of
science.8 It would be possible to consider each of these criticisms individu-
ally, but it is suggested here that the first four may be read as specific
examples of the fifth. For example, for a statement to be scientific it must be
falsifiable. It must, therefore, be sufficiently clearly defined to allow mean-
ingful testing and must by definition be a provisional statement rather than
an absolute one.9 By the same token, for a statement to be scientific it
cannot be a value judgement or based on an ideology unless it also happens
to be falsifiable, which might in turn lead to questions about its status as a
statement of values or ideology. As regards the criticism of increased risk-
taking, it will be contended here that a properly scientific understanding of
the precautionary principle aims specifically at the reduction of risk at a
point when meaningful statements about risk are impossible. It is further
suggested, therefore, that a successful response to the criticism that the pre-
cautionary principle is unscientific would also represent a successful response
to the other criticisms.
Were the ‘unscientific’ criticism to be shown to be well founded, the pre-
cautionary principle would face a very serious problem, which would in turn
impact upon sustainable development and indeed environmental law more
broadly. Agenda 21 states that science should ‘provide information to better
enable formulation and selection of environment and development policies in
the decision-making process’.10 Furthermore, the key role for science is empha-
sised by the fact that Agenda 21 identifies a series of support programmes:
strengthening the scientific basis for sustainable management; enhancing scien-
tific understanding; improving long-term scientific assessment; building up
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scientific capacity and capability.11 However, the very fact that the need for
these programmes is felt appears to be an admission that science is unable to
answer all the questions that sustainable development asks, and it is precisely
here that the precautionary principle makes its appearance in Agenda 21:
In the face of threats of irreversible environmental damage, lack of full
scientific understanding should not be an excuse for postponing actions
which are justified in their own right. The precautionary approach could
provide a basis for policies relating to complex systems that are not yet
fully understood and whose consequences of disturbances cannot yet be
predicted.12
Taking all this together, the criticism that the precautionary principle is
unscientific is surely not without foundation: Agenda 21 appears to admit
that when science is unable to provide an answer, something other than science
may be required and that specifically is the precautionary principle. This
certainly looks worrying for the principle’s proponents, but perhaps the
charge of being unscientific is less damaging than has been assumed so far.
Might it ultimately amount to no more than a fairly neutral observation? It
is submitted, however, that if that is what was intended then the term used
would be ‘non-scientific’. The critics of the precautionary principle definitely
have something else in mind: when applying the term unscientific they seek
to convey the message that the precautionary principle is in essence irrational
in the sense that it does not allow logical arguments or sound judgements to
be made.13 If that criticism can be substantiated, it would have very serious
implications for decision-making processes that claim to make use of the
principle in reaching conclusions about whether, for example, technologies
may be developed and deployed and, if so, to what extent. A decision on the
basis of the precautionary principle could be taken for the best of motives,
but if the principle itself is fundamentally flawed in the way implied by this
criticism, then the decision could nevertheless be sub-optimal and perhaps
even counterproductive.
There is, then, clearly a pressing need for more clarity on the nature of the
precautionary principle to determine whether or not it offers a basis for
rational decision-making. In this regard, the work of David Resnik from the
field of the philosophy of science is instructive in so far as its starting point is
the precise question with which this section of the chapter is concerned: is the
precautionary principle unscientific?14 The sting of the criticism is already
drawn to some extent when Resnik points out that what may properly be
described as ‘scientific’ is controversial even within the philosophy of science
itself. Furthermore, he helps to focus and delimit the criticism by pointing
out that much will depend upon what society seeks to achieve by utilising
the precautionary principle. With these points in mind, Resnik reformulates
the basic question so that it reads: is the precautionary principle a rational
86 Law and ecology
method for making practical decisions?15 What Resnik is aiming to do,
therefore, is to see whether the precautionary principle properly belongs
within the boundaries drawn by the requirements of practical reason. To do
that, he distinguishes three types of decision-making situations:
 Decisions under certainty, where the outcomes of different choices are known.
 Decisions under risk, where even though the outcomes of different choices
are not known with certainty it is nevertheless the case that probabilities
can be assigned to the outcomes of different choices.
 Decisions under ignorance, where it is not even possible to assign prob-
abilities to the outcomes of different choices.16
The first situation raises few difficulties and could be said to describe the
making of fully informed decisions. The second situation is more complex,
but can be dealt with using recognised decision-making approaches, for
example, those involving quantitative risk assessment (QRA). Decisions
under risk will often be controversial: parties may disagree about which
values to input into QRA calculations, about the adequacy of the data set,
about the degree of conservatism that is appropriate, and so on. Never-
theless, the very fact that a decision-making technique such as QRA can be
employed allows the point of disagreement to be identified relatively easily.
A focus for discussion thus exists, around which the strengths and weak-
nesses of competing arguments can be tested. Furthermore, the very fact that
probabilities can be assigned and that techniques such as quantified risk
assessment can be utilised means that decisions under risk do not require the
application of the precautionary principle. One of the key messages articu-
lated by Resnik, therefore, is precisely that the principle is only applicable to
decisions under ignorance.
It is immediately clear, however, that if decisions under risk may be con-
troversial, the situation is likely to be even more difficult for decisions under
ignorance. Indeed, if it is not even possible to assign probabilities to the
outcomes of different choices, then there is apparently no reason not to
assign an equal probability to the best-case and the worst-case scenarios. If
that is true, then logically there would appear never to be a reason to dis-
count the worst-case scenario and thus never a reason not to opt for the
most precautionary approach. Critics of the precautionary principle such as
Charnley accordingly contend that it operates in effect as the principle of
inaction.17 Defenders of the principle such as Peterson point out, however,
that operating the principle in this way is actually to replace it with the
principle of insufficient reason.18 In so far as Peterson is correct, criticism of
the precautionary principle as the principle of inaction is surely wide of the
mark and may itself be said to be ‘irrational’.19
While these problems with the precautionary principle can be discounted
as more apparent than real, there is, however, a more fundamental problem
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for Resnik in the form of the criticism levelled by Majone against the pre-
cautionary principle, namely that it relies upon an illegitimate distinction
between risk and ignorance. For Majone, there is no such clear-cut division,
but rather only a knowledge–ignorance continuum.20 This may be countered,
however, by suggesting that Resnik’s tripartite scheme translates into three
points on that continuum.21 A stronger defence is paradoxically provided by
Majone himself when he concedes that the precautionary principle does have
a limited role, namely where ‘losses (or utilities) are unbounded’ and where it
is ‘clearly impossible to calculate expected values’, for example, where there
is a threat of ‘serious and irreversible damage’.22 It can accordingly be con-
tended that Majone and Resnik are actually in agreement as to the situations
when it is appropriate to resort to the precautionary principle: the bound-
aries set by Majone coincide with Resnik’s definition of decisions under
ignorance. Support for this interpretation may be drawn from an analogous
situation in tort law characterised by the impossibility of assigning probabilities
to one or another causation scenario and where no remedy would available
to the plaintiff notwithstanding that a duty of care has been breached and
harm has been suffered. Courts in such situations have found it appropriate
to deviate from the standard ‘but for’ and balance of probabilities tests to
establish causation and ensure that a remedy is available.23 It may be sug-
gested, accordingly, that the precautionary principle is the ex ante analogue of
the carefully defined exception that the courts have set down for dealing with
harm ex post in situations where it is impossible to assign probabilities.24
So far, however, there is reassurance only that contexts exist in which there is a
need for an approach to decision-making which can cope with the inability to
assign probabilities. There is as yet no clear answer to the question whether such
approaches may correctly be described as scientific – courts in the sort of inde-
terminate causation cases just referred to have indeed been at pains to deny
that the decisions they are taking are based on scientific or philosophical as
opposed to strictly legal understandings of causation. In order to answer that
question it is necessary next to consider how the precautionary principle may be
operationalised. Here again, Resnik offers assistance. In brief he sees the
operationalisation of the precautionary principle as involving two stages.
Firstly, in a given decision-under-ignorance situation it is necessary to con-
sider whether a hypothetical threat is plausible. This is a question that sci-
entists are well placed to answer in as much as they are used to considering
whether a given hypothesis is plausible prior to committing limited resources
to testing it. Well-established criteria for a test of plausibility are accordingly
available within science including: coherence, explanatory power, analogy,
precedence, precision, and simplicity.25 In so far as a hypothetical threat
meets these criteria it may be deemed to be plausible. It will also be possible
to differentiate between different hypothetical threats as more or less plau-
sible utilising these criteria and it is therefore possible to demonstrate that
there really is no equivalence with the principle of insufficient reason.
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The second stage of Resnik’s approach to the implementation of the
precautionary principle is to consider whether, in so far as a hypothetical
threat is deemed to be plausible, any proposed response is reasonable. Once
again, there are well established criteria for addressing such a question
(notably within law), including: effectiveness, proportionality, realism, effi-
ciency, consistency and non-discrimination (and it is interesting to note that
Resnik here draws inspiration from the European Commission’s Commu-
nication on the Precautionary Principle).26 Thus, in so far as a proposed
response to a plausible hypothetical threat meets these criteria, then it may
be deemed to be reasonable. It will also be possible to differentiate between
proposed responses as more or less reasonable utilising these criteria and it is
therefore possible to see that there really is no equivalence with the principle
of inaction.
Taken in the round, then, the conclusion to be reached on the question of
whether the precautionary principle is scientific is that it is, in so far as this is
understood in a sufficiently sophisticated way to cope with the complexity of
decision-under-ignorance situations. In other words, there needs to be an
acknowledgement of what is distinctive about situations in which it is not
possible to assign probabilities to different choices, a recognition that quan-
tified risk assessment techniques have no traction in such contexts, and an
acceptance that it is nevertheless possible to take decisions in a way consistent
with the requirements of practical reason on the basis of tests that are well
established both within science and within law.
5.3 Can the precautionary principle be made operational
in policy and regulatory settings?
So much for the operationalisation of the precautionary principle as a means
of reaching rational decisions in theory, but is there any evidence that this
approach is being adopted in practice by policy and regulatory actors? In
this regard, the example of the differential approaches to the precautionary
principle taken by the WTO and the European Commission with regard to
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
is instructive. Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement provides that:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant inter-
national organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary mea-
sures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
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The European Commission’s interpretation of this measure reads:
The [sanitary or phytosanitary] measures, although provisional, shall be
maintained as long as the scientific data remain incomplete, imprecise or
inconclusive and as long as the risk is considered too high to be imposed
on society.27
Majone has described this approach as establishing an extremely subjective
standard that relaxes ‘all the substantive and procedural constraints on reg-
ulatory arbitrariness … to the point of being non-binding’.28 And he has
criticised the Commission for essentially utilising the precautionary principle
to disguise political reasons for adopting and maintaining such measures,
specifically pressure from the European Parliament, which is in turn
responding to general public unease with regard to globalisation and new
technologies such as GMOs.29
Considering this dispute, it is possible to discern more clearly some of the
contentious issues surrounding the precautionary principle. Firstly, is it
unreasonable for a public administration to seek to be responsive to public
concern? The Commission has after all, just as often been criticised for being
remote and unresponsive.30 On the other hand, there are certainly times
when public administrations push ahead with policies on the basis that
public opinion has essentially reached the ‘wrong’decision: the UK government’s
insistence on the MMR vaccine despite a concerted campaign against it and
widespread media and public concern may be cited as a classic example of
this situation.31 Secondly, is either of the interpretations of the precautionary
principle in this case more open to subjectivity than the other? The key
difference between them lies in the emphasised portions of the following
phrases:
[World Trade Organisation] Members shall seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review
the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time.
[European Commission] Measures, although provisional, shall be
maintained as long as the scientific data remain incomplete … and as
long as the risk is considered too high.
It may accordingly be suggested that opting for one or other of these ver-
sions reveals a subjective preference for a more business-oriented approach
to precaution in the case of the WTO’s language and a more social welfare-
oriented approach in the case of the European Commission’s. A more
sophisticated analysis may be provided by systems theory. From that per-
spective, the approaches taken by the WTO and by the European Commission
may be differentiated on the basis that they reveal the operation of different
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communicative social systems.32 The first approach may thus be read as a
deployment of the code of the economic system (payment/non-payment) and
more specifically of a steering programme focused on minimising the deferral
of payments.33 Similarly, the second approach may be read as a deployment
of the code of the system of science (true/false) and more specifically of a
steering programme focused on minimising risk.34 As if the distance between
these two constructions of the precautionary approach in the context of the
SPS Agreement were not already great enough, a systems theory reading of
the situation would go on to point out that the system of politics will in turn
reconstruct these selections on the basis of its own power code. There is
accordingly from a systems perspective apparently no objective solution, as
it were, to the problem raised by the different systemic constructions of the
precautionary principle that are possible in a given practical setting.
The question is, then, whether Resnik’s two tests of plausibility and rea-
sonableness would do anything to assist in this sort of situation. It is first of
all necessary to be clear that they do not constitute a mechanism by which a
single agreed decision will automatically be reached. It would accordingly be
possible to reach either the WTO’s or the Commission’s conclusion by
applying the plausibility and reasonableness tests. In so far as that is the
case, it might be objected that this approach adds nothing to an already
complex situation and thus should be discounted. It is suggested, however,
that any understanding of the precautionary principle in terms of ‘brightline
standards’ is inappropriate, as Fisher and Harding have stressed.35 An
approach such as Resnik’s provides a means of reaching decisions under
ignorance within the realms of practical reason on the basis of familiar, well
established and accepted standards. While it will not, therefore, generate
unique answers, it will encourage transparency and accountability in the
making of decisions under ignorance and will in any event reveal the exact
location and nature of disagreements in so far as public actors would need to
address explicitly the various criteria of the plausibility and reasonableness tests.
From a systems theory perspective, this finding is not at all surprising or
disappointing. The theory that is based on the concept of cognitively open
but normatively closed systems is by no means taken aback by the conclusion
that scientific, economic, political and, for that matter, legal constructions of
the same issue are incommensurable and that information cannot be transferred
unproblematically between these systems. Some versions of systems theory
would continue that analysis to the point where the idea that Resnik’s tests
could have any hope of contributing to the resolution of disputes about the
implementation of the precautionary principle would have to be abandoned.36
Other readings of systems theory would, however, perceive in those tests a
reflexive potential – in other words, the possibility that the content and
application of those tests could constitute an opportunity for structural
coupling between the systems in play in a given practical setting.37 There
would still be no unique conclusion, there would still remain the potential
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for even radically different constructions of the same issue within different
systems, but the existence of the tests and the requirement to utilise them
would mean that the systems in play would be required to perform simulta-
neous transformations (even if only momentarily) on the basis of the same
extraneous event, which in systems terms is already to say a great deal. This
in turn would mean that the systems in play would need to deal with the fact
of alternative constructions rather than ignoring them. Again, there is no
suggestion here of anything akin to an ideal speech situation, no hope is held
out of an intersubjective bridge being built between competing constructions
by the simple expedient of the application of the tests of plausibility and
reasonableness.38 But what is offered, consistent with a systems theory per-
spective, is the possibility that the application of these tests represents an
example of structural coupling and thus the possibility that some selections
may become more difficult to make than others. In other words, while even
this version of the theory does not imply that systems can observe what they
cannot observe, it does allow that the unobservability is observable – what
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has referred to as presence in absence.39
Before becoming too starry-eyed about this reflexive reading of Resnik’s
approach, however, it is necessary to be sure that it properly addresses
observations made by Fisher and Harding about the implementation of the
precautionary principle, specifically the fact that despite considerable devel-
opment of frameworks to implement it in a range of jurisdictions, little if any
thought has been given to the relationship between those frameworks and the
underlying theory of administrative constitutionalism.40 This is important,
they contend, because without clarity in this regard there is a risk that the
precautionary principle becomes meaningless.41 In considering this issue,
Fisher and Harding identify two principal models of administrative con-
stitutionalism, namely the deliberative-constitutive (DC) (which they draw
from the earlier work of Deville and Harding)42 and the rational-instrumental
(RI) (which they draw from the European Commission’s Communication on
the Precautionary Principle).43 They then check to see, firstly, how each
model approaches the sorts of issues raised by the implementation of the
precautionary principle and, secondly, whether an understanding of the pre-
cautionary principle favours one model of administrative constitutionalism
over the other. Given the foregoing discussion it would be particularly
instructive to discover whether the reflexive reading of Resnik’s two-test
approach to the implementation of the precautionary principle favours one
model over the other and whether the conclusion mirrors that of Fisher and
Harding.
Beginning with the role and nature of the public administration as conceived
by each of the two models, the DC model sees an ‘institution constituted
with broad deliberative powers that can be adapted to the problem at hand’
whereas the RI model sees an ‘instrument of [the] legislature that carries out
a limited set of tasks on the basis of a rational methodology’. The DC model
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accordingly appears more in tune with modern ideas of stakeholder engage-
ment in the policy and regulatory process, whereas the RI model appears
closer to a classical top-down technocratic approach. That is not to say that
public participation has no role in the RI model, but whereas in the DC
model this is vital to the achievement of a ‘deliberative problem-solving
process’, in the RI model it is rather a matter of aiding accountability and a
‘means of identifying preferences’. This difference is reflected in the way in
which the two models characterise the problems they seek to regulate.
Whereas the DC model understands these to be complex both socio-
politically and physically, the RI model is convinced that they are ‘manage-
able by methodologies’. The same difference informs the way in which the
two models understand the nature of the administrative process, with the DC
model seeing it as combining ‘scientific analysis and deliberation’ while the
RI model sees a clear ‘division between scientific and political processes’. As
regards the basis for the justification of decisions under both models, the DC
model sees this as constituted both by the giving of reasons and by the fact
of deliberation whereas for the RI model this depends upon a demonstration
of the fact that the ‘decision-maker adhered to predetermined methodologies
and standards’. The range of differences that exist between the two models
accordingly reflects overall the different motivations for their development.
In the case of the DC model, the motivation is the desire to demonstrate
‘how the principle can be implemented in any institutional setting’ whereas
for the RI model the motivation is the desire to demonstrate that ‘action
pursuant to the principle is accountable and consistent with pre-existing legal
obligations’.44
Fisher and Harding conclude from this comparison of the two models that
while the DC model looks at first sight to be the best-suited to the imple-
mentation of the precautionary principle, the matter is not necessarily so
straightforward and it may be a matter of seeing which approach is best
suited to specific circumstances.45 They note also that the choice of one or
other model in the real world has reflected the preferences of those making the
choice. Thus, policy makers have tended to favour the deliberative-constitutive
model whereas lawyers have tended to favour the rational-instrumental
model.46 The reason for the lawyers’ choice is surely related to the greater
ease with which the RI model (at least as it is more narrowly understood)
would be amenable to judicial review.
What happens, however, when the two models are considered in terms of
the reflexive reading of Resnik’s two-test approach to the implementation of
the precautionary principle? Understanding the contention that exists in
precautionary decision contexts in systems terms certainly appears to favour
the DC over the RI model. There is an acceptance that the issues at stake
may be constructed very differently within different systems and that a single,
uniform and somehow unquestionably ‘rational’ answer will only mask rather
than resolve the problem. It must be stressed, however, that the systems
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approach moderates the enthusiasm with which the DC model might be
embraced, in so far as it highlights the limits that inevitably exist with regard
to the achievement of simple, unitary answers to complex precautionary
questions. The two-part test understood reflexively provides an opportunity
for structural coupling, but it does not hold out any much stronger hope
than that. Does all this mean that the RI model is entirely discounted by the
reflexive reading of Resnik’s two-part test? The answer is a qualified no. That
approach could operate under either model but it is important to note that
this conclusion only holds good in so far as key aspects of the rational-
instrumental model are understood in a particular way. Specifically, this
requires that the rational-instrumental model’s focus on adherence to meth-
odology is understood in the broader way that the reflexive reading of the
plausibility and reasonableness tests imply and not in a narrowly techno-
cratic way. In so far as the tests were to be understood in such a way, then
the systems approach clearly shows that this would be to produce an unac-
ceptably restricted view of the complexity of the problem at hand – one
which ignores the presence of other systems in play and of the distinctive
constructions of the issues and indeed of the two-part tests that they bring to
the situation.
Taken in the round, then, the answer to the question of whether the
precautionary principle can be made operational in policy and regulatory
settings is once again a qualified yes. Resnik’s two-part test offers a practic-
able approach based on established standards from science and law that
nevertheless avoids any misunderstanding that the principle can be expressed
as an algorithm. Practical examples, however, reveal the extent to which the
implementation of the principle takes place within highly contested settings
which in turn reveal that the application of the tests of plausibility and
reasonableness will themselves become fractured. Taking a systems view of
the situation renders this finding less surprising and in turn offers a possible
escape route, albeit one that accepts fracture as inevitable (even necessary)
and thus understands the application of the tests in a particular, and specifically
reflexive, way. This reading sees the two tests as an opportunity for structural
coupling between the systems in play, which nevertheless does not imply the
emergence of an intersubjective dialogue nor of an objective resolution. At
best, structural coupling encourages a mutual reading of the different con-
structions, which may appear to be thin gruel to those with higher hopes for
the precautionary principle, but which nevertheless may strike a more rea-
listic note with those who have had experience of such situations in practice.
Fisher and Harding, however, are surely right to insist that there needs to be
greater reflection as to the model of administrative constitutionalism within
which the implementation of the precautionary principle takes place. In this
regard, the reflexive reading of the two-part test appears to favour the DC
model (while insisting on the limitations of normative closure and the extent
of what is possible from structural coupling) and would require a particular
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understanding of the RI model, which would either see the narrow view as
an example of a purely technocratic construction of the problem and the
solution or would call for a broader view which understands that a range of
system rationalities are in play. The question that remains, however, is whether
any implementation of the precautionary principle could be subjected to
meaningful judicial review. It would surely seem to be the case that, if it could
not, then the efficacy of the principle would be called into question. It would
be one thing to claim that the application of the two-test approach is a
rational basis for decision-making under ignorance (understood specifically
as the inability to assign probabilities to different choices), but it would
be quite another to admit that the application of the tests was itself beyond the
reach of judicial review. In such circumstances, what reassurance would there
be that the decision-making process had not been hijacked by vested interests
whether state or commercial in nature?47 What reassurance would there then
be that precautionary decisions were indeed imbued with the characteristics
of practical reason?
The points made by Fisher and Harding in relation to existing choices as
to the models of administrative constitutionalism already raise interesting
and potentially troubling further questions in this regard. Does the lawyers’
preference for the RI model indicate that only this one is amenable to review
and thus that the DC model is not? On the other hand, do the concerns
highlighted about the narrowness of the traditional understanding of the RI
model indicate that while it may be amenable to judicial review it does not
necessarily allow an adequate implementation of the precautionary principle?
And beyond these questions, what happens to the prospects for judicial
review, firstly, when it is recognised that what is required for a rational
implementation of the precautionary principle is something akin to Resnik’s
two-test approach and, secondly, when more specifically it is recognised that
the most realistic reading of those tests in any practical setting is the reflexive
one which acknowledges the insights of a systems theory understanding of
the complexity of decision-under-ignorance situations?
5.4 Can the implementation of the precautionary
principle be subjected to meaningful judicial review?
Before a firm conclusion can be reached in this regard, it will be instructive
to look at the experience of courts in reviewing precautionary decisions. The
courts in the UK are of course well aware of the limits of judicial review and
of the questions of technical competence and constitutional propriety that
arise should they seek to become too substantively involved in what is
properly and reasonably the preserve of the executive. It is thus not surprising
to find that the evidence from the UK suggests a very cautious approach on
the part of the courts in so far as the precautionary principle is concerned.
Fisher concludes her survey of the UK case law by stating that (1) ‘while
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many actions are found to be in accordance with the precautionary principle
there has been no development of a principled framework for deciding what
is precautionary’ and (2) ‘review tends to be deferential and thus effectively
sanctioning the status quo’.48 On the basis of this assessment of the UK
approach, there would appear to be problems in practice associated with
making the precautionary principle justiciable.
While a deferential attitude on the part of the UK courts might not be
surprising, the Nordic courts might be expected to have a more advanced
approach to the precautionary principle, given the fact that these jurisdictions
have been at the forefront of the development of environmental law gen-
erally. In fact, this turns out not to be the case and surveys of the case law
reveal a similarly deferential approach. Studies of the situation in Denmark49
and in Finland50 both find that judges understand the principle to be more
political than legal, with the result that precautionary decisions will not be
substantively reviewed. Judicial restraint in Norway meanwhile appears to
be due to the fact that the precautionary principle is hardly evident in
environmental policy areas and Bugge questions whether it will continue
to evolve from an optional into a compulsory principle.51 While Sweden has
enshrined the principle in its Environmental Code, the position of the judiciary
is complicated by the fact that, as Michanek reports, a balancing of interests
is allowed that may result in a diminution in its impact.52 The evidence from
Scandinavia accordingly appears to mirror that from the UK. Judicial
restraint is the order of the day on the basis that precautionary decisions are
properly for the executive and therefore provided that procedural require-
ments have been met there will rightly be no substantive second-guessing of
the decision-maker.
There is of course a much more extensive jurisprudence on the precau-
tionary principle at the level of the European Court of Justice and the Court
of First Instance, but it may not ultimately take us much further in obtaining
clarity about the scope for judicial review. Scott and Vos suggest that these
courts have also interpreted the principle so as to allow member states con-
siderable discretion to err on the side of caution so long as they provide
evidence of scientific uncertainty.53 Fisher suggests that the problem with the
approach of the ECJ and CFI can be traced back to the fact that the European
approach to the precautionary principle represents the paradigm case of the
rational-instrumental model of administrative constitutionalism. Further-
more, it appears that this has been narrowly understood in the Commission’s
Communication on the Precautionary Principle, with the result that it has
problematically required decision-makers to engage in risk assessments
which, as Resnik’s tripartite scheme revealed, are simply inappropriate to
decisions under ignorance where it is impossible to assign probabilities.
Fisher describes this as a requirement that decision-makers proceed on a
factual basis when facts are precisely what are missing. Her reading of the
ECJ and CFI jurisprudence suggests that it reflects this tension without
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recognising it.54 In other words, there is a failure to appreciate what is distinctive
about decisions under ignorance as opposed to decisions under risk.
There would accordingly appear to be two principal obstacles in the way
of achieving the meaningful judicial review of precautionary decisions:
firstly, the question of whether judges are clear as to which requirements
would need to be met in implementing the principle in order to be able to
ensure the procedural adequacy of precautionary decisions while maintaining
a respectful distance from any trespass on the substantive aspect; secondly, the
question of whether judges are clear as to the difference between decisions
under risk and decisions under ignorance in order that they may not place
unreasonable demands on decision-makers to proceed on a factual basis
when it is precisely the absence of the ability to assign probabilities that
characterises the sorts of situations in which the precautionary principle is
appropriately applied. From the perspective of systems theory (at least the
variant that has been outlined above) the justiciability of the precautionary
principle is crucial in so far as it is the means by which the fragmented problems
that engage the principle can be internalised within the legal system. From
the point of view of society within that theory, law’s ability to internalise these
problems, both at the regulatory and especially at the judicial level, allows
normative expectations to be stabilised even in the context of significant
uncertainties.
In order to see more clearly what this means in practice, it is instructive to
look more closely at one of the key statements on the precautionary principle
by the Court of First Instance, namely the case of Pfizer Animal Health SA v
Council.55 In Pfizer the issue at stake was whether the Community institu-
tions had erred in removing a particular substance from a list of authorised
growth promoters for use in agricultural animals on the grounds that it could
give rise to antibiotic resistance that could be passed to humans. Article 11 (3)
of Directive 70/524 allowed the Commission to commence a procedure to
alter the list of authorised antibiotics where this was considered necessary to
ensure the protection of human or animal health or the environment following
the adoption of a safeguard measure by a member state. The Commission
took such action on the basis of the precautionary principle in relation to the
antibiotic virginiamycin produced by Pfizer in response to a safeguard mea-
sure adopted by Denmark, which ultimately resulted in Council Regulation
(EC) 2821/98 removing that antibiotic from the authorised list. Pfizer applied
to the Court of First Instance for annulment of the regulation. The judgment
in this case is long and complex, and what follows, therefore, concentrates in
particular on the court’s treatment of the precautionary principle.
The parties to the case were in agreement that at the time when the regulation
removing virginiamycin was adopted ‘neither the reality nor the seriousness of
the risk’ of the transfer of antibiotic (specifically streptogramin) resistance
from animals to humans ‘had been scientifically proven’.56 It can immedi-
ately be seen, therefore, that this was properly a situation in which the
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precautionary principle would have a role. Pfizer, while conceding that the
Community institutions were entitled to take preventive measures of the sort
involved in this case, nevertheless contended that they ‘did not correctly
assess [the] risk’ and ‘that they adopted a decision for reasons of political
expediency without a proper scientific basis’57 – thus echoing the sort of
critique of the precautionary principle made by Majone discussed above.
In considering this complaint, the CFI begins by noting that both it and
the ECJ have held that ‘where there is scientific uncertainty as to the exis-
tence or extent of risks to human health, the Community institutions may,
by reason of the precautionary principle, take protective measures without
having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become
fully apparent’.58 Accordingly, in such a situation, ‘a risk assessment cannot
be required to provide the Community institutions with conclusive scientific
evidence’ of the reality or the seriousness of that risk.59 On the other
hand, the same case law is cited by the CFI as authority for the proposition
that ‘a preventive measure cannot properly be based on a purely hypothetical
approach to risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been
scientifically verified’.60 What this means is that a preventive measure can be
taken only where, even if the existence and extent of a risk have not been
conclusively established, that risk nevertheless appears ‘to be adequately
backed up by the scientific data available at the time when the measure was
taken’.61
It is already apparent from the previous discussion of the difference
between a decision under risk and a decision under ignorance that the CFI’s
use of language here is unhelpfully loose, even if, digging beneath the surface
of the words employed, it appears that it is nevertheless managing in essence
to distinguish between these two situations. Hope is raised that there might
be greater clarity when the CFI goes on to distinguish ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’,62
but it immediately muddies the waters further when it asserts that ‘in a case
such as this, the purpose of a risk assessment is to assess the degree of
probability of a certain product having adverse effects on human health and
the seriousness of any such adverse effects’.63 This is further compounded
when the court proceeds to suggest that ‘it is for the Community institutions
to determine the level of protection which they deem appropriate for
society’. While that is undoubtedly true and entirely unobjectionable, the
way in which the Court expresses this fact is less than felicitous:
It is by reference to that level of protection that they must then …
determine the level of risk – i.e. the critical probability threshold for
adverse effects on human health and for the seriousness of those possible
effects – which in their judgement is no longer acceptable for society
and above which it is necessary, in the interests of protecting human
health, to take protective measures in spite of any existing scientific
uncertainty.64
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The problem here, of course, is that the expression ‘critical probability
threshold’ is meaningless in the context of a decision under ignorance (which
the court has previously correctly identified as the appropriate location for the
deployment of the precautionary principle) where it is precisely impossible
to assign probabilities to different choices. The fact that the court has per-
sisted in using the term ‘risk assessment’ in the context of precautionary
decision situations may well explain why it has been misled in to discussing
probabilities where their absence is actually the defining characteristic. This
is all the more unfortunate because in other places the court seems much
clearer on this point, for example, where it recognises that ‘it may prove
impossible to carry out a full risk assessment … because of the inadequate
nature of the available scientific data.’65 Indeed, the court goes so far as to
note that ‘unless the precautionary principle is to be rendered nugatory, the
fact that it is impossible to carry out a full scientific risk assessment does not
prevent the competent public authority from taking preventive measures’.66
In essence, it appears that provided the public authority has carried out the
most thorough scientific assessment possible in the circumstances and provided
it is not proceeding on the basis of mere conjecture, then the court will not
interfere with the decision to take preventive measures.67
At this point, the court takes the opportunity to discuss further the extent
to which precautionary decisions are open to review. The court is clear that
‘Community institutions enjoy a broad discretion regarding definition of the
objectives to be pursued and choice of the appropriate means of action.’ As
a consequence, the courts may only intervene where ‘such discretion is viti-
ated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers’ or where the institutions have
‘clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion’.68 Where, as in the present
case, the institutions have had to ‘evaluate highly complex scientific and
technical facts, judicial review of the way in which they did so must be limited’.
Furthermore, the court is ‘not entitled to substitute its assessment of the
facts for that of the Community institutions’.69 In this regard, in so far as the
institutions took account both of the ‘seriousness of the repercussions’
should the relevant antibiotic resistance actually be transferred from animals
to humans, and of the relevant scientific research, the court concludes that
they ‘did not make a manifest error of assessment when they came to weigh
up their obligations’.70 The institutions were certainly not obliged, as Pfizer
had contended, to wait for the first human death as a result of the relevant
antibiotic resistance, before taking action.71 As a consequence, ‘the Community
institutions did not exceed the bounds of the discretion conferred on them’
when they concluded that the scientific information available was ‘not mere
conjecture but amounted to sufficiently reliable and cogent scientific evidence’
for the hypothetical link between the use of virginiamycin in animal feed and
human antibiotic resistance.72
The question remains as to the extent to which the court would be willing
to look more deeply into the grounds for the decision taken by the
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institutions. At one point, the court seems to indicate that it has engaged in
an exercise of comparing the plausibility of the competing arguments when it
states that ‘Pfizer’s arguments that the development of streptogramin resistance
in humans can be more plausibly explained by other factors cannot be
accepted’.73 But it shortly after seems to indicate the contrary when it states
that ‘It is not for the Court to assess the merits of either of the scientific
points of view argued before it and to substitute its assessment for that of the
Community institutions.’ Rather in so far as the ‘Community institutions
could reasonably take the view that they had a proper scientific basis for a
possible link, the mere fact that there were scientific indications to the contrary
does not establish that they exceeded the bounds of their discretion in finding
that there was a risk to human health’.74
This consideration of the Pfizer judgment commenced with the observation
that there appear to be two main obstacles to meaningful judicial review of
precautionary decisions and the foregoing discussion of the case surely only
supports this observation. The language of the court clearly does appear to
indicate either a difficulty in separating decisions under risk from decisions
under ignorance or at least sufficient looseness in the use of terminology to
allow this impression to be formed. Similarly, references to ‘risk assessment’
and ‘critical threshold probability’ at the very least give the impression that
judges are unclear as to requirements to be met in implementing the pre-
cautionary principle in order to be able to ensure the procedural adequacy of
such decisions. Does this mean that precautionary decisions are not amenable
to meaningful judicial review? If so, then the practical usefulness of the prin-
ciple as a tool of executive decision-making, though defended in the previous
section of this chapter, would also be placed in doubt. Furthermore, from a
more conceptual perspective, the ability of law to internalise the fragmented
problems that engage the precautionary principle, an ability that offers the
societal benefit of stabilising normative expectations in the context of significant
uncertainty, would be in question.
5.5 Conclusion
In seeking to answer those remaining questions, it is important to stress that
it is not the point of this chapter to second-guess the court as regards whether
or not it was right to decide in favour of the Community institutions and
against Pfizer. What the preceding analysis surely does show, however, is that
the controversy that has surrounded the judicial review of precautionary
decision could be abated were there to be greater clarity in the language used
by the courts and, of course, in the first instance by the decision-makers
themselves. Were it to be the case that precautionary decision-making pro-
ceeded on the basis of the two tests of plausibility of the hypothetical harm
and the reasonableness of the proposed response, this would lead not only to
more robust decision-making, but also to greater confidence in the quality of
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the decisions. It would also, it is submitted, provide courts with clear procedural
requirements, the adequacy of which it would be a much more straightfor-
ward matter to review. Again there is no suggestion that precautionary
decisions would suddenly become uncontentious, nor that the judicial review
of such decisions would please all parties: the systems theory-inspired analysis
of such decisions above revealed the extent to which there is in the context of
functional differentiation an irreducible fracture in the understanding of the
issues at stake and indeed of the precautionary principle itself. The reflexive
reading of the two-test approach, however, focuses on the opportunity they
offer for structural coupling – to reiterate, not an intersubjective bridge
between normatively closed systems, but rather the creation of an opportu-
nity for a mutual reading of competing constructions both of the issues at
stake and of the precautionary principle itself. In so far as judges direct their
attention to this reflexive aspect of the two-test approach to the imple-
mentation of the principle, they will not only help to ensure that precau-
tionary decisions are procedurally robust, but also, crucially, play a role in
ensuring, firstly, that such decisions are not misunderstood as unitary once-
and-for-all answers to questions which by their nature reflect, perhaps to the
greatest extent, the inevitable fracture of concepts and forms in the context
of functional differentiation and, secondly, that the principle itself is not
misunderstood as a simplistic algorithm.
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What should we make of the prospective evolution of biotechnological artefacts
into means – rather than simple objects – of environmental regulation? What
might be the effects of engineering regulatory norms into the very artefact
that is to be regulated? These questions are prompted by the development of
a particular approach to the regulation of genetically modified crops, namely,
the technique of biological ‘containment’. In 2004, as part of a research
initiative designed to facilitate the policy of ‘coexistence’ between GM and
non-GM crops,1 the European Union funded a programme of research into
a set of biotechnological strategies to prevent gene flow from transgenic to
conventional plants. The terms of reference of the Transcontainer programme
characterise its principal objective as the development of ‘genetically modified
(GM) crop plants that are “biologically contained”’:
[I]n order to reduce significantly the potential spread of transgenes of such
GM crop plants to conventional and organic crop plants and to wild or
weedy relatives, when such exist. Coexistence of GM crops and non-GM
crops can be promoted through the implementation of biological trans-
gene containment strategies, while at the same time the potential flow of
transgenes from GM crops to wild relatives can be reduced significantly.2
Plants would be programmed to function in accordance with regulatory
objectives framed by EU bodies and implemented by national authorities.
Ultimately, if this approach were taken further, regulatory instruments
directed to the behaviour of farmers might be obviated by measures written
into the behaviour of the organism itself. It is not yet clear what the ultimate
effects of Transcontainer technology and its likely successors will be, but the
question of how politics might be inscribed in biotechnological artefacts is a
question with a future.
With the theme of this volume in mind, the question is engaging because it
divides two ways of thinking about law and ecology. On one hand, the
prospect of inscribing norms (or politics) into the texture of an organism
suggests that the contingencies of regulatory processes – the effects of nego-
tiation, translation, and reflexivity – might be effectively bypassed by technical
means. Regulation would become a truly instrumental art. In that sense, bio-
engineered regulation promises to realise the basic understanding of regulation
(and law more generally) as an instrumental operation. Most theories of
regulation start from that premise; however ‘responsive’ it might take reg-
ulation to be, theoretical explanation begins within the instrumentalist
ambitions of regulatory schemes and introduces social complexity or con-
tingency only secondarily, as a factor that limits or complicates the realisation
of instrumental interventions. Even if regulatory measures are not directly
enforceable, even if they have to take into account the peculiar cultures of
corporate or administrative actors, and even if regulators have strategically
to scale up or down through the orders of a ‘regulatory pyramid’ to find the
right means of influence, all of these operations are characterised a priori by
the will to instrumentality.
Alternatively, one might approach regulation from the perspective of what
Hanjo Berressem (2010) characterises as ‘radical paradoxical logic’.3 From
this perspective, any means/ends schema is, precisely, a ‘schematisation’;4
that is, it is a way of modelling the world that is referable to a specific
observer or observational idiom. The instrumentalist view of the world
assumes that the facts – persons and things – which have to be ordered
‘ecologically’ pre-exist regulatory observation and intervention. The reality,
however, is that regulators can only see what they can see,5 and what they
can see is an effect of their observational schemata. The crucial point is not
that the ‘ecology’ that is apprehended and modelled through the viewfinder
of a regulatory discourse is a construct; it is that this specific ‘ecology’ is just
a fold6 in the broader ecology of systems or discourses in which regulation is
implicated. ‘Ecology’ appears twice over: as what is seen from within the
‘internal point of view’ of practitioners or theorists of regulation, and as the
differentiated set of discursive processes which condition this internal point
of view. What is interesting is the articulation of these two ecologies, which is
the point at which paradoxical logic emerges: ecologies in the first sense are
immersed in – or immanent in – ecology in the second sense. The conven-
tional, instrumentalist, take on regulation law sees only one ‘ecology’ – the
schema of a common plane across which causative interventions lead (more
or less directly or efficiently) to effects – and externalises the processes from
which this ecology precipitates and within which it is held steady. These
processes – which make up ecology in the second sense – are paradoxical in
ways that might be characterised in different ways, depending on one’s pre-
ferred theoretical idiom. Crudely, social configurations or assemblages are
emergent; their being, and that of their elements, does not pre-exist their
association and articulation. Readers of Niklas Luhmann will be familiar
with the sense in which paradoxicality is made productive by operations
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which fold distinctions into distinctions. But what does all this mean for a
study of regulation through technology?
What is in question is the materiality and instrumentality of regulatory
technologies. In a now classic exploration of the senses in which ‘artefacts
have politics’, Langdon Winner drew out the ways in which politics might be
realised in technical or material means: ‘The issues that divide or unite
people in society are settled not only in the institutions and practices of
politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements or steel
and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts.’7 The most celebrated
examples are the low overpasses that Robert Moses built over Long Island
parkways in the mid-twentieth century; Moses designed these overpasses
with headroom of only 9 ft expressly so as to restrict the use of the park-
ways, the beaches and other recreational facilities that they served to the
affluent middle classes, who travelled in private cars, and to exclude poorer
people and African Americans, who were more likely to travel in tall buses.8
Transcontainer technology might be taken as a contemporary example of the
programme of engineering politics into material or technical artefacts. Cer-
tainly, some representations of Transcontainer technology9 pick up on the
sense in which regulation through technology might cut through social con-
tingency by materialising specific means/ends operations, and by auto-
matically generating certain effects in the world. This is where Luhmann’s
version of ‘paradoxical logic’ comes in: materialities (and instrumentalities)
are an effect of observation. The schemata that frame or fix materiality and
instrumentality – the categories of form, extension, motion, causation or
effect – are referable to an observer. Materiality and instrumentality are
effects of schematisation. More important, these diverse observational
idioms or perspectives are reciprocally engaged. The schematisation of a
material thing or instrumental operation from any particular perspective will
be conditioned by what is seen and said in other observational idioms.
Again, all of this will be familiar to amateurs of radical paradoxical logic.
Here, the point is that technological means are just as contingent as the
institutional arrangements that they are supposed to bypass; the observation
of technologies is integral to what they are and what they do. Materiality is
an effect of the terms in which it is observed or schematised, and there are as
many materialities (in one) as there are observers or idioms of observation.
‘Materiality is sociality’;10 that is, materialities that seem to ground or pre-
determine associations or assemblages of actors or discourses are actually
emergent effects of those associations or assemblages. Emergence does not
preclude durability. Materialities remain durable, and instrumentalities continue
to function instrumentality, because they are contextualised within emergent
ecologies whose elements are bound by relations – relations of double con-
tingency, a courbe machinique, or an exchange of competences – in which
contingent forms are continuously reiterated or ‘refreshed’. Nonetheless, this
is still durability within contingency. The sociality that sustains materiality
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can be reconfigured, more or less dramatically, as the inflection of these
bonds shifts; as, for example, the knowledge of plant genetics evolves, as
legislators respond to public anxieties about GM crops, or as courts develop
innovative schemata of causation and liability. Transcontainer technologies
can be understood as nexuses within just this kind of (paradoxical) sociality;
their materiality and instrumentality is a contingent ‘ecological’ effect.
6.2 Antecedents
In a report published in 2007, the ETC Group traced the origins of the Trans-
container project to the development of genetic use restriction technologies –
so-called ‘terminator technologies’. Genetic use restriction technologies were
initially developed as means of engineering intellectual property rights into
the behaviour of transgenic plants. Conventional intellectual property rights
share the essential limitation of conventional regulatory measures: texts are
not self-implementing. The scope and effectiveness of a right depends on the
means available to enforce it, and processes of enforcement imply negotia-
tion, translation, and adaptation. Given these limitations the appeal of ter-
minator technologies is obvious. So long as the only economically viable way
of exacting royalty payments for seeds is to charge a ‘technology fee’ related
to each successive generation of crops (rather than capitalising anticipated
royalties in a single (prohibitive) premium) breeders somehow have to pre-
vent farmers from evading these technology fees by reproducing saved seed.
By preventing the reproduction of seeds through second and subsequent
generations, terminator technologies would effectively compel farmers to
return to suppliers to buy proprietary (and royalty-bearing) seeds each
season. So terminator technologies promised to turn plants into the perfect
commodity, a form in which, for the first time, rights would be directly
inscribed in the essential texture of things. The technology ‘explicitly pro-
duces property (or, reproduces the plant as property)’;11 proprietary rights
are ‘embedded in the material itself ’;12 ownership is written ‘into the
genome’.13 From this perspective, terminator technologies promise to enforce
patent rights without reference to jurisdictional or cultural limits:
In the agricultural sector, it is possible to foresee the imminent demise of
the IPR system as the primary means for channeling returns from
innovations to innovators. The advent of genetic use restriction technol-
ogies foretells of a future in which seed patents and plant variety legis-
lation is a ‘thing of the past’. Future biological innovations will be
protected biologically. … Every country will exist within a ‘one size fits
all’ system that has perfectly enforceable innovation appropriation.14
The technique of hybridisation, which was adopted in the early twentieth
century, has precisely the same economic effects as terminator technology.
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Crop yields drop significantly in the F2 generation, so fresh seed stock has to
be purchased each season. However, some important crops (notably cotton,
rice, wheat and soya bean) are not amenable to hybridisation, so breeders are
obliged to turn from biological appropriation strategies to legal instruments:
trade secrets, shrink-wrap licences, grower agreements, patents and plant
variety rights. These crops are the most obvious candidates for the first
applications of genetic use restriction technology.
The ambition of genetic use restriction technologies is to automate intellectual
property. What does this ideal of automation involve? First, the objective of
terminator technologies is to recruit technology as the means of making
property rights truly exclusionary. A complex array of gene constructs is
composed into a gene switch15 that, once activated, would effectively prevent
plants from reproducing seeds (and hence the patentable ‘invention’). The
business of making a gene switch that could function so precisely and reli-
ably as to draw an absolutely hermetic proprietary boundary is far from
straightforward, but what is crucial for present purposes is what this ideal
(and its representation in critical commentary) says about the institution of
property. The representation of terminator technology as a means of per-
fecting property implicitly reduces conventional, textual, property institu-
tions to the kind of instrumentality that is supposed to constitute the essence
of technology. The ambition of terminator technology, which was also
reflected in critical commentary and in the use of the ‘terminator’ epithet, is
(finally) to instrumentalise property rights. But if we take materiality and
instrumentality as effects of observation, then things are not so straightfor-
ward. Far from curtailing processes of negotiation, translation and reflex-
ivity, the technology becomes an occasion for their renewal; more precisely,
the technology itself becomes a medium through which these processes are
articulated. The meaning and effect of the technology – quite simply, what
the technology is and what it does – becomes an effect of the association of
diverse (and often opposing) interpretations.
To some extent, this effect is visible in the history of genetic use restriction
technologies. When the question of terminator technology was taken up by
the 1999 meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Tech-
nological Advice (SBSTTA) of Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
its commercialisation was opposed on grounds of bio-safety. The draft
recommendation that emerged from the meeting of the SBSTTA invoked the
precautionary principle in support of the proposition that ‘products incor-
porating [terminator] technologies should not be approved by Parties for
field testing until appropriate scientific data can justify such testing, and for
commercial use until appropriate, authorized and strictly controlled scientific
assessments… have been carried out in a transparent manner’.16 At the time of
writing the so-called ‘de facto moratorium’ established by this Decision still
held. This characterisation produced two alternative responses from proponents
of terminator technology. The first was discursive or institutional, and
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consisted in a challenge to the precautionary premises of the 2000 Decision.
At the 2006 Curitiba meeting of the COP to the CBD, a group of nations
made a sustained but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to argue that the pre-
cautionary principle should be replaced by a procedure of case-by-case cost–
benefit analysis. The second strategy involved an ironic turn to technology. If
the basic objection to terminator technologies was premised on bio-safety,
why not turn the technology itself into a bio-safety device? Even if, techni-
cally, the essentials of gene switch technology remained the same, the ‘tech-
nology’ in the sense of a purposive intervention took on a very different
character. The inherent potentiality of the technologies, and perhaps even
their ‘original’ design, became an effect of the reciprocal inflection of diverse
actors or discourses.
The innate adaptability of terminator technology manifested itself soon
after the publication of the first patent. A technical report produced for the
1999 meeting of the SBSTTA distinguished between two possible forms of
genetic use restriction technology: the original terminator technology, now
renamed as a ‘variety-specific’ genetic use restriction technology, and a newer
form of ‘trait-specific’ technology. Unlike the variety-specific form, trait-specific
technologies would allow seeds to be reproduced into subsequent genera-
tions, but would block the expression of a particular (proprietary) trait.
From the point of view of the farmer, these traits would become optional
extras. They would be carried by all successive generations of the plant,
pending activation by an external agent which could be bought (under
license) from the producer. The virtue of the new variant was said to be that
it might ‘eventually provide an empowering mechanism to allow public and
private priorities to be partially reconciled’ (ibid: 14). Terminator technologies
were on their way to becoming bio-safety technologies. Gene switch tech-
nologies were soon to be promoted as means of excising transgenes from
modified plants, either by excising them from the whole plant once they had
served their purpose, or by excising them from those parts of the plant in
which they were either redundant (for example, a gene construct conferring a
mode of pest control may be required only in the roots of the plant) or
commercially undesirable (notably fruits or seeds). An editorial in Nature
Biotechnology characterised this evolution in terms of the plot of the movie
Terminator 2, observing that the ‘new Terminator technology, like the robot
in Terminator 2, would, it is envisaged, be a humbler, kindlier beast. Its role
would not be to prevent resource-poor farmers from gaining illegal access to
GM crops. It would be an environmental control mechanism – a way of
reducing the unwanted spread of transgenes in field situations’.17
6.3 Coexistence
According to the ETC Group, the Transcontainer programme is a direct
evolution of these more responsive terminator technologies. Politically, the
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appeal of biological containment strategies was said to be that they offered a
technical solution to public concerns about the environmental impacts of
transgenic plants:
[Agricultural biotechnology’s] future commercial success depends on
finding a plausible techno-fix to prevent leaky genes from escaping. If
governments can be convinced that biological containment of GMOs is
technically possible, it will open the floodgates to new markets for GM
crops, and commercial-scale production of GM pharmaceutical plants
(plants engineered to produce drugs), and GM industrial crops (plants
engineered to produce chemical compounds for industrial use), as well
as GM trees.18
Indeed, according to the ETC Group, the ‘double back-up systems’ that
were proposed by the Transcontainer project promised to make the separation
of GM and non-GM crops even more radically and effectively than ‘Termi-
nator 2’ technology could ever have done.19 What this characterisation
brings to the fore is the sense of technology as an ultimate realisation of
legality; technology reduces legal action to its instrumental essence (in this
case the law in question is the law relating to food and agriculture rather
than the law of property). Yet, in their response to the ETC Group, the
directors of the Transcontainer project observed that only one of the seven
containment strategies explored by the project has any technical similarities
with terminator technology, and even here the objective of the containment
strategy ‘is not to restrict the use of the seeds of biologically contained GM
crops but to facilitate coexistence with non-GM crops’.20 The basic premise
of the European Union’s policy of ‘coexistence’ is that ‘[n]o form of agri-
culture, be it conventional, organic, or agriculture using GMOs, should be
excluded in the European Union’.21 Restating this premise, the Transcontai-
ner project’s response to the ETC Group argued that the project ‘is not
conducted under the guise of bio-safety [but] with the aim to facilitate the
coexistence of GM crops and non-GM crops’.22 In what sense is the realisation
of coexistence different from the realisation of bio-safety?
Regulatory policy in the European Union starts from the premise that
‘coexistence is not about environmental or health risks because only GM
crops that have been authorised as safe for the environment and for human
health can be cultivated in the EU’.23 Once the cultivation of GM crops has
been authorised by the European Food Safety Authority, following an
assessment of the environmental impact of the crops and their specific mode
of cultivation,24 their coexistence with conventional and organic crops becomes
an economic and regulatory question: ‘coexistence is concerned with the
potential economic loss through the admixture of GM and non-GM crops
which could lower their value’.25 The basic axiom of coexistence is freedom of
choice: producers should be free to engage in their chosen mode of
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agricultural production without being unfairly – or ‘disproportionately’26 –
prejudiced by the activities of other growers, and consumers should be free
to exercise their preferences for the material, efficient or symbolic qualities of
one or other kind of product. Freedom of choice presupposes clear product
differentiation, so the EU’s coexistence regime is based on the mandatory
labelling of products containing GMOs. GM and non-GM products are
distinguished by reference to a threshold criterion: so long as the presence of
GM DNA is no more than 0.9 per cent of the product, and so long as the
presence of these traces is truly ‘adventitious’,27 that product will still qualify
for labelling as a product of conventional or organic agriculture. The refer-
ence to a threshold criterion recognises a basic implication of maintaining a
heterogeneous agricultural regime; contamination of one production line by
another is bound to take place by means of, for example, the inadvertent
commingling of seed stock, gene flow across crops, or the incorporation of
residues left in farm machinery, transport vehicles, or silos used alternately
for GM and non-GM crops.28
This is the point at which the economic dynamic of coexistence emerges.
How does one balance the interests of GM growers and non-GM growers?
Of itself, the adoption of GM agriculture imposes costs on conventional
farmers. For so long as consumers continue to differentiate between GM and
non-GM crops, and to regard the latter as inferior to the former, then non-
GM growers in an unregulated regime of agricultural production would have
to take on the costs of measures to ensure the purity of their products. On
the other hand, given the practical inevitability of commingling or con-
tamination, a labelling regime that insisted on 0 per cent presence of traces
of GM crops in non-GM crops would effectively extinguish GM cultivation.
So the point of introducing a non-zero tolerance of (adventitious) contamina-
tion is to institute a balance between the interests of the two constituencies –
or, quite simply, to make some form of coexistence possible. The question
then is how to institute the right balance. How should ex ante regulatory
rules – essentially rules requiring growers to register GM holdings, to notify
their neighbours of GM crop fields, and to cultivate GM crops at specified
distances from conventional crops – be framed so as not to create immediate
disincentives to the cultivation of GM crops? How far, on the other hand,
can one go in facilitating GM cultivation without risking exceeding the
threshold of 0.9 per cent ‘adventitious’ GM content? These questions go to
the nature of the ecology in which biological containment devices will operate.
6.4 Regulatory ecology
A few years ago, Jürgen Habermas warned that biotechnologies were collapsing
the traditional, ‘categorical’, distinction between the made and the grown, or
between ‘what is manufactured and what has come to be by nature’.29
Although the genetic constitution of domesticated species has been
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profoundly modified by centuries of artificial selection, these methods of
breeding consisted in an essentially ‘therapeutic’ mode of intervention, pre-
mised on ‘a clinical mode of adjustment to the inherent dynamic of
nature’.30 Breeders merely inflected the natural process of growth and evo-
lution, but biotechnologies reduce living tissues and organisms to inert
components which can be engineered and programmed: ‘what hitherto was
“given” as organic nature, and could at most be “bred”, now shifts to the
realm of artefacts and their production’.31 The EU’s policy of coexistence
quite straightforwardly assumes that the distinction between the made and
the grown has already collapsed; or, indeed, that it never existed. According
to the European Commission, coexistence is merely the latest variation on a
timeless practice:
The issue of coexistence is actually as old as agriculture itself. Over
numerous generations, the genetic make-up of farmed plants varies sig-
nificantly from their wild relatives, and cross-pollination is usually
regarded as undesirable. In the case of GMOs, there is also the need to
ensure that modified genes do not accidentally migrate to conventional,
organic, or wild plant species, particularly in the case of genetically
modified non-food plants.32
Implicitly, by reducing plants to their ‘genetic make-up’, and hence to a
mode of existence that emerged only with the rise of the science of genetics
and the business of biotechnology, this proposition represents biotechnological
‘making’ as the common techne of natural selection, traditional breeding
practices, and biotechnological intervention. For present purposes, the eclipse
of the old distinction between the made and the grown is less interesting than
the fact that coexistence brings with it a new and specific ecology.
The central axis of this ecology is the regulatory technique of traceability.
A label is reliable only if it refers to a product whose (relative) purity can be
guaranteed, and to guarantee purity one has to be able to follow a product
through from its emergence to its point of sale. Formally, traceability means
‘the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or sub-
stance intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed,
through all stages of production, processing and distribution’.33 The EU’s
coexistence regulation prescribes that all products ‘consisting of ’ GMOs (a
whole plant or fruit), products ‘containing’ GMOs (processed plants or
fruits), food ‘produced from’ GMOs (e.g. oils produced from seeds or sugar
produced from sugar beet), and animal feed ‘produced from’ GMOs should
be traceable through all stages of their progress ‘from farm to fork’.34 Those
involved in the production, transport, storage, and distribution of these food
products are responsible for ascertaining their provenance and immediate
destination,35 and they are required to retain for at least five years all the
documents, samples and test results that they might be called upon to supply
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to establish how a traceable product passed through their hands. These
obligations are complemented by an assemblage of national inspection
procedures that can, where necessary, be mobilised to make the whole tra-
jectory of a GMO and its products visible to regulators. This is regulation as
a politics of control, in the specific sense of ‘inspection’ or ‘verification’.36
The subjects of a regulatory regime can be called to account at various
points and by various means, but these subjects are left to – indeed, have
to – schematise and ‘integrate’ controls into their own ecological horizons in
ways that will feed back into the structure and operation of regulatory
controls.
The EU’s regime of traceability identifies each GMO by reference to ‘the
transformation event from which it was developed’.37 The category of the
‘transformation event’ refers to the specific act (and effect) of inserting a
gene construct in a host organism. Each such act generates a unique mole-
cular pattern that is produced at ‘the junction areas, the two regions where
the transgenic DNA is “welded” to the genome of the host organism’.38
Because transgenic modification is a highly random operation, in which
transgenic DNA is inserted into the host genome at unpredictable points, the
point of ‘welding’ will be unique to each act of transformation, even where
the act manipulates a gene construct and a plant variety that have been
combined before. So a transformation event will be specific to each indivi-
dual product of genetic modification. Laboratories are required to record the
creation and marketing of new transformation events rather than new
organisms; each transformation event is assigned a ‘unique identifier’, a code
that identifies a GMO for the purposes of authorisation, registration and,
crucially, traceability.39 The transformation event functions as the index that
traces the reproduction and circulation of the products of each specific act of
modification. However, it follows from the logic of coexistence that a trans-
formation event does not indicate ‘GMO-ness’ as a particular category of
being; it functions as the trace of a trace, as a signifier whose signification is
an effect of its use and interpretation.
To begin with, the category of the transformation event eclipses the dis-
tinction between the ‘grown’ and the ‘made’. This point can be made by way
of a contrast between the logic of the transformation event and the char-
acterisation of transgenic plants as patentable ‘kinds’ of plant. In 1999, in a
decision that held that transgenic plants were not ‘plant varieties’ for the
purposes of the European Patent Convention and were therefore eligible for
patentability under the Convention,40 the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the
European Patent Office reasoned that traditional plant breeding and bio-
technological intervention were different ways of making or (in)forming
plants. It was appropriate to limit the breeders of new plant varieties to the
protection provided by the legal form of the plant variety right because these
rights were ‘only granted for specific plant varieties and not for technical
teachings which can be implemented in an indefinite number of plant
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varieties’.41 Whereas traditional breeders created a specific genus of organ-
ism, often distinguishable from related varieties only by minor enhance-
ments, the biotechnology corporations created an entirely different order of
genus. The genus of a transgenic plant was not, argued the Board, ‘an indi-
vidual plant grouping to which an entire [genetic] constitution can be
attributed … but an abstract and open definition embracing an indefinite
number of individual entities defined by a part of its genotype or by a prop-
erty bestowed on it by that part’.42 In other words, the effect of splicing a
transgenic construct into a particular kind of plant is to give that plant a
new taxonomic and genotypic identity. The transgenic construct expresses
the principle of a super-taxon, a genotypic principle that overwrites the
identity of any plant into which it is inserted.43 For the purposes of European
patent law this means that a novel transgenic plant qualifies as an invention
because it consists in ‘a claim covering but not identifying plant varieties’44 –
that is, a claim that ‘encompasses’ plant varieties but whose ‘subject matter’
is not a plant variety.45
The identification of a transformation event does not have the effect of
‘genotyping’ organisms in this way. The process of fixing and tracing an
event does not involve deciding between – or determining priorities
between – ‘making’ and ‘growing’ as two alternative ways of bringing
organisms into existence and of defining their being. In one sense, of course,
the form of a transformation event assumes the difference between the grown
and the made; the event is formed at the intersection between DNA of these
two kinds, namely the DNA of the transgenic construct and the genomic
DNA of the host plant. This index of modification then functions as an
indicator of the presence of material (re)produced from the originally mod-
ified plant. But in the ecology of coexistence the index is not used to distin-
guish between two kinds of organism, two kinds of formal cause, or two
orders of being; rather, it is used to identify the degree of presence of the
material indexed by the trace. The practical premise of coexistence policy –
namely, that the commingling of GMO and non-GMO material is almost
certain to happen at some point in a chain of agricultural production –
means that the difference between GMO and non-GMO is one of degree
rather than one of kind.46 What distinguishes the terms is not the presence
or absence of the trace of the transformation event but the degree to which it
is present.47 Within the policy of coexistence, the basic function of the trace
is to make the difference between minimal (and hence adventitious) presence
and substantial (and hence intentional) presence, and this difference is not
the difference between two kinds of being but the difference between two
strategies of cultivation and two kinds of label (or market appellation).
The difference between GMO and non-GMO production can be framed in
different ways, depending on the interest of the observer and the phase of
production that is being observed. All the way down a (traceable) line
of production, the difference between GM and non-GM production is an
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effect of interpretation. This is the other side of the politics of ‘control’;
the measures by which actors and their activities are ‘controlled’ – in the
sense of ‘verification’ – are interpretively (re)constructed by each of the
actors in question. This effect is evidenced by the functions of the transfor-
mation event as a technique of control. Javier Lezaun observes that the chief
virtue (in regulatory terms) of the transformation event is its precision.
Earlier techniques for the identification of GMOs detected the presence of
the promoter sequences that are common to many transgenic organisms,
thereby ‘catching multiple GMOs in one single test’;48 by contrast, the spe-
cific molecular pattern identified by the form of the transformation event
allows regulators to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised
GMOs, and indeed to trace a DNA fragment back to a specific source,
agent, and act of modification.49 Crucially, this quality of specificity facilitates
the co-ordination of a diversity of actors or discourses: when those involved
in the process of regulation – corporate laboratories, testing agencies, pri-
mary and secondary producers, regulators and administrators – talk about
potato EH92-527-150 they can be sure that they all talking about the same
thing. But each actor will construe the presence of traces of a transformation
event in different ways. For politicians and campaigners against the cultiva-
tion of GM crops what is in question is the rationale of the 0.9 per cent
threshold, and, perhaps, of the coexistence policy in general.51 For producers
and distributors the objective is to develop strategies to keep the presence of
traces of GM ‘events’ below the threshold of 0.9 per cent. For testing agen-
cies, the challenge is to maintain the stability and specificity of the form of
the transformation event.52 How are these held together in practice? This is
where the question of ecology returns.
The transformation event illustrates a crucial aspect of the EU’s coex-
istence policy; in eclipsing the old distinction between the grown and the
made, coexistence policy comes close to recognising a regulatory ecology in
which instrumentality, durability and materiality are emergent effects of
sociality. Although coexistence is officially presented and implemented by
reference to instrumental effects, coexistence is articulated by the norm
which provides that the degree of (adventitious) presence of GMO-derived
material should not exceed the threshold of 0.9 per cent in products labelled
as non-GMO products. The norm can be integrated in a variety of ways. For
example, for those who still take seriously the distinction between the grown
and the made, the norm measures a latitude of impurity, and the practical
object is to reduce impurity to a minimum by (for instance) ensuring that
seed stocks are rigorously differentiated. For farmers considering adopting
GM crops the 0.9 per cent norm is a measure of the potential expense of
establishing spatial segregation distances (see below), or a measure of their
potential liability to neighbouring farmers. For consumers, the 0.9 per cent
norm underwrites the validity of labels, and these labels communicate infor-
mation that can be acted upon in various ways. What is true of the norm is
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also true of the instruments through which it is operationalised: the trans-
formation event, techniques of traceability, and, perhaps, Transcontainer
technologies, are similarly diffracted.
6.5 Ecological modelling
The objective of the Transcontainer project is ‘to facilitate coexistence by
containing GM plants next to conventional plants in neighbouring fields’;
the premise is that ‘[containment] has the potential to allow the application
of shorter isolation distances between GM plants and fields with conven-
tional or organic crops’.53 In other words, biological containment measures
are supposed to complement or (partly) replace more conventional techniques
for keeping GM and non-GM crops apart. In 2009, a European Commission
report reviewed the measures taken by fifteen member states in implementing
the principle of coexistence.54 The report identified two basic kinds of reg-
ulatory measure: the first kind consisted in ‘information, registration and
training procedures’, which (e.g.) require prospective GM farmers to seek
authorisation from a public authority before they embark on cultivation, or
to notify their neighbours or other interested parties; the second kind con-
sisted in what the report identified as ‘technical segregation measures’.55
Classically, these ‘segregation measures’ take two forms: isolation distances
and buffer zones (or pollen barriers). An isolation distance sets a fixed,
species-specific, distance between GM crop fields and neighbouring non-GM
fields with sexually compatible crops, the object being to contain GM pollen
drift within a specified radius. Whereas isolation distances are essentially
inert barriers, buffer zones surround fields of GM crops with non-GM crops
of the same species, the principle being that these sexually compatible plants
would effectively absorb gene flow from their GM analogues.
Figuratively, to use Deleuze’s distinction between discipline and control,
regulatory policy construes both spatial segregation and Transcontainer
technologies as modes of discipline (moulding) rather than control (mod-
ulation). Plants are localised, identified and contained, either by means of
spatial quarantining or by means of techniques that are supposed to make
plants inhabit – that is, behave in – space in a specific, predictable, and
quasi-mechanical way. Both techniques presume a conventional model of
ecology, in which the relations between plants and people play out in an
objective spatial extension, which is taken to be the common medium of
social and biological existence. The behaviour programmed into ‘biologically
contained’ plants would be a ‘behaviour’ adjusted to the characteristics of
this common ‘ecological’ domain. For some practitioners of coexistence
policy, the advantages of building spatial containment into plants were not
clear. The Commission’s decision to fund the Transcontainer project apparently
‘surprised’ some national regulators, for whom spatial segregation techniques
were entirely adequate to the task of ensuring coexistence in the phase of
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cultivation.56 Although this representation might overlook some of the
implications of engineering politics as artefacts, the perception of techniques
of biological containment as enhanced versions of existing regulatory techni-
ques is a good place to begin exploring how material technologies are ani-
mated by diverse schematisations. Already, the complexities of the spatial
measures that might eventually be complemented or replaced by Transcon-
tainer technologies tell us a good deal about the way in which material forms
are multiplied by observation.
The difficulties of fashioning an ecology of coexistence are reflected in the
variability of spatial segregation distances. In the case of some common GM
crops, notably oilseed rape, isolation distances can be quite significant. For
example, Luxembourg and Latvia require producers of GM oilseed rape
crops to maintain a minimum isolation distance of, respectively, 3,000 m and
4,000 m between GM and non-GM crops.57 In the case of maize, the Com-
mission’s report observes that generally ‘isolation distances for maize pro-
duction range between 25 m and 600 m with respect to conventional maize
and between 50 m and 600 m regarding organic maize’.58 So, for example,
Germany requires cultivators to keep a fixed distance of 150 m between Bt
maize and conventional maize, and 300 m between Bt maize and organic
maize.59 Before these regulations were promulgated German farmers relied
on the recommendations of the GM seed companies, which proposed an
isolation distance of only 20 m.60
To begin with, the extent of an isolation distance will depend on the sci-
ence of plant behaviour. Plants have different pollination behaviours and
differing potentials for gene flow by means of pollen drift;61 their seeds can
be more or less long-lived or viable in the soil seed bank; they have different
climate responses and different sensitivities to biogeographical factors such
as the prevailing wind, herbivore abundance, the density of pollinating
insects, or seedling mortality. These natural propensities establish one con-
text for the calibration of spatial segregation measures. From a regulatory
perspective, one has to take into account not only the behaviour of plants in
one phase or season of cultivation, but also the likely effects of the accumu-
lation of seeds and other residues in the soil. And any regulatory ecology has
to take into account how plants behave in relation to humans. For the most
part, accounts of the EU’s coexistence policy work within a schematisation
that simplifies the contingencies of space. Many accounts are exercises in
agricultural economics that start from the assumption that ‘each farm [is]
managed by a risk-neutral and profit-maximizing decision maker’ (farmer).62
Given that assumption, the crucial question about existing or proposed spa-
tial segregation measures is how or whether they relate the behaviour of the
rational farmer to the behaviour of plants in such a way as to achieve the
two basic objectives of coexistence: the objective of choice, which requires
proportionality between the two types of cultivation, and the objective of
ensuring that GM and non-GM products are actually held separate. The
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terms of reference of the Transcontainer project quite explicitly take this
economic matrix as the framework within which the effects of biological
containment strategies will be modelled; the project seeks to calculate the
‘maximum incremental social tolerable irreversible costs of the usage of GM
plants’, and hence to explore ‘the reversible and irreversible costs and bene-
fits for the private sector (technology providers, farmers, agro-food chain
operators, occupational safety for farmers, investment in cultivation
machinery, etc.) and the public sector (regulations, environment, biodiversity,
etc.)’.63 So the ecology of coexistence is premised on the way that landscapes
are apprehended by rational human actors; landscape is the common
medium in which plants and humans interact, but it is mapped on a grid of
economic co-ordinates and vectors.
Studies in the design of coexistence regulations propose that one should
take into account ‘the geographical influence of landscape, land fragmenta-
tion, and field configuration on the impact of GM crops’.64 So, for example,
if the agricultural landscape is divided into a number of smaller farms, sig-
nificant isolation distances will be a greater disincentive to the cultivation of
GM crops than it would in a landscape of larger farms; the costs of notifi-
cation and (in certain cases) negotiation will increase in direct proportion to
the number of proximate neighbours, and the area of land that has to be
kept uncultivated in order to maintain an isolation distance will be pro-
portionally greater than it would be in the case of larger holdings. Similarly,
the size of farms, and the nature of farm tenures, will make so-called
‘domino effects’ more or less likely; farmers deciding whether or not to
adopt GM cultivation might be dissuaded by the costs of implementing iso-
lation distances, and as more and more farmers commit to non-GM culti-
vation they might (collectively) be more concerned to ensure the identity of
those non-GM crops, and therefore more likely to insist on maximal com-
pliance with ex ante regulations. The broad point is that spatial regulations
have to be responsive to the ways in which rational farmers approach the
implementation of ex ante measures. Empirical investigations have given a
sense of the factors which shape the perceptions of farmers. For example, a
study carried out in Portugal, where farmers are likely to adopt transgenic
maize in order to insure against losses caused by the European corn borer,
confirmed that fixed isolation distances and intensive registration and infor-
mation procedures are likely to present smaller farmers with a steeper reg-
ulatory gradient. The conclusion was that regulation premised on rigid
isolation distances ‘reduces rather than supports coexistence’.65
In practical terms, this might mean, for example, that buffer zones are
better (and more adaptable) regulatory instruments than isolation distances:
the area of a buffer zone is usually less extensive than that of an isolation
distance; the crop grown in a buffer zone can be harvested and sold
(provided it is labelled as a GM product); buffer zones are potentially more
flexible than isolation distances because they are (potentially) open to
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negotiation between farmers.66 From the perspective of agricultural
economics, negotiation is the ideal of regulation. The European Union’s
coexistence guidelines observe that ‘groups of farmers in a neighbourhood
may achieve a significant reduction in the costs related to the segregation
of GM and non-GM production types if they co-ordinate their production
on the basis of voluntary agreements’.67 In Germany, distances may be
modified by private agreement – and ex post liability principles will be
modified accordingly.68 More broadly, prescriptive regulatory measures
are subject to bargaining in much the same way as Coasean logic takes
property rules and liability rules as means of bargaining towards economic
efficiency.
6.6 Conclusion
What does this brief review suggest about the likely ecology of biologically
contained plants? Crudely, the effect of Transcontainer technologies would
be to minimise zones of spatial containment, and the extent of that effect
will depend on the particular technology that is adopted. The Transcontainer
project focuses on three particular techniques: ‘controllable fertility’, which
uses gene switches to prevent transgenic plants from producing viable seeds;
‘controllable flowering’, which would result in non-flowering varieties of
crops whose commercial value lies in their vegetative parts; and ‘chloroplast
transformation’, which would eliminate transgenes from plant pollen by
engineering constructs into the chloroplasts rather than the nuclear
genome.69 Many of the variables involved in calibrating spatial segregation
distances will immediately come into play in deciding which of these techni-
ques to adopt. For example, even if containment techniques do function
effectively, the cost of the technology would have to be such as to reduce the
gradient faced by potential adopters of GM crops. Crucially, the choice of
technique will depend on the nature of the crop. For example, controllable
flowering technologies would be viable only in the case of crops (notably
trees) whose commercial value is not dependent on the maturation of their
flowering parts. Similarly, in the case of flowering crops such as oilseed rape,
which disperse pollen over an extensive area and which are therefore ideal
candidates for containment by means of controllable fertility technologies,
these technologies will be viable only if they overcome the difficulties
involved in timing the activation of the gene switch to allow the oil-rich
seeds of the plant to mature.
Much will depend on the efficacy and reliability of the technology. When
BASF’s Amflora potato was approved for cultivation, the European Com-
mission specified that the potato should be cultivated in such a way as to
reduce the risks of residue GM potatoes remaining in the soil after harvest,
or of tubers being distributed adventitiously. In a sense, because they repro-
duce asexually, potatoes are less volatile than the flowering plants with which
120 Law and ecology
the Transcontainer project is concerned; ‘genetic drift’ is an effect of
immediate material contiguity rather than pollen dispersal. But the terms of
the authorisation illustrate the point that potential – perhaps unavoidable –
residues of GM cultivation have significant long-term implications for any
regime that is sensitive to the degree of presence of GM products. If GM
cultivation becomes effectively irreversible due to the effects of residues, what
does that mean for the policy of coexistence? The more crucial point is that
cultivation is just one phase in the processes of production traced out by the
EU’s regime of coexistence. By minimising segregation distances, contain-
ment technologies might transform the ecology of cultivation. In the eco-
nomically mapped landscape of cultivation, segregation distances would no
longer have the effect of making GM cultivation uneconomic for certain
farmers. But one would still have to ask how cultivation is framed by other
phases in the process of agricultural production. What is the likelihood of
the ‘commingling’ of ‘contained’ seeds and ‘non-contained’ seeds, whether
GM or non-GM? To what extent can the immediate products of ‘biologically
contained’ plants be kept apart from those of non-GM crops? With concerns
about the efficacy of the technology in mind, might legislators (re)impose
spatial segregation in order to add a ‘political safety factor’?70
The likely operation of Transcontainer technologies would be analogous to
the operation of other basic technologies of coexistence. By analogy with the
form of the transformation event or the operation of traceability procedures,
one might say that the instrumentality of containment techniques would be
an effect of sociality (that is, sociality as paradoxical multiplicity). That is, as
in the case of these analogous techniques, the operation of containment
technologies would be framed or conditioned by the basic norm of coexistence –
the requirement that non-GMproducts should contain nomore than 0.9 per cent
of GM material. To return to a proposition introduced earlier in this chapter,
the norm is a variable nexus, or a form ‘brings people [or discourses] together
because it divides them’.71 And although regulatory politics might be inscri-
bed or materialised in the behaviour of plants, this materiality will be as
much an effect of observation as that of the transformation event. So the
ecology that really matters to the operation of containment technologies is
not the linear ‘ecology’ projected by the regulatory will to instrumentality,
but the paradoxical ecology of emergent sociality.
Notes
1 Between 2004 and 2009 the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme for
Research (FP6) funded three associated research projects: the SIGMEA project,
which sought to model gene flow by simulating the flow of pollen across a virtual
landscape (LandSFACTS), and which simulated the way that (rational) farmers
allocate crops to fields (see http://www.inra.fr/sigmea) and the Co-Extra
(Co-Existence and Traceability) project, which sought to develop techniques for
the traceability of GMOs, ranging from biological methods for detecting GMOs
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production and distribution, ‘from farm to fork’ (see http://www.coextra.eu).
2 See http://www.transcontainer.wur.nl/UK/questionsanswers/.
3 Cited by Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in Chapter 1 of this volume (n. 16).
4 This (Kantian) term is taken from one of the principal exponents of ‘radical
paradoxical logic’, Niklas Luhmann. See generally Luhmann 1995.
5 See Luhmann 1989: 22–23: ‘In a somewhat different, Wittgensteinian formula-
tion, one could say that a system can only see what it can see.’
6 Or, to borrow John Rajchman’s term, ‘perplication’; ‘creative distantiation in the
midst of things’ (Rajchman 1998: 17).
7 Winner 1980: 128.
8 Winner 1980: 123–24.
9 See generally ETC Group 2007.
10 See Latour and Lépinay 2008: 47.
11 Van Dooren 2007: 76.
12 CBD 1999: paragraph 108.
13 Van Dooren 2007: 71.
14 Swanson and Goeschl 2005: 693.
15 An animated presentation is set out in the online supplementary materials to Hills
et al. (2007).
16 CBD 1999: 47.
17 Keenan and Stemmer 2002: 215.
18 ETC Group 2007: 4.
19 ETC Group 2007: 8, 23–25.
20 Transcontainer 2007b: 2.
21 European Union 2003a, Recital 1.
22 Transcontainer 2007b: 1.
23 European Union 2003a.
24 At the time of writing, the Amflora potato, which was approved for cultivation by
the European Commission in March 2010, was the first GM crop to be approved
since 1998.
25 European Union 2003a.
26 European Commission 2006: para. 2.1.4.
27 Meaning ‘low-level, technically unavoidable and unintended presence’ (Directive
2001/18/EC, 29).
28 For a survey of these in relation see Messean et al. 2006.
29 Habermas 2003: 46.
30 Habermas 2003: 46.
31 Habermas 2003: 12.
32 European Commission 2006: 8.
33 European Union 2002: article 3.
34 European Union 2003b.
35 European Union 2003b: article 3.3.
36 See Deleuze 1990.
37 European Union 2003b: article 3.4.
38 Lezaun 2006: 511.
39 The identity of each transformation event – and hence the specificity of each
unique identifier – is ultimately guaranteed by a deposit of biological material in
the European Commission’s Institute of Reference Materials and Measurements.
40 Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention excludes ‘plant or animal vari-
eties’ from patentability.
41 European Patent Office 2000: point 3.10.
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42 European Patent Office 2000: para. 3.1.
43 The inventor aims at providing tools whereby a desired property can be bestowed
on plants by inserting a gene into the genome of those plants. Providing these
tools is a step which precedes the further step of introducing the gene into a spe-
cific plant. Nevertheless, it is the contribution of the inventor in the genetic field
which makes it possible to take the second step and insert the gene into the
genome of any appropriate plant or plant variety. Choosing a suitable plant for
this purpose and arriving at a specific, marketable product, which will mostly be a
plant variety, is a matter of routine breeding steps which may be rewarded by a
plant breeders’ right. The inventor in the genetic engineering field would not
obtain appropriate protection if he were restricted to specific varieties, for two
reasons: first, the development of specific varieties will often not be his field of
activity and, second, he would always be limited to a few varieties even though he
had provided the means for inserting the gene into all appropriate plants (European
Patent Office 2000: para. 3.8).
44 European Patent Office 2000: point 3.8.
45 European Patent Office 2000: point 3.1.
46 Of course this degree can be almost negligible; many contracts stipulate a max-
imum degree of 0.1 per cent, but the distinction is necessarily one of degree.
47 As a result, the form of the transformation event ‘denatures’ the distinction
between the grown and the made. It materialises the difference between these
terms into a singular trace – a molecular junction – which then marks (to a dif-
ferent degree) both sides of the distinction between GMO and non-GMO pro-
ducts. The distinction is turned into a unity and then divided again in such a way
as to eclipse the terms that were originally unified.
48 Lezaun 2006, 510.
49 So ‘two apparently identical GMOs, identical organisms sharing the same set of
transgenic elements could still be differentiated at the level of the transformation
event’ (Lezaun 2006: 510).
50 EH92-527-1 is the transformation event that characterises the BASF Amflora
potato, whose unique identifier is BPS-25271-9.
51 The Amflora potato offers a good example; the object of the genetic modification is
to produce only that starch (amylopectin) which is optimal for the production of
paper and textiles. Critics of the decision to authorise cultivation of the Amflora
potato (notably the parliament of Austria and the government of Italy) objected
that the dissemination of the potato might weaken the efficacy of certain antibiotics.
52 As Lezaun 2006 points out, the form of the transformation event presupposes and
precipitates from the coupling of a number of discursive and non-discursive prac-
tices: ‘the level of specificity of the “transformation event” must be understood as
the intersection of multiple legal and technical trajectories, rather than as a quality
intrinsic to the unit of regulation, or to the analytical tools capable of detecting it’.
53 Interview with Piet Schenkelaars, Transcontainer 2007a.
54 See generally European Commission 2009: para. 7.
55 See European Commission 2009: para. 7.2.
56 Transcontainer 2007a: 5.
57 Beckmann et al. 2006.
58 European Commission 2009.
59 Consmüller et al. 2009: 49.
60 Consmüller et al. 2009: 49.
61 For example, one might distinguish between ‘actual’ gene flow and ‘potential’
gene flow, or rates of deposition of pollen and rates of fertilisation (see Ceddia
et al. 2007: 171).
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62 Beckmann et al. 2006.
63 Transcontainer 2007a.
64 Demont et al. 2008: 2.
65 Skevas et al. 2009: 60.
66 Demont et al. 2008: 3.
67 European Commission 2003a: 46.
68 European Commission 2009.
69 For a summary see Transcontainer 2007a: 3.
70 With respect to spatial segregation distances, refer to the fact that an ecology mea-
sure might be increased to reflect a ‘political safety factor’ (Demont et al. 2008: 12).
71 Latour 2004: 13.
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Chapter 7
Perspectives on environmental law
and the law relating to sustainability
A continuing role for ecofeminism?
Karen Morrow
7.1 Introduction
Diversity is, in many ways, the basis of women’s politics and the politics of
ecology; gender politics is largely the politics of difference. Eco-politics, too, is
based on nature’s variety and difference. …1
Due in part to these inherent qualities, ecofeminism can be understood as a
significant aspect of the politics of inclusion. Ecofeminism is rooted in the
dynamic and diverse social and political milieu provided by feminist and ecol-
ogy movements. As such, it recognises the pervasive, complex and multifarious
nature of oppression/exclusion. Sustainability too, with its emphasis on the role
of bottom-up participation in governance in augmenting orthodox international
practice in this area, also espouses the new inclusiveness. The foundational
Brundtland Report is notable in this regard, observing that:
The law alone cannot enforce the common interest. It principally needs
community knowledge and support, which entails greater public parti-
cipation in the decisions that affect the environment. This is best
secured by decentralizing the management of resources upon which local
communities depend, and giving these communities an effective say over
the use of these resources. It will also require promoting citizens’
initiatives, empowering people’s organizations, and strengthening local
democracy.2
While it is important to recognise that ‘participation and sustainable devel-
opment are both ambiguous concepts’,3 the potential for productive linkage
and synergistic dialogue between ecofeminism and sustainability in respect of
advocating and actualising more inclusive approaches to environmental
decision-making is clearly worthy of further examination.
Realising the full potential of inclusive approaches to decision-making
requires not only social and political change but also ultimately institutional
and legislative innovation in order to address the manifest inequalities that
exclude certain voices from participation and power in the current polity, to
the detriment of (amongst other things) sustainability. Discussion here will
focus on the continuing relevance of ecofeminism and related approaches
(specifically Lorraine Code’s concept of ‘ecological thinking’) in promoting
debate in their specific spheres and in making a potentially significant con-
tribution to a more inclusive political (and emerging legal) praxis in the
sphere of sustainability. Particular emphasis will be placed on the contribu-
tion of inclusive ecofeminist approaches to developing more sustainable
decision-making processes, specifically through advocating an expanded view
of viable inputs into both discursive and deliberative systems. This discussion
builds on the broad approach towards valid participation that is already
evident in environmental sociology,4 and considers its ripeness for extension
into the legal sphere.
7.2 Sustainability and the new inclusiveness
The principles that may be regarded as supporting sustainability, while not
uncontroversial in themselves,5 are, to a degree, the product of the interplay
between global governance and increased awareness and scientific under-
standing of the now potentially perilous impact of human activity on the
biosphere across a range of functions, such as pollution, resource scarcity,
loss of biodiversity and global warming. At the same time, moral, political
and legal imperatives have also played a substantial role in fashioning sus-
tainability thought and action. Spurred on by the work of economists6 and
scientists7 in particular, the international community sought to initiate
change,8 notably through setting up the World Commission on Environment
and Development (WCED) to investigate sustainability. The WCED initiated
a global consultation process (in itself exhibiting the new inclusiveness), cul-
minating in the report Our Common Future.9 The report posited the need for,
what would in social, economic, environmental and, not least, political terms10
constitute a radical change in the way humanity interacts with the environment.
However, underpinning the headlining (and indeed headline-grabbing) concept
of sustainable development11 invoked by the Brundtland Report, lies the
fundamental recognition that, to achieve sustainable development, the interna-
tional community would need to alter not only the ways in which humanity
relates to the environment but also the ways in which people relate to one
another. To fully achieve this would require a fundamental re-visioning of
prevailing concepts and systems of governance.
The viability of sustainable development as presented in the Brundtland
Report is based in part on the concept of sustainable governance, which
looks wider than the traditionally empowered categories of political actor in
order to incorporate all stakeholders in a process that is as much, if not
more, about growing sustainability up from grass-roots level as it is about
attempting to promote it from above:
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We call for a common endeavour and for new norms of behaviour at all
levels and in the interests of all. The changes in attitudes, in social
values, and in aspirations that the report urges will depend on vast
campaigns of education, debate and public participation.
To this end, we appeal to citizens’ groups, to non-governmental orga-
nizations, to educational institutions, and to the scientific community.
They have all played indispensable roles in the creation of public
awareness and political change in the past. They will play a crucial part
in putting the world on to sustainable development paths, in laying the
groundwork for Our Common Future.12
The Commission’s own methodology showed a commitment to wide parti-
cipation in terms of information gathering process: notably, its deliberations
were informed by the innovative use of public hearings dispersed across the
globe to elicit information from a broad range of stakeholders.13 The need
for governance reform to give voice to those normally excluded for decision-
making processes is clearly articulated in the report:
It could be argued that the distribution of power and influence within
society lies at the heart of most environment and development chal-
lenges. Hence new approaches must involve programmes of social
development, particularly to improve the position of women in society,
to protect vulnerable groups, and to promote local participation in
decision-making.14
Concepts of intergenerational and intra-generational equity are also pressed
into service to underpin the need for an inclusive approach to decision-making:
Even the narrow notion of physical sustainability implies a concern for
social equity between generations, a concern that must logically be
extended to equity within each generation.15
While the intergenerational equity issues are philosophically fraught with
(perhaps insurmountable) difficulties which tend to preoccupy the academy,
the more immediate issues of intra-generational justice merit just as close
attention, since: ‘ … many problems of resource depletion and environ-
mental stress arise from disparities in economic and political power’.16 In
this context, the fact that the WCED identified: ‘ … a political system that
secures effective citizen participation in decision-making’17 as the first plank
in the strategy for pursuing sustainable development seems particularly
apposite. The Commission recognised that the contribution of NGO net-
working and other activities to sustainability praxis was already significant
and growing even at this stage.18 In light of this, the report went so far as to
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advocate a role for law in securing formal participation and supporting
rights for NGOs as a core concern:
Recognition by states of their responsibility to ensure an adequate
environment for present as well as future generations is an important
step towards sustainable development. However, progress will also be
facilitated by recognition of, for example, the right of individuals to
know and have access to current information on the state of the envir-
onment and natural resources, the right to be consulted and to partici-
pate in decision-making on activities likely to have a significant effect on
the environment, and the right to legal remedies and redress for those
whose health or environment has been or may be seriously affected.19
While the Brundtland Report enthusiastically embraces the notion of an
extremely prominent role for NGOs in progressing the sustainability agenda
as an unalloyed good, a note of caution must be sounded: there is a danger
that NGOs come to be seen, and to see themselves as acting, as a form of
proxy for the public in terms of participation. This raises issues of the via-
bility of NGOs’ credentials in this regard, not least their ability to be repre-
sentative of the public. Furthermore, over-reliance on NGO participation
also raises the possibility of the public delegating both responsibility and
activism to professional NGOs. These factors combine to leave little space
for direct citizen involvement in decision-making processes.20 However, in
particular where international law is concerned, but also, arguably given the
complexity of environmental decision-making contexts, in the domestic
sphere, it may be the case that, for most citizens, meaningful participation is
beyond their grasp without the mediation and assistance of NGOs. In any
event, post-Brundtland, the participation issue quickly became pressing, in
particular in light of the crucial role played by environmental concerns in
spurring the UN to action on sustainability in the UNCED in Rio in 1992.
The ongoing work of the Commission for Sustainable Development
(CSD) in its appointed task of fostering the development of Agenda 21 has
played an important part, in principle at least in opening up governance in
light of the sustainability imperative. It was only, however, at the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 that
the sustainable governance agenda really came to the fore in the interna-
tional community. The WSSD, in contrast to Rio, which was arguably
dominated by NGOs, had a strong business steer21 in tandem with broader
developments in this area in the popularisation and practice of Corporate
Social Responsibility. One result of this was that a major theme of the
summit was to develop ‘partnership’ approaches to governance. In so doing,
it placed already powerful major groups, notably those representing business,
industry, science and technology centre stage and, arguably effectively mar-
ginalised other stakeholders in terms of influence if not participation. On the
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positive side, by drawing diverse parties into a co-operative endeavour
(though this may in and of itself be problematic), the practice of partnership
at least attempts to harness broader participation to defuse conflict and
pursue goals. It also serves to render co-operation more formal and business-
like. In any event, post-Johannesburg, civil society participation is now the
norm in sustainability contexts generally and with respect to partnerships in
particular. Partnership as pursued at the WSSD and beyond, while viewed
on the whole as a fairly positive development (if limited by voluntarism) by
some commentators,22 is seen as negative by others.23 On balance, while
partnership is currently very much in vogue, it remains to be seen whether it
actually offers much in the way of substantive change in the business of
governance.
For all the interesting and often useful strategies adopted by the CSD in
response to its ambitious and innovative remit to foster the sustainability
agenda (in particular in actively involving major groups in its activities), it
must be said that it remains a weak and marginal body,24 even within the
UN. In any event, through developments in sustainability governance under
the auspices of the CSD it has become clear that, for good or ill, the praxis
of participation in governance for sustainability is, even where formal
appearances remain broadly consistent,25 capable of constantly changing and
evolving, often quite profoundly, over time.26
7.3 Gender and the new inclusiveness
The value of looking at gender-based exclusion from power and decision-
making is not only of interest in its own right. It also offers potentially
valuable insights into the participation of marginalised and excluded groups
in environmental law and the sustainability praxis more generally, as, in part,
the latter attempts to address a multiplicity of excluded groups including
women. In addition, inter-group permeability means that, for many women, the
reality of their experience in this regard is the product of multiple/compounded
exclusion, making the need to address the interactions between gender and
other forms of marginalisation a particularly pressing one.
At the outset, it should be noted that, despite internal differences, the
women’s movement had established global networks at its disposal that
arguably meant it was comparatively well placed to exploit the opportunities
provided by the forging of the sustainability agenda.27 This, together with a
cooperative modus operandi, enabled the women’s movement to develop a
clear role in the new, more consensual sustainability-based governance. At
the Rio Earth Summit, women’s groups exploited the opportunity to influ-
ence agenda-setting provided by the more inclusive approach emerging in
this area as espoused by the Brundtland Report. In particular, the women’s
movement was successful in promoting substantial changes to the draft of
Agenda 21 (rendering the content of the formerly gender-blind working
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document gendered throughout in its final form) through the pre-UNCED
work of the UN Environment Programme/Women’s Environment and Devel-
opment Organisation-run World Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet.
Women were also included in the major groups whose participation was
deemed crucial to progressing sustainability in Agenda 21. Significantly,
gender also gained specific coverage in Principle 20 of the Rio Declaration.
In principle, subsequent UN initiatives such as the Beijing Platform of
Action28 and the Commission on the Status of Women’s Agreed Conclusions
on the Status of Women and the Environment29 have continued to develop
the integration of gender and environmental issues, albeit often with limited
practical impact.30
Underpinning the Brundtland-inspired approach adopted by Agenda 21 is
the recognition that sustainability is founded on sustainable decision-making
which in turn requires participation in and ownership of decisions by all
stakeholders, from the major groups to the individual. A viable sustainability
paradigm therefore requires a shift in the locus of action far beyond tradi-
tional state actors and the privileged cohorts that comprise the establishment
in the development of international law and policy. Inclusiveness is particu-
larly important here, as women are under-represented in these contexts, and
as a result the established role of women in respect of the environment often
imposes responsibility without power. If, as argued by the Brundtland
Report, the success of sustainability depends on grass-roots change, this is
not a viable prospect in the absence of empowerment of those who are
expected to deliver on this – many of whom are women.31 Law, of course,
has a role to play in addressing these issues. However, even when well
intentioned (which is not always the case), the law can unintentionally
aggravate adverse gender impacts in the environmental sphere.32 Still, sus-
tainability demands sustainable outcomes, and to achieve this, decisions
must be arrived at in a sustainable way, i.e. through sustainable processes
produced by sustainable institutions; law must therefore be pressed into service
to concrete effect in this regard.
In the past, strategies for tackling gender issues tended to focus on
achieving gender neutrality as the solution. More recent thinking indicated
that this may not be the answer and that better results on the ground could
be achieved, first by developing policies focused on women,33 and to a
greater degree by adopting the more thoroughgoing gender awareness
espoused by what has become known as ‘gender mainstreaming’. Gender
mainstreaming represents a third generation of gender policy (after ‘in princi-
ple’ recognition and ‘women’s issues’ phases). Like sustainability, gender main-
streaming necessarily requires the adoption of an integrationist approach to
developing law and policy. Gender mainstreaming had its practical origins in
the failures and limitations of first and second generation policies on women.
Its theoretical basis, on the other hand, can be found in the UN’s 1995
Beijing Conference on Women, and in a more developed fashion, in the
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Beijing Plus-five Conference, Women 2000: Gender, Equality, Development
and Peace for the Twenty-first Century. The ‘in principle’ commitment at
such a high policy level was followed up by the introduction of System-wide
Plans for the Advancement of Women and by a whole raft of internal gui-
dance and training across the UN. A useful working definition of gender
mainstreaming has been provided by the UN Economic and Social Council,
which characterises it as:
… the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any
planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all
areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as
men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes
in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to
achieve gender equality.34
The Council of Europe offers an alternative version comprising:
a gender equality strategy that aims to transform organizational processes
and practices by eliminating gender biases in existing routines, involving
the regular actors in this transformation process.35
Despite cosmetic differences, both definitions share the same basic aim
of gender equality. While each encapsulates practically focused initiatives,
they are both also geared (implicitly in the case of ECOSOC and explicitly in
that of the Council of Europe) to the more profound issue of changing
organisational culture.
The central problem is that, while the principles of both gender equality
and sustainability may be fairly broadly accepted, principles do not make
prescriptions. In both cases, realising these fairly abstract goods in practical
terms is fraught with disagreement and difficulty, amplified by the additional
complexity arising from the overlap between gender and sustainability. The
OECD has taken an in-depth look at the relationship between gender and
sustainable development36 as part both of its Horizontal Programme on
Sustainable Development, and its contribution to the ongoing work of the
CSD in this area. The OECD’s approach tackling cross-cutting issues in this
area is to ‘engender’ its analytical, statistical and policy work37 in order to
improve its policies and foster more sustainable development. Its focus tends
to be on immediate practical concerns such as health and education, though
it also recognises that the societal substructure, including political participa-
tion and legal rights, also need to be addressed. This is commendable in real
terms, as bodies tend to respond more effectively to concerns that can be
addressed in practical terms rather than to more profound needs for change
132 Law and ecology
in organisational culture.38 At the same time, this focus can be rather reduc-
tionist: there is a very real danger that a goal-setting and a tick-box-approach
focus can become somewhat myopic. While intuitively appealing to a degree
and arguably capable of solving some problems in isolation, the ‘practical’
approach can ultimately miss the underlying point and avoid the major
issues that are the cause of the symptoms tackled.
7.4 Ecofeminism and sustainability
Karen Warren, a leading scholar in the field, describes ecofeminism as pro-
viding multicultural (on social domination in its many and varied forms) and
pluralist perspectives39 on:
… a variety of so-called ‘women–nature connections’ – historical,
empirical, conceptual religious, literary, political, ethical, epistemologi-
cal, methodological and theoretical connections on how one treats
women and the earth.40
Warren further characterises the ecofeminist perspective as twofold: identi-
fying and tackling patriarchy, but also developing ‘practices, policies and
theories which are not male-gender biased’, and which recognise the role of
humans as ‘ecological beings’.41 It is in the latter elements that a great deal
of potential common ground may be found with the sphere of sustainable
governance, in so far as the experience of some of the major groups identi-
fied in Agenda 21, labouring under what Slicer terms ‘related multiple social
oppressions’, is concerned.42
In its early years, ecofeminism was somewhat unfairly criticised as narrowly
ecologically focused and simplistic. This has not, however, been borne out
by its subsequent rapid growth in both range and sophistication.43 Ecofe-
minism was also rather more justifiably criticised for being dominated by
white Western theorists.44 Comparatively soon, however, it developed a more
dispersed character, through distinctive and influential contributions by
women of colour and the developing world.45 Drawing on its own rhetoric
of inclusiveness, therefore,46 ecofeminism47 is now best understood as a very
broad church indeed. At the same time, ecofeminism is recognised as a multi-
faceted and contested area of discourse. This does not, however, decrease its
salience. In fact, its fluid and dynamic nature is one of its strengths.48 The
same may be said for ecological discourse, which is also neither unified nor
unifying, but conflicted and unstable, and consequently creative and
vibrant.49 Such ‘creative conflict’ perspectives draw to some degree on work
such as that of Ferguson on identity politics and as a result identify the dif-
ficulty or desirability of defining a ‘collective’ or ‘community’. Both ecologi-
cal and ecofeminist discourses do seem capable of accommodating the
inevitable contestation of the nature of such ‘commonalities’ and this does
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not in and of itself render them otiose for practical purposes50 and may
actually enable them to thrive. Ferguson in turn builds on Zerilli’s work,51
making the point, highly relevant when considering the strong activist com-
ponent of ecofeminism, that, in many respects, practice and participation are
more important than identity claims in defining commonality.52 The inclu-
siveness of such practice/participation-based views of identity is further
enhanced (if also to a degree problematised) by the fact that identities are
necessarily the complex product of ‘multiple, overlapping and sometimes
competing practices’.53 It should therefore be noted that attempts to describe
them on the basis of class membership will always sacrifice accuracy to
simplicity.
In addition to the advantages offered by a practice/participation based
approach, ecofeminism’s expansive philosophical, social, political and economic
foundations include both activist and philosophical practice in its form and
content. This ensures that ecofeminism offers a range of different but related
lenses through which to view environmental issues in general and environ-
mental decision-making in particular. The many voices that have emerged in
the development and maturation of ecofeminism have played significant
(if not entirely compatible) roles and have, at the very least, led it to become
a vibrant, sustained and dynamic part of social and political discourse. It is
therefore to be hoped that it will also become part of a legal landscape,
especially in relation to inclusiveness in the context of sustainability. This
aspiration sits well with Sandilands’ identification of ecofeminism’s greatest
potential as:
… the democratic politicisation of gender and nature … challenging
hegemonic identifications, … [and] opening up new spaces of social and
political (and ecological) life to scrutiny and debate and of tackling the
discursive relations in which problematic gendered and ecological relations
are embedded.54
In light of this, ecofeminism has already made important contributions in a
broader theoretical context, not least in its contribution to feminist political
ecology, which regards gender as a ‘critical variable’ in human interaction
with the environment55 and sees ‘gendered knowledges and spaces and
women’s collective struggles’ as central56 to the realisation of sustainable
political and ecological practices. Its potential to make a broader contribution
to further developing the theory and practice of sustainability and the law
that supports it is clear.
7.5 Considering Code’s ecological thinking
According to some commentators, despite a raft of gender initiatives in a
variety of fields, while:
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… there has been a lot of dialogue on the intrinsic link between citizenship
and environmental issues or feminism … there has never been an
attempt to link the two to derive the complex political connection.57
This is arguably too dismissive of the existing working theories of ecofe-
minism, despite the fact that practical progress has thus far been rather
limited. As things stand, arguably the most interesting developments in eco-
feminism in terms of its contribution to broader debate and its ability to
forge new connections and inclusiveness, lie in its contribution to feminist
philosophy. Lorraine Code’s work in this area is of particular interest.
Building on clear ecofeminist foundations, she has developed her earlier
work on gender, considering feminist epistemology in the context of broader
axes of oppression,58 into a concept which she terms ‘ecological thinking’.59
She defines the latter as:
… not simply thinking about ecology or about the environment: it generates
a revisioned mode of engagement with knowledge, subjectivity, politics,
ethics, science, citizenship and agency. … 60
Thus defined, ecological thinking provides an interesting and even revolutionary
perspective from which to ponder the need to alter political and legal theory
and practice in order to meet the challenges posed by a biosphere compro-
mised by human activity. Despite superficial appearances and explicit
acknowledgement of Rachel Carson61 and other environmental scientists’
work, Code’s approach is not a work of traditional ecology. Rather, it seeks
to draw on the methodologies, currency and indeed ubiquity of ecology in
modern life and thought to inform a broader approach to societal ordering.
This fits well with Koggel’s broader observation that: ‘epistemological, moral
and political projects are intertwined’.62
Code’s concept of ecological thinking responds to this challenge in a number
of ways. First, by consciously promoting the development of more inclusive
forms of decision-making – advocating what she terms ‘collaborative epistemic
negotiation’.63 This negotiative process provides the means whereby ‘knowledge
claims’ become adopted in environmental policy’,64 and looks at policy debate
as a heuristic device to take such claims from contested to accredited, effectively
democratising this process. Given the situated and embodied nature of our
relationship to the world around us, the case for adopting the new inclusiveness
and arriving at what Jasanoff terms ‘co-production’ of knowledge and policy65
in this context is particularly marked. Code’s approach also ties in convincingly
with the ‘pivotal’66 Foucauldian perspective that views power-based approa-
ches to societal ordering as inadequate to take into account the ‘diffused
nature of control’ in modern society67 and postulates by way of remedy the
adoption of a discursive element in attempts to address such concerns. As
Ockwell and Rydin succinctly express it:
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Foucault highlights the regulatory power of discourses as they act to
select appropriate and meaningful utterances and actions within a
struggle for hegemony in the policy-making process.68
Hajer applies a ‘post-Foucauldian framework’,69 adapting this analysis in an
environmental context and arguing that a discursive approach is particularly
well suited to deal with the conflict situations that arise therein. Ockwell and
Rydin’s comments on Hajer’s work are useful:
… discourses are the product of institutional practices and individual
activities that reflect particular types of knowledge. They are produced
actively through human agencies that undertake certain practices and
describe the world in certain ways. Actors do not, however, act within a
vacuum. Discourses simultaneously have structuring capabilities as they
provide parameters within which people act and shape the way actors
influence the world around them.70
They particularly admire Hajer’s ‘story-line’ approach to discursive solutions
for conflict, as both combining different threads into a narrative and proving
an evaluative context for contested claims:
… story-lines also play an essential role in positioning actors, adding
credence to the claims of certain groups and rendering those of other
groups less credible.71
In terms of processing knowledge claims, sociology has shown in particular
over the last part of the twentieth century,72 that ‘ … knowledge is socially
constructed and shaped by the institutional contexts within which it is gen-
erated and accredited’.73 In response to such an understanding, inclusiveness
plays a particularly significant role in Code’s approach, in terms of process
and by actively seeking to address the multiple foci of institutional exclusion
including: gender and sex, race, class, and postcolonialism and draw these
perspectives into established policy and decision-making processes. The goal
here is not, however, limited to pursuing inclusiveness but also in part to
adapting, enriching and expanding societal engagement with knowledge
claims in the development of more equitable but also crucially more effective
praxis.74
In consequence, Code regards the realisation of ecological thinking as
requiring:
… a revisioned mode of engagement with knowledge, subjectivity, politics,
ethics, science, citizenship, and agency that pervades and reconfigures
theory and practice.75
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As a result, ecological thinking aspires to actualising the new inclusiveness
through developing a more holistic and less compartmentalised approach to
decision-making. The aim of ecological thinking in this regard is far-reaching,
seeking not only to tackle atomisation but also to replace attempts to
address it by mere synthesis, that represent the current norm, with a much
more ambitious holism.76 Still, as Læssøe rightly states, primacy of place
arguably needs to be assigned to professional (scientific and technical)
knowledge because:
… the complicated problems related to technological development and
the associated environmental implications grant experts and technocrats
considerable power to influence political decisions that have major
consequences for the lives of ordinary citizens.77
This, however, cannot tell the whole story. It is increasingly accepted that
knowledge claims are contested.78 Some disciplines, notably environmental
sociology, are disposed to engage head-on with the concept of contested
knowledge; in particular recognising the ‘ … shortcomings of abstracted
and “neutral” scientific knowledge in dealing with complex, uncertain,
and deeply value-laden environmental questions’.79 On the other hand, where
the law is concerned, ‘objectivity’ is often used to justify technocracy80 and
an almost blind faith in science. This is not to say that the contestability of
knowledge is not discussed: Steele, for example, sees value in carefully con-
sidering dissenting views ‘ … particularly in an area where there are many
uncertainties’. To this end, this discussion will focus on the potentially dis-
course transforming integration of what is often, arguably somewhat
unhelpfully, termed ‘situated knowledge’81 (all knowledge is, after all situated
in some way) into institutional understanding. Steele identifies a number of the
potential benefits of such knowledge as including, in some cases, where it
is generated by affected parties, offering ‘greater understanding’ of the issues
involved. In the alternative, knowledge contributed by interested parties
enjoying broader cogent experience can offer the ‘bread of reflection’.82
It is unsurprising therefore that Code strongly critiques what may be termed
the prevailing super-dominance of professionalism in decision-making pro-
cesses and the consequent erosion of public trust in both the procedures and
their outcomes that is one of its most corrosive results. Code’s approach
in this area complements the work of sociological theorists such as Beck.83
Much of her emphasis lies in examining the customary (though increasingly
questioned84) dominance and almost talismanic invocation of science as
justification in current decision-making processes and the characterisation
of scientific knowledge as ‘ … the most objective, certain, and sophisticated
knowledge humankind has achieved … ’.85 As a result, she sees the
scientific community and their claims enjoying enormous (and not always
warranted) epistemic authority and creditability.86 The growth of
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constructionist analysis87 of science is a significant consideration in this
regard, arguing that:
Science is ‘just’ a contingent and historical culture or form of life – a
communal and local language game without any privileged access to
objectivity and truth. Scientific knowledge is ‘constructed’ much like
other knowledge; it is local and contextual, maybe ‘gendered’ and politically
suspect.88
According to this view, scientific knowledge, far from being able to support
special claims to objectivity, precision and validity, is in at least some
respects, as indeterminate and shaped by cultural factors as lay knowledge.89
In light of such observations, Code regards continued unquestioning acceptance
of the super-dominance of science and its claims as dangerously combining
to mask hidden influences, interests and agendas.
Code’s analysis of the influence of science in decision-making could (and
indeed arguably should) just as cogently be applied to that of professional
politicians and administrators, whose own expertise and resultant authority
is just as entrenched in processes and practices as that of the scientific commu-
nity. The dominance of the political, scientific and ultimately economic
establishment in decision-making appears to remain the case despite osten-
sible efforts to embrace the new inclusiveness. This is demonstrated in
Pesendorfer’s work on the legal control regulation of chemicals in the EU.
He views regulation in this area as traditionally based on ‘hard scientific
facts’.90 Pesendorfer observes that, despite a move on paper towards incor-
porating more inclusive approaches to regulatory issues in this sphere under
the REACH reforms, outcomes offer little change ‘business as usual’. In
arriving at this conclusion, Pesendorfer identifies a number of factors that
contribute to this situation, namely:
… structural factors (institutional arrangements, power of industry), the
broader context (… world trade, neo-liberal globalisation, Lisbon goals)
and the dominant belief system (paradigm) shared by the major actors
lessen ambitious goals and that new modes of (participatory) governance
have an impact on only the debate, not the output and outcome.91
Pesendorfer views the REACH regulation as ultimately being characterised
by a series of ongoing conflicts between what he terms ‘advocacy coali-
tions’.92 Despite the apparent opening up of the regulatory process, the vast
power, resource and influence differentials between the ‘business coalition’ on
the one hand and the ‘Green coalition’ on the other had a huge impact on
the end result,93 and the locus of debate and decision were shifted from the
environmental to the economic sphere. The new inclusiveness may have
given the green coalition an opportunity to participate in the regulatory
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decision-making process. It did not, however, ensure that it would exert
actual influence on outcomes.94 This calls into question the viability of
inclusive/participatory governance. The value of the new inclusiveness is not
confined to participation for its own sake (though this is beneficial in the
processes of sustainable governance) but includes the broadening of the
range of inputs into regulatory decision-making to render regulatory out-
comes themselves more sustainable. Pesendorfer’s analysis of the operation
of REACH demonstrates a degree of intractability in the face of attempts to
reform regulation and embrace inclusiveness that is arguably equally applic-
able to the broader environmental regulatory milieu and gives rise to profound
cause for concern.
In response to the continuing dominance of such privileged classes of
knowledge, ecological thinking invokes the application of a more dispersed
methodology for decision-making, advocating a horizontal and integrated rather
than a vertical and segregated, approach to knowledge gathering and decision-
making. The taskof the new inclusiveness is to admit knowledge to both counter
and complement the ‘dominant social-political imaginaries’ of the machinery of
the scientific and political/administrative communities.95 This requires the
development of a more catholic approach to information gathering and
knowledge generation; one that allows commensurate value to be placed on
‘local, lay, experiential and intuitive’96 knowledge in addition to materials
from the professional realm. In light of such concerns, Steele underlines the
importance of complementary knowledge in the following terms:
Scientific claims are increasingly debated in the public realm, and citizens
are supposedly more able to gain access to information on the basis of
which knowledge-claims can be asserted and questioned. It has been
argued that civil society is thus increasingly well informed, and citizens
increasingly aware that the claims of science are disputable … One sug-
gestion here is that the public through its scepticism and willingness to
question scientific claims, may provide important decision-making
resources in respect of information, where those with responsibility for
decisions choose to recognize this.97
One possible response to this issue is to advocate with Irwin the development
of ‘citizen science’98 in order to broaden what are regarded as cogent
knowledge claims. This, however, brings unwelcome conceptual baggage and
arguably requires the excluded to ape the form of the mainstream as a pre-
requisite for inclusion. A preferable term, therefore, would be quotidian
epistemology. Quotidian epistemology encapsulates understanding based on
lived experience, generating, to borrow Code’s analysis, knowledge that is
‘ … part of and specifically located in a social-physical world that constrains
and enables human practices’.99 Quotidian epistemology by its very nature
encapsulates spatial knowledge, recognising that:
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Place matters because without a recognition of and attachment to
places, we cannot defend the environment, we cannot feel a struggle, we
cannot fight for anything [Nonetheless]…we need to recognise the different
ways and the different places that we are attached to. They are not all
natural.100
But at the same time it extends to embrace all other dimensions of experien-
tially acquired or lived knowledge.
The concept of quotidian epistemology shares some features of Lyotard’s
‘narrative knowledge’,101 not least in adopting an expansive approach to
knowledge itself, founded on the recognition that ‘it coincides with an extensive
array of competence-building measures’.102 Both suggest a pluralistic approach
that is helpful in addressing the significant ‘blind spot’ in science-dominated
decision-making processes.103 Furthermore, both approaches underline the dis-
tinction between knowledge and learning, identifying science as a (limited)
subset of the latter. Lyotard acknowledges the specific limitations of scientific
knowledge in its reliance on experiment-based verification, and more sig-
nificantly for present purposes, also notes that the validity of its claims depends
on its expression in ‘the language judged relevant by the experts’.104 In con-
sidering scientific and non-scientific (in his approach narrative) knowledge, while
Lyotard regards the two as essentially incommensurable, he acknowledges the
variable influence that they exert on one another; more significantly, he views
‘the former’s existence as nomore – and no less – necessary than the latter’s’.105
Quotidian epistemology is however distinguishable from Lyotard’s narrative
knowledge in that it is not to be equated with custom or the self-legitimating
narrative as its quintessential form. Rather, it is based on observation and
experience and therefore claims a type of evidence-based validity, though not one
determined by the strict scientific canon. More broadly evidenced experiential
claims of this type have a long-established pedigree in the law and quotidian
epistemology therefore owes its validity to a spatially located and experienced
understanding of a lived environment rather than to status accorded to it as
quasi-customary knowledge. Furthermore the value of quotidian epistemology
lies in adding a significant additional dimension to evidence-based argument
in contested decisions. In this regard, quotidian epistemology ultimately seeks
to augment and more effectively socially locate technical understanding by
adopting a broader approach to decision-making. This is founded on inte-
grating additional available and useful multiple knowledges that are gener-
ated by attested lived experience into the realm of legitimate and indeed
necessary consideration. Quotidian epistemology aims to draw on the full
richness and resource of experience in additionally informing decision-
making processes and outcomes to achieve multi-dimensional and therefore
optimal consideration of the mandated actions that result. That quotidian
knowledge is inherently and necessarily diverse in nature as a result is not a
weakness, but part of its value and utility. Code’s ecological thinking,
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focusing, as it does, on details, difference and their significance, rather than
on trying to bluntly fit everything to a ‘one size fits all’ prescription, is
exceptionally well geared to promote, value and exploit quotidian knowledge.
This mutually supportive accommodation is further bolstered by the emphasis
within ecological thinking on dealing with what Code terms ‘evidential
analogies and disanalogies’, which
… combines careful readings of evidence characteristic of empiricism in
its creative, deliberative versions with investigations that locate events,
experiences, symptoms, social issues, problems within wider patterns of
power and privilege, oppression and victimization, scarcity and plenty,
joy and sorrow.106
While quotidian knowledge is tied to embodied experience and necessarily
flexible in nature, Code argues that it is not thereby reduced to the merely
relativistic but rather ‘ … it is sufficiently coherent to be interpreted and
enacted across widely diverse situations’.107 This is in part due to the fact that
Code views knowledge as the product of a collective and ‘deliberative process
of negotiation’,108 which is necessarily reflexive and iterative in nature but also
grounded in physical and historical reality and that as a result, both the con-
tested process of negotiating knowledge, and the constraints imposed by rea-
lity, prevent a descent into what Saarikoski terms the ‘abyss of relativism’.109
Koggel’s analysis of ecological thinking is helpful here. Koggel recognises
that ‘knowledge is provisional, dynamic and changing’ and furthermore that:
Responsible knowing emerges through engagement in and interaction
with the world and through a process of critical reflexivity about the role
of humans and of the environment in shaping communities, ecosystems
and the world as a whole.110
Nonetheless, social constructivism rightly suggests, quotidian knowledge
should be just as open to testing and evaluation as any other type of
knowledge claim: its validity, cogency and relevance are not to be accepted
without question.111 This adds a new multidimensionality to the negotiation
of knowledge, in terms of its construction and accreditation and to addres-
sing conflicting knowledges.112 This will inevitably feature multifaceted con-
flicts along the spectra from scientific and quotidian and intra-scientific and
intra-quotidian camps and also to the forging of variable alliances between
them in specific contexts. Such complexity is however to be embraced rather
than rejected if we are taking ecology as our model, since:
Ecosystems are inherently variable and complex, a fact often obscured
by the simplicity with which environmental problems are portrayed and
policy solutions prescribed.113
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Code’s approach arguably favours strategies that are very familiar to those
steeped in the historic common-law case-based methodology. The broad
application of legal principles (rather than specific prescriptions) on a case-
by-case basis to the facts in hand, for example in the law of nuisance,
necessarily produces decisions that are specifically spatially founded and
located.114 The determination of disputes that are the subject of judicial
consideration in this context is, in theory at least, the result of a combination of
expert opinion (legal and increasingly scientific) and the quotidian (law would
usually term this ‘subjective’) experience of claimants sufficiently resourced and
motivated by experienced interference with private property rights115 to initiate
proceedings. The core concept of reasonableness in nuisance, where physical
damage to neighbour’s property is always unreasonable and the actionability
of intangible interference with a particular claimant’s use and enjoyment of
land is judged against broadly accepted societal standards of behaviour, has
long served to accommodate individual quotidian experiences on the one hand,
while preventing relativism from prevailing in the application of the law on
the other. However, as the twentieth century progressed, the role of the sci-
entific experts in this area came, as the result of judicial deference, to often
(but not always) dominate decision-making. Typical of the former all too
frequently manifest situation is the case of Graham and Graham v Rechem
[1996] Env LR 158, at the time the second-longest civil case in English legal
history, in which the claimants’ evidence of the alleged impacts of the
defendant’s neighbouring incinerator on their own health and that of their
livestock was roundly dismissed by the court. This can, however, be con-
trasted with the approach adopted by the court in Blackburn v ARC [1998]
Env LR 469 which found the claimants’ observations on the impact of a
neighbouring landfill site on their property rights germane to the determi-
nation of the case. While what may be termed quotidian knowledge was
utilised and valued by the courts in Blackburn116 it was done in rather qua-
lified terms and with a limited impact on the outcome. In both instant cases,
while the claimants succeeded, redress was confined to damages rather than
halting the activities causing the interferences complained of.
Finally, the identification of responsibility as a key tenet of Code’s theory
is an important safeguard against the potential for her concept of ecological
thinking to promote relativism in the generation of knowledge: central to her
theory is the idea that knowledge brings with it responsibility and that this
applies to all knowledge holders, both individually and collectively. Respon-
sibility also rests with all, regardless of gender and in recognition of this,
change is required to ‘create an impact on collective decision-making’,117 an
area in which there is much to be done: as Basu puts it, ‘although citizenship
is supposed to be gender neutral, it is in fact an extremely gendered
activity’.118 This is also true of many of the activities attached to citizenship,
since the concept is necessarily status based. In response to this and the
recognition that ecological concerns invoke debate on notions of responsible
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citizenship119 and trust, substantive change is required in the practices
of citizenship with massive ramifications for the way in which decisions
are made:
Granting centrality to responsibility in this ecological framework affirms
a pivotal role for consultative, deliberative, negotiated decisions in
constructing, claiming and circulating knowledge.120
The fact that Code’s concept of ecological thinking is so clearly predicated
on an understanding of the complexity and interconnections that character-
ise society is absolutely crucial to its construction. These features form part
of a wider project geared towards what Code terms ‘ideal cohabitation’121 in
respect of both the human and the natural world in a more viable and just
society. Furthermore, Code sees a significant virtue of ecological thinking as
providing the impetus to ‘reconsider the power and value of the small’,122 an
approach that fits well in principle with, for example, the ‘best practice’
approach adopted towards sustainability by the UN’s Commission for Sus-
tainable Development (CSD), considered above. Even so, Code is nervous of
equating the global with the local, fearing that to do so ‘ … posits an illu-
sory symmetry between the two’.123 While this concern may be justified in
some respects, for example in that what is local is knowable in a way that
what is global is not, it should not be allowed to mask the fact that sig-
nificant commonalities do exist in the many locals that together make up the
global in any given context and that there is a great deal to be said for dia-
logue and dissemination of experience between them. Indeed Code herself
sees the value of the power of experience of the particular to ‘generate ana-
logies’,124 though not, by conscious vigilance for disanalogies, prescriptions
that are more broadly applicable.
Taken as a whole, ecological thinking is far removed from the often largely
cosmetic changes to political praxis suggested by a grafting on of sustain-
ability to business as usual models. Its realisation would profoundly chal-
lenge current societal, political and legal practice on a number of significant
levels in general, and demand a significant reworking of notions of citizenship
and participation in particular. It is more likely that the radical demands of
sustainability will be met in an extensive and ambitious recasting of cur-
rently unsustainable modes of action, rather than in desultory tinkering with
a system that is comprehensively failing to deliver; ecological thinking has a
great deal to offer as one possible approach to engaging with this imperative
challenge.
7.6 Conclusion: Toward a productive synthesis?
Whilst ecofeminism is an inherently inclusive concept, hugely malleable and
multi-faceted, and as such manifesting itself in a myriad of forms, it exhibits
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core characteristics that have a great deal of relevance more generally. In
placing a clear emphasis on participation and promoting an active and
engaged citizenship, all of which are significant elements in both Code’s
ecological thinking and broader feminist political activism,125 ecofeminism sits
well with the dispersed notions of decision-making and responsibility that
underpin sustainability. Likewise, the fact that feminist thought in general,
and ecofeminism and ecological thinking in particular, posit the necessity of
incorporating quotidian or lived experience into politics126 also shares core
values that sit well with the need and desire to incorporate grassroots ele-
ments that are central to sustainability theory and practice. This is particu-
larly the case since so much activity in the realm of sustainability focuses on
activities that lie without the usual channels of law and policy development,
in what McAfee and Snyder have termed ‘the non-governmental places of
common problem solving’127 located in civil society. As Ferguson states:
… just as biological sex does not exhaust the meaning of gender, citizenship
does not exhaust the meaning of civic identity.128
It is therefore essential that those excluded from predefined commonalities and
established channels of influences are positioned, through the empowerment
of civil society in its most inclusive form, to attempt to address and contest
their exclusion as they see fit and agitate to challenge the status quo. In
light of this, there is also much to be said for embracing what Underhill-Sem
identifies as the ‘partnership ethos’129 of ecofeminism.130 This partnership
ethos needs to be more fully exploited in a range of ways encapsulating the part-
nership between the natural world and humanity, and where humanity is con-
cerned, between professional (scientific, technical, political and administrative)
and quotidian knowledge holders.
In the author’s opinion, crafting a viable basis for effective interactions
between civil society and governmental systems in the broadest sense of the
term provides the current locus for discussion and debate of developing the
new inclusiveness that must provide the core of any workable and working
concept of sustainable governance. A key problem, central to the relevance
of ecofeminist and other dominance-challenging perspectives, lies in the fact
that, while the moral imperative and possibly even the justice of bringing
such excluded views to the table is clear, their viability in actually securing
any change in approach and more specifically outcome, is open to serious
question. Code addresses this issue by pointing out that, despite their man-
ifest disadvantages, resistance movements have already to some degree
managed to exert influence for change in a number of areas, gender among
them.131 In light of this, advocacy both within and without the system,
although as Code rightly points out problematic, has done a great deal to
open doors to those formerly excluded from decision-making processes. It is
here that law has had the potential to add to developments, though whether
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it has actually delivered much is at this stage highly debatable. However, at
the very least, once participation becomes entrenched in soft or hard law,
while the influence exerted by formerly excluded groups may not necessarily
be proportionate to their social or moral claims, it cannot be so easily dis-
regarded, at least in formal terms. Once procedural entitlements are
embraced in law, substantive claims can at least be aired in a highly visible
fashion that will, it is to be hoped, make them more difficult to ignore.
Many of the values that this new governance must exhibit can be drawn
from broader feminist and ecofeminist theory. These include: an active citi-
zenship founded on participation, with all environment actors promoting
participation based on practice rather than simply predicated by status.
Shiva persuasively identifies participation as a ‘vital human need’.132 However,
it must also be observed that participation, while important in its own right,
in order to be meaningful needs to be evaluated in terms of the ability of
all participants, not merely to play a part in processes, but also to exert a
proportionate influence on the determination of outcomes.133
The adoption of inclusiveness in respect of participation in knowledge
gathering, policy-making and decision-making, seeks to accommodate the
rights of active citizens to meaningfully contribute to addressing and valuing
diversity, rather than attempting to impose an artificial uniformity on pro-
cesses. Such inclusiveness must place commensurate value on the input of all
voices to debate and on decision-making based on the cogency of their con-
tribution, broadly interpreted, to the issues in hand.
Inclusiveness seeks to deliver, where possible, a truly consensual (negotiated
rather than imposed) approach to knowledge gathering and decision-making
processes. While consensual outcomes to such processes may not be possible, as
ultimately difficult choices must be made, these will at least be arrived at on the
basis of having heard and carefully considered contributions by a whole range
of participants. In this respect, inclusiveness offers not so much a cure for, as a
necessary counter to the dominance of individualism that characterises much of
modern political thought and the laws that it gives rise to.
Furthermore, an inclusive and consensual mode of knowledge gathering and
decision-making offers the opportunity to place the shared priorities and col-
lective concerns generated by the demands of sustainability much more promi-
nently within the frame for consideration than is presently the case while, at the
same time valuing the contribution of the individual in what Lee terms ‘ethical
association – an association that sees the need to respect the dignity and
agency of each individual’, that ultimately enriches democracy.134
Finally, in practical terms, it is vital to increase in knowledge gathering
and decision-making processes the range and depth of inputs to incorporate
not only professional but also quotidian knowledge. This is a prerequisite in
order to fashion effective sustainable governance that reflects the complexity
of reality and to address the enormous and intertwined social, economic and
environmental challenges of progressing the concept of sustainability more
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generally. If human ingenuity is to address the challenges posed by sustain-
ability, we surely cannot afford to be profligate with this resource by discounting
huge tracts of knowledge and experience wholesale because it fails to fit the
dominant professional knowledge paradigm. To this end it is crucial that we
consciously address
the inertia of knowledge practices that stems from their embeddedness in
institutional structures. …135
At the same time, our relationship with the environment is also geo-
graphically, historically, socially, politically, economically, technologically,
culturally and ultimately legally constructed and our approach to progressing
sustainability in each of these areas and in the complex interconnections
between them is a matter of ever increasing importance. However, over a
decade and a half on from Rio, despite developments on paper, the rhetoric
of sustainability thus far has made little difference on the ground; environ-
mental degradation continues apace; and despite lip service being paid to
participation, in particular though notions such as stakeholding and part-
nership, the locus of power remains firmly entrenched in the status quo, with
the market ultimately at its core.136 In this regard the development of policy
and law consistently continues to fail to keep pace with human-made
impacts on the natural world, a position by its very nature unsustainable and
perilous to both biosphere and humanity. The Brundtland Report stated:
National and international law has traditionally lagged behind events.
Today, legal regimes are being rapidly outdistanced by the accelerating pace
and expanding scale of impacts on the environmental base of development.
Human lawsmust be reformulated to keep human activities in harmonywith
the unchanging and universal laws of nature. There is an urgent need;
 to recognise and respect the reciprocal rights and responsibilities of
individuals and states regarding sustainable development,
 to establish and apply new norms for state and interstate behaviour
to achieve sustainable development,
 to strengthen and extend the application of existing laws and inter-
national agreements in support of sustainable development, and
 to reinforce existing methods and develop new procedures for
avoiding and resolving environmental disputes.137
However, little substantive progress has been achieved on any of these fronts
and, as yet, despite ever increasing scientific knowledge of the vulnerability of the
biosphere to human activity and quotidian experience of the impacts of
environmental degradation and resource scarcity across the globe, there is no
truly significant political or legal development to shift sustainability beyond
mere formalism.
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Perhaps the last word is best left with Code, who observes that:
… theories of knowledge are neither self-contained within philosophy
nor isolated from people’s lives in the societies where their ideals and
standards prevail.138
The same is undoubtedly true of laws. Law has the potential to at least
facilitate developing the viability of the new inclusiveness in order to begin,
albeit tardily, to actualise sustainability by exploiting its potential to mandate
broader participation in sustainability praxis. As things stand, and if the
established global polis and the law that it generates continue, society will at
best lag behind the environmental imperatives and at worst actually retard
progress. In light of the pressing ecological problems that we now face, it is
about time we harnessed the potential of law, to see it come of age in
enabling us to exploit the full breadth of available resources in the attempt to
forge not just a better way of living but a sustainable one.
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Chapter 8
Animals and the future salvation
of the world
Piyel Haldar
Without the … hope of the last judgement, the Western legal tradition could not
have come into being.1
8.1 Introduction
The term ‘environmental law’ suggests two possible sources of sovereignty.
On the one hand, and somewhat obviously, ‘law’ refers us to the full con-
stitution of protocols, decision making procedures and statutes determined in
the name of national sovereignty, as well as to the more general principle of
jurisdiction under which all decision making and norms are proscribed by
legal sovereignty. On the other hand, ‘environmental law’ draws from
broader non-legal and non-state principles (scientific, philosophical, cultural)
relating to the care, remediation and management of the biophysical sphere.
It simultaneously alerts us to the possibility that the environment itself might
be regarded as sovereign; that it is the environment itself, its fate and its
future in the face of human-made catastrophe, that ought to determine the
decision making process, the terms of agreements and indeed the very
structure of social life and culture. A sort of green sovereign emerges from
the earth itself. Characterised as mother, cosmic force, gaia, the future, or
any number of other avatars, such sovereignty calibrates the efficacy and
merit of the law only in its own best interests.
And yet, from the perspective of modern legality, there is no real compe-
tition between these two sovereign principles. To decide environmental issues
within the legal arena already acknowledges that the status of the environ-
ment falls below the requisite standards expected of sovereignty. The clear
triumph of law over the environment indicates, and indeed, rests upon a
hierarchical distance between ‘man’ and what he inhabits. Equally, what
allows for the superiority of ‘man’ over the natural environment has to do
with the sovereignty of law itself. In order to chart the emergence of law’s
role in what Giorgio Agamben calls the anthropological machine – the
discursive and material apparatuses that maintain the distinction between
humanity and animality – what has to be understood is how law, just like
post-pagan and post-axial religions, overturns a state of affairs in which man
was subject to the sovereignty of the environment.2 Law, in other words,
reverses a once-held state of affairs in which nature once determined the law.
By focusing on a range of Christian didactic literature dealing with animals,
this chapter3 charts the process from which the environment is seen as
sovereign to the excision of nature in the role of world formation; a process
that might be described as moving from the verdant to the desiccated.
Moving from an understanding of standards of normativity that are measured
by and inhere within the natural environment, such literature culminates in
what might be termed the modern juridico-anthropological machinery that
separates man from the very environment he inhabits. What will be argued is
that the primacy of law over nature is rooted in a particular mode of Christian
hermeneutic that posits an exterior law that establishes the natural scheme of
things and cultivates man accordingly. Nature becomes a mere cipher for
divinity and for a law. It hides the ultimate source of life and provides clues
as to the character of a universal law. Nature as a mystical set of clues or
ciphers thus engenders and cultivates in Christian subjectivity a process of
decoding. The environment we inhabit is to be read as a text subsisting out-
side the self; it has to be cracked and deciphered only through the inter-
nalised process of human reasoning. The various chronicles that present the
hermeneutic imagining of the natural environment simultaneously present us
with an understanding of Law’s process of becoming other: the making
possible and regulation of social relations within culture operates only
through the imaginary order of nature.
In charting the role played by Christian didactic, what will be argued
further is that this historical process leading to the legal excising of nature
and animality does not completely disavow a certain characteristic of sover-
eignty associated with the natural world. This characteristic might be defined
in relation to a notion of a coming salvation. What will become clear is that
the animals that form the subject matter of the literature under investigation
in this chapter take a certain pride of place not simply because they betray
Divine mystery but because they usher and indicate a specifically Christian
idea of a future salvation. Animals, being God made yet separated from
the Adamic heredity of man, existed without original sin. They alone
retained a purity denied to post-lapsarian humanity and were given what
Ernst Kantorowicz terms a ‘halo of perpetuity’.4 Thus, Kantorowicz notes,
the biblical homily of the little donkey who carries Christ into Jerusalem
on Palm Sunday perfectly illustrates the relationship between animals and
the economy of salvation. The donkey is at once physical flesh and can thus
be returned by Christ to his original owner once he has carried out his
function of transport. But the sinless donkey is also sempiternal, messianic
and ‘haloed’. It is the immortal quality of the animal messianum that stays
with Christ in the Holy City which is itself an allegory of eternity.5 Because
pure, these animals were best suited to the purpose of describing to Christian
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man all that he needed to be saved: ‘But ask the animals and they will
teach you.’6
It is this Christian notion of a future and eternal salvation that makes
animal didactic literature so relevant and characterises modern law’s rela-
tionship to sovereignty. It is a feature associated with the idea of nature’s
proximity to sovereignty that is retained by Western legal systems. There are
a number of ways in which this observation about the normative dimension
of fabulous animals impacts on the specific understanding of law. The idea
of salvation is clearly incorporated into understandings of political sover-
eignty. Any declaration of a state of exception, which for Carl Schmitt
determines the nature of sovereign, for example, is a rhetorical moment that
is accompanied by the dubious statement that ‘eventually all will be all right’
or ‘the end justifies the means’. Consequently, all other present priorities are
suspended, deemed non-urgent, until some future resolution has been
achieved; until the global economy has been put in order, until we are once
again unified in the name of capitalism, until the enemy has been defeated,
until the terror has subsided. The exception is always that which lives in the
shadow of an imagined future. The Christian literature on animals presents
Western legal thought with the idea that the future provides a single voice
that speaks pro nobis. Law, in other words, is not simply coordinated by the
past, by the wisdom of elders, or by tradition. It refers equally to, and is
defined equally by, the future, by hope and by the concept of salvation.
More specifically, however, and to the extent that it incorporates at least
something of current environmental concerns, environmental law perfectly
reflects this key logic of modern Western legal systems. That is to say, in
attempting to initiate the sovereignty of the environment, it too looks toward
some significant future point in which salvation might be reached. Environ-
mental action groups might well take a stance that is seemingly and vehe-
mently anti-legal and anti-state. To be sure, there is a great deal to be said
about claims that our faith in law has disintegrated, that political language
can only inadequately express planetary disaster and that the covenant of
things is broken. But the call to ‘save the planet’ is simply a provocation of the
most conservative and conserving of sovereign principles that determine
the law by turning to the language of the future as something absolute that
hold things together. It becomes one call among many that attempts to steer
the trajectory of political and legal discourse towards an anticipated horizon.
The environment and the non-human animal that inhabits it do not only
remind man of an uncivilised or anarchic past but cipher an idea of the
future to be harnessed as a regulatory principle.
The features of Christian literature that establish both the juridico-
anthropological machinery and the soteriological discourse in the heart of
the present chapter might be preliminarily highlighted. First, animals depic-
ted in the early Christian, or physiologus bestiaries symbolised the mystery
of creation, the divine provenance of all things and the attributes of that
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divinity. In so doing, a specific hermeneutics developed in order to reveal
through the animal kingdom a logos which was higher than anything that
might be said to reside in nature. Second, a later medieval development in
the literature used the same animals in order to allegorise a normative code
for the behaviour of man in preparation for his salvation. Here the bestiary
emblematised man rather than god; the animal, as it were, penetrated man.
This process will be examined by tracing the development of animal sym-
bology across three broad categories of relevant literature that constitute the
medieval obsession with animals. These are natural histories, mystical zoo-
graphy (or the physiologus bestiaries) and later medieval bestiaries. Each will
be examined in turn, paying attention to the development of a semiotic
system that carefully arranges the place of man within his environment, in
relation to Divinity and finally in relation to notions of redemption.
8.2 Pagan mythology and Aristotelian zoology
While not directly or obviously Christian in their moralising content, it is
important briefly to note two substantial categories of literature that occupy
a relationship to, and influence, the later Christian bestiaries. First are the
collections of mythologies, such as those of Aesop and Ovid.7 In their explicit
and implicit worshipping of nature, pagan mythology quite obviously stood in
direct contrast to Christianity. Animals, here, did not symbolise a divine
entity separated from the environment; they did not instruct by virtue of
divine provenance. Nevertheless, individual characters and narratives from
this sub-genre of literature were incorporated and transformed into the bestiary
tradition. It is through the transformation from paganism to Christianity that a
new hermeneutic structure is developed that, as will be shown, radically
transforms man’s relationship to the animal kingdom.
The second category of pre-Christian animal literature might loosely be
termed Aristotelian and incorporates a broad range of natural histories (such
as Pliny’s Natural History)8 and encyclopaedias (such as Isidore of Seville’s
Etymologiae).9 Descriptive and anecdotal, these were largely clear of any
sort of explicit moralising. They were, quite obviously, as the term ‘natural
history’ suggests, inquiries into the infinite variety of nature. Meticulous
surveys are provided of known geography, ethnography, anthropology, physiol-
ogy, botany, agriculture, horticulture, metallurgy and mineralogy. Each natural
history would therefore devote a significant volume to a zoological survey of the
world. Predominantly influenced by Aristotle’s History of Animals,10 classical
zoology was concerned with tabulating the ontological place of animals
within the natural universe. Members of the living kingdom were placed into
chapters depending on their genus and differences. While these classical
accounts might include oddities and improbabilities, the authors cling to
firm facts (albeit facts that were often transmitted anecdotally). As with the
mythological, or Aesopian, tradition, Aristotelian histories held no clue as to
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any divine providence that may or may not subsist within nature. The
environment, a set of self-sovereign facts, simply existed. The environment
held no moral value and provided no hidden narrative lesson about man’s
place on Earth. As a result of this lack of moralising, later theologians would
accuse the classical authors of these merely technical histories of having fal-
sified the world soul, voiding nature of any symbolic and divine ordinance.
Nevertheless, such logical classification, which culminated in being expressed
according to the epistemological model of the Porphyrian tree, is not totally
removed from the realms of the more fabled and fabulous bestiaries.11 It
ought to be remembered that in Book VIII of his Natural History Pliny
records his belief in the existence of werewolves as well as ‘the amphisbaena,
the basilisk, the catablepa, the crocoti, the corocoti, the leukocroti, the
leontophont and the maticore, all destined to go on to crowd the bestiaries
of the Middle Ages’.12 There is more to the influence of the Aristotelian
natural histories since, as shall be argued, the natural history of animals lays
a descriptive field on which the symbolic animal, in the most didactic
examples of Christian animal literature, is allowed to graze!
8.3 The post-pagan bestiarum vocabulum
The normative turn in distancing the sphere of humanity from its environment
begins with the incorporation of pagan mythology and Aristotelian histories
into more symbolically charged Christian didactic. This Christian tradition
of animal literature consists of the curious mystical compendia derived lar-
gely from the Physiologus (the title is seldom translated but, when it is, it is
usually as ‘Naturalist’) as well as the various Patristic Hexahemera (accounts
of the six days of Creation).13 Dating from the second century AD, the Phy-
siologus in particular (correctly or incorrectly attributed to a ‘Theobaldus’
who lived, if he did live, in Alexandria) collected from the pre-literate tradi-
tion of Mediterranean folklore a number of these animal tales and herded
them towards Christian homily. The text is organised into forty-nine chapters
each of which is devoted to the characteristics of an actual or fabulous
animal; each animal is illustrative of some aspect of Christian doctrine. The
Physiologus stands as a particular and significant example of the Christianisation
of pagan deities. Christ the ‘aethereal bee’ buzzes around, as it were, polli-
nating a once pagan life with his own Divinity. The eagle as an emblem of
Jupiter, for example, metamorphosed into an emblem of John the Baptist.14
The Physiologus and various later translatio (there are innumerable examples
of post-Theobaldus Physiologus bestiaries), were regarded as much more
than a ‘system of mystical zoology’; they were more a species of Christian
didactic.
Appointed by monasteries and illuminated by monks, the Physiologus
bestiaries form a tradition of Christian literature in which animals were only
ever allegorical. Such texts were symbolic rather than natural; Augustinian
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rather than Aristotelian. Just as they attempted to take over pagan thought,
they also rejected the scientific studies of Aristotle and pretensions of both
Pliny and Aelian.15 As a consequence, the taxonomy of animals was not
constrained by any sense of actuality but by (collective) imagination. No
distinction was made, nor should be made, between the credible and the
incredible; the fabulous was permitted to mix quite freely with the actual.
With no apparent theoretical difficulty, unicorns, onocentaurs, jacalus, ich-
neumons, ieucrots, alerions and amphisbaena coexisted with blackbirds,
camels, giraffes, oxen, asps or dogs. Whatever the animal, they became per-
ceptual figures of that other scene or primary Cause. The clear purpose to
the Physiologus bestiaries was not the impersonal or meticulous observation
of nature. Nature was but the conduit, or cipher, pointing to God. Conse-
quently, the acts or habits for which the animals of these bestiaries were
renowned were similarly allegorical. Thus the fable of the lion who never
closes his eyes (et quotiens dormit, sua nunquam lumina claudit)16 was to be
read as Christ’s eternal watchfulness over the souls of men. Salamanders
who could not be consumed by fire referred to the righteousness of Christ.
Hydra (enhydro), who ate the intestines of a crocodile from the inside,
represented Christ saving souls from the depths of hell. Unicorns who could
be tamed only by a young virgin were allegorical of Divine purity. Barnacle
geese that grew on trees, or ant-lions that were the offspring of both lion and
ant were all examples of hidden and mystical providence and therefore
True.17 The adoption of the Physiologus by early Patristic teaching was
grounded in the capability of animal allegories in making known the mys-
teries of Christ or the Divine creation and, consequently, came to be appro-
priated as a key medium in broadcasting the ‘lessons’ of the New Testament.
By the later Middle Ages the animals of the Physiologus decorated chancels
and chapels, were embroidered on sacerdotal vestments and wrought upon
ecclesiastical furniture, vessels and reliquaries. What mattered about this
esoteric text was emphatically not the empirical observation of the Aris-
totelian natural histories but rather the element of ‘make-believe’ or faith.
The discourse on the becoming of nature (physiologia) is here inextricably
linked to the discourse on the genealogy of the Gods (theologia).18
In different terms, linking physiology to theology presents the structure of
the world as an ordained and unified whole. Nature, tabulated by the Aris-
totelians as manifold, is defined within the bestiary tradition as disclosing
only one true providential nature. Nature ceases to exist as a factual self-
sovereign existence. This is why the difference between actual and imaginary
creatures cannot be maintained. The environment is simply a cipher, a tool,
symbolic fodder to feed the Christian appetite for God. The assimilation of
paganism, however, was not a straightforward act of putting ancient animal
figures to Christian use. Under Christianity, a new theory of signs had to be
developed according to which the physicality or imaginary qualities of the
natural environment referred not to itself but to an abstract idea. That such
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reference could be made known only through symbol or allegory was fully
concordant with the semiotic formula of Origen and Augustine by which cre-
ated objects in nature were suffused with both literal and symbolic meaning.
The word ‘lion’ referred to an object lion that in turn referred to yet another
object (the divine). The allegorical path opened up in order to reveal what,
without this semiotic formula, would remain hidden. The Heraclitean frag-
ment ‘nature loves to hide’ (phusis kruptesthai philei) was given a particular
spin. What nature hid was an external divinity and its revelation could be
made only through semiotic exercise or, in other words, through man’s
reason.19 Cassian in the fifth century clearly distinguished allegorical from
historical knowledge for precisely these reasons. Allegorical knowledge
(along with tropological, and anagogic knowledge) was spiritual knowledge.20
The Physiologus was thus hermeneutic in design and to be described as
claves scripturae sacrae (key to the holy scriptures).
Moreover, the deciphering of animal symbols and allegory is to be con-
sidered crucial to the constitution of Christian subjectivity, for only man can
decipher, since his alone is the province of reason. This is what allows him to
impose his sovereignty over the natural environment and distinguishes him
from both animals and pagans. That is to say, the manner in which man
emerges triumphant over beasts in the didactic tradition of animal literature
is based not so much on the attribution of logos as on the ability of man
alone to determine and thereby possess meaning in the world. The determi-
nation of animal symbology is given its most coherent systematisation as a
result of Christian semiology. Indeed, the normative function of animal
symbology was never as strong as during the long process of Christianising
the West. Under paganism, the (symbolic) function of animals was a cele-
bration of nature as the Goddess natura. Nature was in and of itself both a
matter of ontology and of destiny. On the part of ontology, man cohabited
with nature; his being was only ever being-with nature. On the part of des-
tiny, the word ‘symbolic’ would be a misnomer, for the animal did not refer
to natura but was natura. It is Christianity that introduces the symbolic
schema by putting into effect the radical revolution in religious thinking
inaugurated by the great thinkers of the Axial Age and famously analysed by
Karl Jaspers.21 Christianity opposed the social bond existing between man
and nature. Indeed, while borrowing from pagan animal lore, Christian lit-
erature of this kind completely opposes pagan zoolatry and places instead a
vertical bond between man-below and God-above. Christianity thus trans-
forms our relationship to the world by eradicating this sense of being-with
animals and splitting the here below from the divine other.22 Under Christianity,
animals took on symbolic valency by pointing to, or becoming, ‘ciphers’
of an exteriority that transcended nature.23
The Christian semiotic formula alerts us to a further significant development
in the shift away from paganism. It has to be stressed that the distinction
between the fabulous and the actual is unimportant to the medieval
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reception of these texts. The modern distinction between imagination and
perception cannot be applied to this species of literature whose purpose is far
from scientific. The material constitution of animal bodies are only symptoms
of an ancient intelligible life force, an a priori soul that exists before nature.24
Nature is but a secondary symptom that along with imaginary beasts points
to a hidden logos that knows no distinction between form and myth. In this
sense, Christianised fables are also denunciatory of pagan worship of the
Goddess natura/physis who ruled over men’s souls. There could be nothing
more unnatural to Christianity than the worship of nature; nothing more
given to the darkness of the soul than the zoolatrous worship of a cat, pig or
bull. Under Christianity, nature simply stands in as messenger for that
absolute idea, that absolute reference, that hidden logos, etc. The position is
maximised by St Paul: ‘God is clearly seen by the mind’s understanding of
created things.’25 The natural world was to be treated only as a vivid scrip-
ture, a ‘living manuscript’, that codified and revealed all the qualities of
the Christian Divinity and the tremendous mystery of His creation: ‘This
whole visible world is a book written by the finger of God.’26 In this sense,
nature took its place alongside the Bible and the inner soul in the provision of
divine exemplars. That the logos hid in nature forced everything that resides in
the world to be subject to a Christian meaning. Allegory established law over
nature. It fixed the stars in position. And, once a law is admitted as sover-
eign, the whole empyrean extent of the animal kingdom knew its place.
Aristotelian natural histories, according to medieval theologians, had failed
to establish a world soul precisely because they failed to recognise this law.
It is according to this semiotic scheme that Christianity instituted a revo-
lution in the relationship between man and animal and in the very status of
what it meant/means to be in the world. In rejecting the pagan worship of
animals in favour of a higher law, Christianity turns man against nature.
Under paganism any aggression towards nature, however necessary such as
hunting, had to be compensated. A balance had to be restored through the
protocols of ritual sacrifice.27 Nature, in other words, was to be received only
under conditions of profound ontological humility. Under Christianity, on
the other hand, natural life surrenders to a higher logos. Rather than
received, nature is to be consumed and its meaning controlled. In the theo-
logical terms set out by Karl Jaspers, nature (whether the natural world, or
our natural biological selves) becomes a ‘cipher’, something other than its
appearance. Christian allegory killed the animal spirit of life in order to
make it speak of this exterior and supernatural otherness. The Christian
subject consented to nothing other than a logos completely separated from
the here-below. The description Marcel Gauchet gives to Christianity as ‘the
religion that brings about the exit from religion’ must be understood not
simply in terms of the syncretic unification of disparate religious beliefs.28
Rather, the revolution in religious thinking is one that brought about the
primacy of law over nature. Animals were no longer worshipped, the
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environment no longer needed to be appeased through pagan rituals. Never-
theless, the natural environment provide a hermeneutic key that indicated the
sovereignty of the logos.
8.4 Later bestiaries
However, the business of deciphering animals alone does not grant man his
triumph over nature and account needs to be taken of a further shift brought
about in the late medieval literature. This further shift emerges out of a third
category of animal literature popularised onwards from the twelfth century.
This category might be characterised broadly as a synthesis of the previous
two. These later medieval bestiaries combine the descriptive flavour of the
natural histories/sciences with the mysterious signification of the Physiologus.
The natural and visible world, in other words, functioned in much the same
way as other symbolic images and alerted medieval man to the Christian
scheme of things and the Divine plan. However, keener stress was placed on the
scientific descriptions of the Aristotelian tradition. They adopt their own
didactic structure commonly by proceeding from ‘observed’ details of parti-
cular animals to anecdotes and fables that, like those of the Physiologus, are
constructed as allegories. Thus, for example, the idea that ‘towards man the
nature of the Lion is kind, so that they cannot become angry unless
attacked’ refers to the ideal qualities of noble personality by highlighting the
supposed qualities of actual lions.29
The significance of this category of texts, and what properly distinguishes
them from other categories of animal literature, is that what is being alle-
gorised is not always, or solely, the hidden qualities of the Christian logos.
The allegorical function of the late medieval bestiary is no longer simply
to transmit the divine cause and provenance of life, nor is it simply to make
manifest the biblical qualities of Christ. Rather, animals become symbolic
of Christian values and the ideal qualities of man. The hidden logos that
inheres in nature determines and instructs behaviour and social relations.
The natural environment comes to be treated as a source for the instruction
of man in all manner of social and cultural activities. This development
seems to have been neglected by literary scholars of this genre. The ‘love
bestiary’ of Richard de Fournival, for example, is famously formatted as a
troubadour disquisition on amatory practices.30 Its primary allegorical
referent is the male lover, his fortunes and his melancholy. The lover is
represented in turn as a unicorn kneeling before a virgin, a cockerel crowing
for his love, a braying ass, a dying swan and, finally with triumphal misogyny,
a dog returning to his own vomit.
Bestiaries such as Fournival’s, guide a course of action and steer man
towards proper conduct. The emphasis crucially moves from faith to living.
Two sources might be said to influence this shift. The first is the influence
of the following biblical aphorism: ‘But ask the animals and they will
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teach you.’31 In bestiaries less bent on romantic pursuits, animals reprove
and instruct on all manner of human behaviour. They warn, for example,
of the dangers that lie in wait for man along the heaven-bound path; hence
the dragon, represented in the Aberdeen bestiary, which lies in wait and
traps the unwary elephant. The second source is an increasing reliance on
Aristotle’s natural history, according to which the human-like features of
animals are instructive. Edward Topsell’s History of Four-footed Beasts
(1607), for example, invokes Aristotelian natural history in order to provide
a neat lesson against murder and tyranny: ‘Were this not a good persuasion
against murder, to see all beasts so to maintain their natures, that they kill
not their own kind? … And what King is not invited to clemency, and
dehorted from tyranny, seeing the King of Bees hath a sting, but never useth
the same?’32 In his entry for the bull, Topsell cites the proverb ‘He may bear
a bull that hath born a calf.’ Or the corruption of youth increases with age.
The epimythia is summarised in the following anecdote: ‘Quartilla was a
woman of most vile reputation for uncleanness because she said when she
was little she lay with little ones like her self, and when she grew bigger, she
applyed her self to the pleasure of elder men, growing in filthness as she had
increased in years.’33
The natural world invariably described as a sacred manuscript now
became the province of imitation. Following Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’s etymological breakdown of the term, a proper ‘ecology’, or
logic of the oikos, emerges that connects ecology to iconology (the logic of
the icon) as the figurative focus of contemplation and imitation.34 In the
words of Alan of Lille, ‘Every creature of this earth/is as if a picture or a
book./It is a mirror of ourselves.’35 Thus, while man replaced God as the
symbolic referent, the hermeneutic exercise that characterised the early
Physiologus bestiaries remained intact. Here, nature was to provide a sacred
key to the norm of human conduct. According to Thomas de Cobham, ‘the
whole world is full of diverse creatures, like a manuscript full of different let-
ters and sentences in which we can read whatever we ought to imitate or flee
from’.36 This hermeneutic act of deciphering fully conformed to the cultural
shift of the twelfth-century renaissance towards man-centred thought.
These later bestiaries are no less esoteric than those of the Physiologus
bestiaries; for the proscribed norm not only has to be imitated but also to be
incorporated within the subjective self. In more precise terms, nature was
the incarnation of quality, the imago virtutis. Through the contemplation of
the bestiary, man constructed within his soul the arca sapientiae, the dwelling
place for divine wisdom. As Peter Goodrich notes of emblems more gen-
erally (and of Alciato’s in particular), the exemplars and their norms ‘are not
simply prosaic statements of miniscule and technical rules. They attach to
life, they go within. … they institute life, they pass on the habitus of the
human.’37 The path to wisdom, the construction of the arca sapientiae, did
not arise out of simple contemplation. It was a matter of hermeneutic and
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rational decoding and as such was reflected in a more complicated semiotic
schema than that which arose from that other, albeit similar, genre of
Christian literature dealing with virtue and vice, and with the psychomachia
(the fight for ‘mansoul’) of the Christian subject.38 The passionate life energy
of animals did not lend themselves obviously to the schematised personifi-
cation of virtue and vice; the range of moral qualities illustrated by bestiaries
were broader and the stark division between them did not apply. Individual
animals, by dint of natural and fantastic history, were given qualities more
flexible than the seven virtues and were capable of a wider spread of vices.
Animal passions were not simply malignant (or simply benevolent) but
rather through action symbolised the complex elemental intensity of human
action. These bestiaries found greater flexibility in recording different, more
nuanced, states of being in the human soul while at the same time allowed
for a meditation upon the meaning of ‘passion’ as a specific Christian mode
of perfection. They laid out for inspection the more extensive emotional
grammar of man (a brief scan of the literature would reveal the following and
more: frugality, pluckishness, prevision, malice, lust, ill temper, uncouthness,
industry, pertinacity, sportiveness, cowardice, lumpishness, submission, deceit,
longevity, chastity, verbosity, and so on). It was through the symbolic animal
that man could take himself apart in order to reflect on his ideal constitution,
his potential for completeness or his departure from the divine plan.
In semiotic terms, such literature might also be distinguished from other
genres of Christian didactic in so far as they relied on shifting signifiers.
Without any loss to the overall coherence or economy of an individual piece
of work, animals were capable of springing about from referent to referent.
Often a single animal would be riddled with qualities of virtue and vice; a
single animal might serve the church or might be a stooge of His Satanic
Majesty. Hence the partridge signals characteristics as varied as fidelity, the
devil, unjust wealth and false parenthood. Or a lion was both ferocious and
compassionate. Predictably enough, Alciato emblematised the bull as being
straightforward, a strong and valiant warrior. But, for him, the bull also
demonstrated restraint, since it was (and may still be) known for keeping
away from pregnant females. The lesson according to Alciato, is that ‘we
ought to suffer much, and keep our hands away from things forbidden’.39
All the fundamentals of ethical man were to be found among animals. The
imaginary order of the natural world provided a model for imitation that
helped establish the social (non-natural) order of the Christian world. What
is, of course, paradoxical is that these animal qualities, which in an ideal
state represented moral and Christian perfection, would also enable man to
designate himself as cultivated, civilised and non-animal. In order to distin-
guish himself from the bestial order, man mirrored those virtues of animality
that better represented perfection and salvation. As Nietzsche observes of
man, ‘he envied the wildest, most courageous animals and robbed all their
virtues; only thus did he become man’.40
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8.5 Salvation
In spite of the disavowal of the pagan notion of primacy of the natural
world, animals nevertheless retained a proximity to a certain sovereignty.
Animals occupied two temporal points in the trajectory of man’s development.
They were placed at the forbidden and pagan point of departure; they
marked the point from which man distanced himself. At the same time, and
more important, they indicated man’s destiny, an end point of perfection and
salvation. Animals provided an orthopaedic model of behaviour but they
did so in order to indicate the day of judgement and the possibility of redemp-
tion as the organising principle of terrestrial life. Clues to the life hereafter in
other words, were held locked in the imaginary order of the natural envir-
onment. The point is emphasised by a number of key animals in the bestiary,
most commonly the phoenix. Lactantius’s Carmen de Ave Phoenice (Song of
the Bird Phoenix) written in the fourth century, became immensely popular
from the eleventh century onwards, making its way into later versions of the
Physiologus.41 It is given central emphasis in the Anglo-SaxonCodex Exoniensis
(the Exeter Book):
O happy bird that knows
No bond of love! Death is thy only love,
Thy one delight is death! Thou longst for death,
That thou may’st be new born. Thou art thyself,
Yet not the same, thyself yet not thyself,
Attaining life eterne through fecund death.42
The legend came to signify more than the singular event of Christ’s resur-
rection. It is man’s longing that is turned towards death/eternal life signifying
the potential for all mankind to rise from the ashes, purified and ready to
enter paradise. This turn toward the possibility of salvation and redemption
also informed a slightly different pedagogic function of fabulous beasts both
in literature and ecclesiastic architecture. Such beasts, while directed towards
man, were reified as portents rather than as ideal qualities. For, as Topsell
puts it, ‘beasts both of natural and extraordinary shapes [show] to prophets,
the ruin or uprising of beastly states and kingdomes’.43 These were the
beasts of the Revelations of St John the Divine heralding the ultimate desti-
nation and end of time. But such beasts were also to be found in the Liber
Monstrorum de Diversis Generibus (The Book of Monsters of Various Kinds)
and the Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem (Letters fromAlexander to Aristotle),
both of which located these beasts in the filth and excess of the geographical
East.44 Examples include the dentestyrannus (or tyrant’s tooth), giant bats,
the eternal beast, etc. Whether biblical or epistolary, these fantasmatic beasts
indicate andwarn of God’s plan.45 As Edward Evans notes, the great atonement
is to be signalled by ‘the disappearance of all antipathies between savage
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beasts and their natural prey … ’46 The lion will lie down with the lamb.
Eden will return.
In other words, both in terms of heralding the Judgement to come, and in
heading a moral march towards salvation, what is emphasised is the profound
ephemerality of ‘man’s’ life itself. The natural environment, omni-temporal,
God-made and prophetic reminds the Christian subject that the regulated
social order is lacking and temporary. Cultural life remains but a wisp com-
pared with the more divinely proximate creatures of the non-cultural envir-
onment. Indeed, this life-itself of man is conceived of only as unhappy and
unnatural. The lesson is illustrated in the Physiologus through the habits of
the partridge which steals eggs from other birds. For, once hatched, the kid-
napped bird eventually flies off to find its true parents. Similarly, man must
‘return to his true father and away from the unnatural parentage which is
what terrestrial life is’.47
In spite of his rationality, any correction in the behaviour of man was only
a temporary state of affairs. Terrestrial life remained radically vile and
longing was only for death and eternal life. It does not seem that Christians
had a happy walk to perfection; life could only be lived in a state of exception
and anticipation. Man was rendered low by virtue of his incorrect status and
shown to be deficient through the mirror of symbolic animal. Animals were,
in other words, a reminder of man’s imperfect and abeyant subjectivity.
We might add that in the terminology of the common law, ‘abeyance’
refers to the principle that interrupts genealogy and inheritance. Property, for
example, cannot vest in a named beneficiary until all ancestors or preceding
owners die: the maxim nemo est haeres viventis (no one can be heir to a
living person) might be taken as a synecdoche of the theological state of
waiting for death. Lacanian theory has of course drawn attention to the lack
at the heart of subjectivity, and the subject’s relation to an impossible object
of desire. Christian soteriology conceives of this lack in terms of waiting or
preparation, while the object of desire (salvation) becomes key to the
manipulation of souls. The humiliation for Christianised man is that his
abeyance rests upon a certain sovereign status that stubbornly remains
attached to the very natural order he seeks to subjugate.
8.6 Conclusion
In allegorising a foundation to which all behaviour is measured, animal literature
instigates a break in the relationship between man and animal. The sacred comes
to be exteriorised and separated from the environment. Moreover, according to
this economy, the symbolisation of the sacred foundation through the figuration
of animals further consolidates this breach by cultivating man as distinctly non-
animal endowed with a capacity to read and decode the world. But in directing
behaviour towards a definite salvation, animal literature institutes an idea of
sovereignty that is defined only in relation to an imagined future salvation.
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The concept of the future initiated by animal didactic literature cannot be
understood as the unknowable horizon of a future to come. It cannot be
equated in any sense to the radical messianic idea of l’avenir so beautifully
explicated by Derrida.48 Within Christian soteriology everything is known
and predetermined. The future becomes the exact spot toward which man
must face and progress. Placing the promise of redemption at the core of
existence wrought heavy changes in the orientation of man who was to invest
both in God the father as well as in a salvation through Christ the Son.
Salvation, a spiritual exteriority, a faith in another world, became the foun-
dational requirement that was to give meaning to all social existence. More-
over, the possibility of salvation points to a divine plan according to which
the whole political organisation of the church was to conform. Salvation, in
other words, instituted a machinery for the terrestrial and political manage-
ment of an overarching plan. It was after the Gregorian reforms in parti-
cular that the general notion of salvation was incorporated into the social
programme of Roman law. The Church was to legalise the present saeculum
in anticipation of the next world. Thus, for example, given that animals
indicated the imperfect nature of man, the whole of secular existence was to
be condemned and defined in relation to penal existence; punishment was
rationalised to reflect the tripartite distinction between heaven, hell and pur-
gatory. The power over naked life was justified and measured in anticipation
of that which the animal and the natural environment were ciphers.
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Chapter 9
Seeking spatial and environmental
justice for people and places within
the European Union
Antonia Layard and Jane Holder
9.1 Introduction
This chapter1 explores the interaction between solidarity, territorial cohesion
and environmental justice within the EU. It considers how the spatial focus
at the heart of territorial cohesion, and the funding streams attached, now
provide a novel and significant way to address environmental inequality. This
is premised on the notion of solidarity between people and places within the
territory of the EU. Taken together, environmental justice, territorial cohe-
sion and spatial solidarity embrace a common core: they all suggest that
location should not be a disadvantage. Relying on the still inchoate and
contested concept of territorial cohesion, policy makers and advocates are
able to extend their claims still further. They are able to use cohesion funding,
treaty provisions and legal prescriptions to pursue environmental justice in
situ, creating positively ‘just environments’ from the ground up. This pro-
vides a novel and exciting way to seek spatial and environmental justice for
both people and places within the EU.
Environmental law is spatially situated. Its ‘stuckness’2 ensures that the qua-
lities of each site are as significant to environmental regulation as the nature
of the regulated activity itself. Each determination must ultimately be made in
situ, evaluating how activities and uses impact upon humans, other species,
habitats or ecosystems. This spatial understanding of environmental law patterns
EU environmental law in particular. We see it, for example, in Natura 2000,3
with its network of protected sites, conceived of as a series of pan-European
ecological places. Similar place-making underpins the use of spatial units as the
foci for public governance, particularly the river basin management at the heart
of the 2000 Water Framework Directive4 and the focus on individual European
seas that underpins the 2007 Marine Strategy Framework Directive.5 It is
inherent in the drawing of nitrogen vulnerable6 and air quality management7
‘zones’ where environmental obligations are imposed differently either side of
the line. Perhaps most significantly of all, this rolling out of environmental law
on an explicitly spatial basis is increasingly underpinned by the funding at
the heart of EU regional policy. Here €105 billion has been allocated to the
‘green economy’8 including €8.7 billion allocated to territorial co-operation9
with the ‘flagship’ Baltic Sea Strategy, which itself draws on over €50 billion
of cohesion funds.10 These strategies provide spatial form to integrative and
holistic projects that address environmental concerns within boundary lines.
At the heart of this regional place-making activity is the concept of ‘ter-
ritorial cohesion’, an idea that remains subject to multiple and contested
definitions. Its goal has been formulated by the Commission as encouraging
‘the harmonious and sustainable development of all territories by building on
their territorial characteristics and resources’.11 This calls on principles of
economic liberalism as well as drawing on ‘harmonisation’, importing a form
of coherence and equivalence and placing the concept firmly within the EU’s
pantheon of integrated policy and decision-making. The interpretation is
underpinned by the new coupling in Article 3 of the Treaty on the European
Constitution, requiring the Union to ‘promote economic, social and terri-
torial cohesion’ as well as the pursuit of ‘solidarity’.12 These strands of ter-
ritorial cohesion and solidarity are drawn together in a growing, and rather
explicit, territorial project: the creation of the idea of a Single European
Territory. This notion is fostered by the many references in policy documents
to ‘the Territory of the EU’ as a given physical reality.13
This spatial delineation of EU territory draws on a normative core in favour
of European integration and increasingly on an idea of what the ‘Union’
entails. Central to these normative claims is the reliance on ‘solidarity’, a
concept that has for some time now lain at the core of the EU’s embryonic
social welfare project yet remains largely unarticulated and frequently rheto-
rical. While the draft of the Treaty on European Union proposed solidarity
between ‘Member States and their peoples’, the solidarity between people was
ultimately relegated to the non-binding, preambular provisions: Article 3 now
calls only for solidarity ‘between Member States’. Still, in the absence of legal
precision the historical and political antecedents of the idea of solidarity
remain. It is a principle that hints at communality and demos, those fraught
ideas within the EU predicated on an understanding of common interest.
Within the EU Treaties and other texts, solidarity has both an internal and
an external dimension characterising aspects both of relationships within the
European Union and of the EU’s relations with the outside world.14 It is not
an idea that necessarily needs to end at the borders of the EU.
Moreover, solidarity can exist not only between Member States and people
but also, and significantly in light of the objective to achieve territorial cohe-
sion, between places. This spatial component is often emphasised by the linking
of both solidarity and territorial cohesion with a commitment to provide ‘ser-
vices of general economic interest’, reflecting an understanding by French
regional planners of territorial cohesion as founded in support for communities
that perpetuate a preferred understanding of place. This represents a French
interest in pursuing redistributive policies within a regional context, the so-called
aménagement du territoire. Such intervention is based not merely on relative
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GDP (as in EU cohesion policy) but is rooted within the French administrative
model. This reflects a cultural dimension. ‘Europeans, it is argued, are rooted in
the soil… In their desire to continue to live where they have for generations they
deserve public support.’15 This understanding of territorial cohesion as at least
partly a cultural mechanism evokes a more emotive landscape than the technical
provisions inserted into EU policy-making as a desire to protect the peripheries
of the EU. Article 174 of the TFEU focuses on geographical difference, requiring
cohesion policies to ‘pay attention’ to ‘rural areas, areas affected by industrial
transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or
demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low popula-
tion density and island, cross-border and mountain regions’.
Compared with solidarity, the idea of cohesion is more clearly understood
within EU parameters, primarily through the projects it provides. It is a
vehicle for funding, one that has long struggled to balance the apparently
twin objectives of competitiveness and wealth production on the one hand
and social cohesion and convergence on the other with a budget that is set to
exceed that for agriculture by 2013. Despite this extensive funding, there is
an inherent tension here in that while both the twin objectives of stimulating
economic growth and competitiveness and of addressing low levels of wealth
and resources both aim at improvement, ‘one is about winners and losers
while the other is about redistribution’.16 Nevertheless, these multiple objectives
are translated into the contested and still unformed concept of territorial
cohesion that draws on strands of both existing cohesion policy and its
legacy in integrative spatial planning, making both emotive and technical
claims. While the substantive legal acquis may remain fragmented, cohesion
funding, particularly as channelled through the ‘territorial co-operation’
objective, has the capacity to transform the idea of territorial cohesion into
more than merely a territorial dimension to existing social and economic
policies on cohesion. Territorial cohesion coupled with a sense of solidarity
aims, as the Third Cohesion Report put it, to ensure that: ‘people should not
be disadvantaged by wherever they happen to live or work in the Union’.17
This embraces a spark of spatial justice,18 suggesting that there could be
solidarity between both people and places. Solidarity as a normative claim
is underpinned by the practice of cohesion: both are attempting to reduce
disparities between people and places within the territory of the EU.
This coupling is significant for environmental law and claims for environ-
mental justice in particular since regional policy has a growing, yet often
rather under-appreciated,19 environmental strand. The intervention of an EU-
wide conception of solidarity and a drawing on the funding streams within
cohesion policy to achieve these integrative aims is becoming increasingly
significant as a new way ‘to do’ environmental law. Cohesion policy already
provides environmental funding ‘carrots’ to supplement regulatory ‘sticks’,
and has already been instrumental in ensuring greater and more effective
implementation of environmental law.
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Now, and perhaps even more significantly, cohesion policy is beginning to
influence environmental law in an explicitly spatial way. Cohesion policy has
itself been spatial from the outset, dividing up Member States by using the
nomenclature of territorial statistics into NUTS 2 regions and then com-
paring them by reference to economic, employment and other, quantifiable,
markers. The funding cohesion policy entails and the place-making projects
regulators increasingly support, coupled with the inescapably spatial quality
of environmental law, creates real possibilities for the environmental justice
project within the EU.20 This movement reflects the broad consensus that,
despite aspirations to pollution prevention and reduction, harm cannot be
eradicated: there is no imminent prospect of an ecotopian state.21 Accepting
this reality, the environmental justice project raises the question of how
environmental risks and harms should be spatially distributed, calling on
politicians, administrators and developers to ensure that if exposures cannot
be eliminated entirely that they are in some way proportionate. Taken together,
the concepts of territorial cohesion, spatial solidarity and environmental
justice embrace a common core: they all suggest that location should not be
a disadvantage and that sustainable places should be formulated from the
ground up within a common environmental acquis.
This is a particularly significant claim for environmental law, itself always
spatially situated but now increasingly cognisant of that fact. Law has con-
ventionally accepted that geography may restrict liability in certain contexts:
that location is relevant to determining legal harm to amenity and ‘what is a
nuisance in Belgravia may not be such in Bermondsey’ (Sturges v. Bridgman
(1879) 11 Ch.D. 852). The substantive premise at the heart of environmental
justice is that spatially differentiated exposure to the risk of environmental
harm should not exist, even if it has not yet crystallised into liability. While
environmental justice has conventionally been conceptualised as a human-
centred harm, it is fundamentally a collective concern bound to location.22
Pursuing environmental justice claims grounded in locality, not only entails
the harmonisation of substantive standards which continues to remain at the
heart of the EU’s environmental law project, it also balances the inherent
‘stuckness’ of environmental law with claims for equality and coherence. The
spatial focus at the heart of territorial cohesion, and the funding streams
attached, now provide a novel and significant way to address environmental
inequality premised on the notion of solidarity between people and places
within the territory of the EU. It uses funding, treaty provisions and legal
prescriptions to pursue environmental justice in situ.
9.2 Territorial cohesion and environmental justice
The pursuit of environmental justice through the concept of territorial
cohesion accepts the central tension at the heart of cohesion policy that the
disparity cohesion aims to redress is itself an inevitable consequence of
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enhanced competition which its programmes aim to promote.23 Recently
cohesion policy has attempted to reconcile this dilemma by invoking the
centrality of economic growth – translated into cohesion policy as an
emphasis on ‘unlocking’ potential.24 Actors developing cohesion policy have
taken up the idea of territory to try and resolve the dissonance between
competitiveness and redistribution, echoing OECD policy to emphasise the
role of place-based policy approaches in capitalising on territorial assets and
locational advantages such as knowledge, skills, specialisation and proximity
between economic agents.25 This coordination and repackaging has created a
new policy language (‘territorial cohesion’, ‘territorial capital’, ‘territorial
assets’) supported and communicated by a new (and still shifting) vocabu-
lary, developing an array of acronyms, symbols, metaphors, maps, texts,
‘visions and scenarios’, and implemented by new ‘knowledge building’ insti-
tutional structures and the setting up of policy networks. The language here
is one of territory rather than spatiality: backed up by significant EU funds,
this is a place-making project creating a political and spatial vision of the
territory of the EU.
Specifically, there is a suggestion that this concept of territorial cohesion,
now inserted into Article 3 of the Treaty EC, gives a territorial dimension to
the European social model. If true, this would be a tantalising possibility:
suggesting that territorial cohesion extends the idea of a ‘European social
model’ into spatial form, incorporating concerns about spatial protection by
calling for ‘a just distribution of opportunities in space’.26 Both politicians
and the Commission have suggested such a link27 agreeing, for example that
‘territorial cohesion of the EU is prerequisite for achieving sustainable
economic growth and implementing social and economic cohesion – a
European social model’.28 There is political support for Davoudi to suggest
that territorial cohesion is not only rooted in the European model, it also
‘extends its affiliation with social-protection to incorporate concerns about
spatial-protection’.29
Yet allying territorial cohesion to a political model as an empirical obser-
vation requires a stable and agreed model of European society in order to
have logical force. In political terms, the European social model is often
attributed to the European vision espoused by Jacques Delors and was referred
to in both the 1994 White Paper on Social Policy30 and the Lisbon Presi-
dency conclusions before being more fully articulated in an annex to the
Presidency Conclusions in Nice in 2000 as being ‘characterized in particular
by systems that offer a high level of social protection, by the importance of
the social dialogue and by services of general interest covering activities vital
for social cohesion’.31 The model, it was said, is based ‘beyond the diversity
of the Member States’ social systems, on a common core of values’.32 Pre-
sented thus, these criteria go beyond social policy, to include characteristics
of state, economy and society.33 Yet there is consistent agreement that ‘the
notion of the “European social model” is misleading’,34 that it is contested
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and hortatory, with empirical heterogeneity undermining claims of a ‘historical
acquis’.35 Some have characterised the concept as being best understood as a
political project used by the European institutions to increase their own
legitimacy.36
If the social model is this uncertain can it then be spatialised? European
planning traditions are diverse37 and proponents have offered no explanation
of how the social model itself is affected by concrete practices in spatial
development policy.38 Consequently, as an empirical observation it is hard to
maintain that territorial cohesion is rooted in the European social model if
no single model can be definitively identified. Certainly, as a normative claim
that the European social model should encompass a core of shared values
which when spatialised would promote spatial justice, territorial cohesion
provides an effective vehicle, particularly when allied to the emphasis on
universal access inherent in the protection of services of general public
interest under the Treaty. Furthermore, as Faludi explains, territorial cohesion
should also include a visionary element. Such spatial visions ‘must conceive
of towns and cities and regions, indeed of the territory of the EU as a whole, as
more than places of production’. He continues, ‘[T]erritories need to be
conceptualized as cohesive … People should want to attach themselves to
territories. Indeed where the process is conducted in transparent fashion, the
very act of visioning territories and their futures can contribute to this feeling
of attachment’.39 Faludi’s vision might be described as a type of territorial
solidarity, with a sense of identity with a territory being forged by the very process
of being involved in deliberation about its future structure, linkages and shape.
Moreover the way the EU is being spatialised emphasises a single EU
territory within which there is a central normative claim for solidarity which
could form part of an accepted acquis whether or not this can be categorised
as a unitary European social model. This is significant for environmental
justice since it has often focused on individual interests, particularly in a
corrective context, even though it is essentially a communal, spatial project.
There are good reasons for this: legal mechanisms have often obscured the
relevance of any collective interest, for example, formulating corrective justice
in terms of individual rights or restricting the ability of NGOs to question
the legitimacy of environmentally harmful decisions, even those implemented
with cohesion funds.40 Increasing administrative and legislative inclusion
(particularly, but not limited to, initiatives introduced in light of the Åarhus
Convention41) operate in sharp contrast to the judicial intransigence in
allowing environmental NGOs access to justice.42 Environmental law has
consistently struggled to conceptualise the collective interest, particularly in
litigation, preferring to consider the interests of individuals and the concerns
of the state. The introduction of territorial cohesion is significant then in that
it offers new scope to focus on places (collective physical or spatial entities)
as well as people, spatially reframing and rescaling the environmental justice
debate at the EU level.
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These possibilities for environmental justice emerge as a direct con-
sequence of both the tentative promotion of a claim for EU-wide solidarity
and the way territorial claims are being made for, and within, the EU. While
the environmental legal acquis is increasingly well developed, it is marked by
a trend towards flexibility and managerialism, and rhetorical proceduralisa-
tion.43 Simultaneously, the recent Treaty alterations and documents outlining
the development of the territorial cohesion concept demonstrate a growing
desire to minimise differences in living conditions between places within a
framework that stimulates growth and economic development. Environ-
mental law has become more open-textured, in part because a growing
recognition that it necessarily takes place in situ means that administrators
on the ground need the ability to implement laws flexibly,44 particularly
when developing programmes for conservation, synergistic pollution assess-
ments or determinations of aquatic ecological quality or quantity.45 There is
clearly an overlap between the desire within regional policy to improve quality
of life and the efforts of environmental law to promote local environmental
quality.
There remains a danger that the intervention is more rhetorical than real.
As Pellegrin writes in the cohesion context, attempts to reconcile apparently
contradictory objectives often illustrate ‘one feature specific to policy-
making at EU level, namely that solutions to contradictions are often more
discursive than real. Stating that there is no contradiction resolves the con-
tradiction, and naming the solution becomes the solution.’46 Such a rheto-
rical, yet ultimately amorphous, understanding of solidarity can already be
identified in the Treaties.47 Yet a claim for environmental justice within the
context of regional policy can draw on the concept’s multiple strands (dis-
tributional, procedural, corrective and social) to suggest that there are alter-
native ways to balance the benefits of economic development and differential
exposure to both environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ within the EU. The largely
unarticulated concept of solidarity provides the key to translate this desire
for equivalence between people and places into reality, particularly when
coupled with such large tranches of cohesion funding. This possibility is
prefigured in the ability of Member States to provide ‘services of general
economic interest’ to citizens, despite the murky legal waters this produces
when viewed in the context of EU competition rules and prescriptions on
state aid.48 In summary, the EU project has always been about more than
economic liberalism and these interactions are increasingly recognised as
spatial tensions as well as political and normative disputes.
9.3 Environmental justice in the European Union
The call for environmental justice began in the 1970s in the United States
when community activists highlighted environmental degradation in their
neighbourhoods resulting from ‘locally undesirable land uses’.49 While always
Seeking spatial and environmental justice 177
grounded in place, the US environmental justice movement built on a strong
civil rights tradition, combining the force of constitutional protection with
concerns for substantive environmental quality. The central claim often
elided the interests of communities and individuals, for example Bullard, a
leading proponent of claims for environmental justice, argued both that
environmental justice is the principle that ‘all people and communities are
entitled to equal protection of environmental and public health laws and
regulations’50 and that everyone should have the right to live in a healthy
environment with access to enough environmental resources for a healthy
life.51 This emphasis on individual rights was frequently articulated within
the historical and political narrative of civil rights, allying the US movement
closely with questions of race and the production of ‘environmental
racism’.52 It was this that led to two characteristic debates within claims for
environmental justice: first, the question of ‘class versus race’,53 and second,
a debate questioning the correct scale to determine inequity.54
Despite the lobbying efforts of individual NGOs and an abundant aware-
ness of environmental justice concerns amongst European scholars, there is
within the EU no systematic attempt to link social status, race or ethnicity to
environmental risk exposure.55 While academics are beginning to engage
with the demands of environmental justice in many European states56 they
note a general lack of institutionalised consideration of these issues, even
characterising the concept as ‘the Anglo-American concept of environmental
justice’.57 Certainly, within Europe, the most systematic developments have
taken place within the United Kingdom, particularly in Scotland.58 The
European Environment Agency has recognised only that the ‘environment-
related share of the burden of disease … depends strongly on socio-economic
aspects such as income, the share generally being higher in lower-income
countries’.59 Significantly, however, an important and growing body of work
is being undertaken by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Europe,
focusing particularly on the impact of environmental inequity on children.60
Scientists have argued to the WHO that environmental justice needs to be
taken at both the strategic and the local scale since their evidence raises con-
cerns that ‘[m]arginalized and disadvantaged groups may be disproportionately
exposed and vulnerable to environmental risks through a range of mechan-
isms including limited financial resources facilitating risk reduction, hazar-
dous or unprotected work, or poor and unsafe living conditions worsened by
social segregation and stigma’.61
As in the United States, there may be a good fit between environmental
disparity and racial and ethnic considerations rather than solely being pre-
dicated on social class.62 This ‘race versus class’ debate is relevant in the EU
as well.63 Academic research here is still incipient, but Harper et al. ask
rhetorically: ‘Why is it that Roma shanty towns are frequently located next
to landfills, on contaminated land, or that they are regularly exposed to
floods? Why do water pipelines end on the edges of predominantly Roma
178 Law and ecology
settlements, so that people have to walk miles every day just to collect potable
water for cooking and drinking?’ They argue that ‘when some landscapes and
social groups are perceived as “beyond the pale” of environmental regulation,
public participation and civil rights, it creates local sites for externalizing
environmental harms’.64 These concerns are clearly integral to all strands of
environmental justice, including access to decision-making. Given the socially
situated nature of many environmental justice concerns, in addition to measures
reviewing equity of siting, there should also be an ‘ongoing role for community
participation in all decisions that fundamentally affect the participants’ lives’.65
In practice, any analysis of environmental justice as simply the spatial
distribution of environmental risks has from the outset been characterised as
too narrow an approach. Distinctions have long been made between proce-
dural, geographic and social environmental justice assessing how access to
decision-making, socio-economic factors and environmental harm are all
intertwined.66 In particular, the procedural strand of environmental justice,
focusing on public participation and access to decision-making was central
to claims of environmental justice from the outset,67 enabling groups and
individuals to question why actually or potentially polluting facilities were
more densely located in poorer, less influential, residential locations. This
procedural strand has become an increasingly influential element in the
debate,68 assessing the ability to contribute to decision-making, obtain access
to information and the ability to bring legal challenges. Indeed, amongst
some lawyers, environmental justice has been formulated primarily in terms
of access to (legal) justice.69 This focus has led to notable successes, in particular
the conclusion of the 1998 Aarhus Convention,70 with its three pillars of
access to information, public participation in environmental decision making
and access to justice. As a result, throughout the EU, wherever people are
located, they have legal rights to gain access to environmental information
and to be involved in decision-making, particularly through the environ-
mental assessment procedures when new projects are developed. The actual
effectiveness of such involvement, in the context of continuing social and
political influences and factors, remains of course highly contested.
Indeed, the third Aarhus pillar, aimed at facilitating the making of legal
claims for environmental redress has proved extraordinarily contentious and
has still to be brought into effect in the EU. This form of ‘corrective environ-
mental justice’ was also a later addition in the United States,71 particularly
under Title VI of the US Civil Rights Act 196472 and is a significant
strand of claims for environmental justice. It has been considered in the
context of infringed rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). Initially, the ECtHR seemed to take distance effectively as a proxy
for causation: in Lopez Ostra v Spain,73 for example, the Court declined to
engage in a causal analysis, emphasising instead ‘the fact that the applicant
and her family lived for years only 12 m away from a source of smells, noise
and fumes’. The Court saw an obvious link between location and violation,
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framing Article 8, the right to a home, as an environmental right in the
context of location. In Lopez Ostra the ECtHR held that ‘naturally, severe
environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them
from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family
life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health’. While in
the more recent decisions in Fadeyeva v Russia74 and Tatar v Romania75 the
Court has taken a more stringent approach to proving causation in terms of
ill health, in both cases it found a breach of the right to private life and
home by virtue of living so closely to an acknowledged environmental harm.
Both concerned particularly egregious sets of facts and were thus able to scale
the ‘high threshold’ of environmental harm required by the ECtHR. While
the relevance and significance of residential location is recognised, ultimately
an action to the ECtHR will lie only in the most exceptional of cases.
One way to move from individuals to collective concern has been to
introduce the idea of ‘social’ environmental justice, assessing the impact of
economic marginalisation, race, ethnicity, class, culture, lifestyles and poli-
tical power in environmental decision-making.76 As Martuzzi et al. have
noted in their review of the siting of waste facilities on health: ‘there is a
tendency in poorer, less educated, disadvantaged people or ethnical mino-
rities to live closer to waste treatment facilities of any kind and, in addition,
that when adverse health effects due to such proximity are detected, these are
often compounded (usually multiplicatively) with the adverse effects of social
disadvantage’.77 In this context it is possible to dismiss claims of environ-
mental inequity as simply part of a broader understanding of social inequity
or to suggest that to focus on environmental concerns is to miss opportu-
nities for much-needed economic development. Yet this engages arguments
of spatiality and scale. When, for example, a local campaigning group, sup-
ported by the national NGO Friends of the Earth, drew attention to the
potential toxicity in Hartlepool of ‘ghost ships’ in a marine breaking yard
that had won a £10.6 million contract to recycle the steel and dispose of the
pollutants from ex-US Navy auxiliary vessels, the activists’ concerns were
rejected as being too insular. The real concern, as successfully framed by
the company that owned the yard and parts of the national media, was the
economic development this remediation would bring to the region and the
far greater safety risks workers would face in other parts of the world if they
were to dismantle these ships there. Ultimately the company and the national
media won the legal argument, redrawing the issue from a local to a regional
scale. In practice, scale framing was used by both sides in enrolling allies,
building relational power and achieving set political ends. As Agyeman and
Bickerstaff note, ‘the scaling of injustice … is an integral part of strategies of
empowerment and disempowerment’.78
It is this rescaling, long familiar to advocates for environmental justice79
that is now being implemented at EU level. Territorial cohesion provides a
new regional focus for environmental justice, a level at which some NGOs
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have already specifically decided to engage.80 Framing environmental justice
as a concern throughout the territory of the EU, by recognising its inherent
spatiality, places it squarely within the remit of principles of territorial
cohesion and solidarity, empowering individuals and communities as well
as places. If through funding or delineation these spatial units are con-
ceptualised as ‘EU places’ then examples of best practice in one part of the
region provide political and philosophical leverage to argue that standards
should be the same throughout. The very idea of EU places is underpinned
by understandings of cohesion and solidarity extending throughout the ter-
ritory of the EU. A call for spatial justice is a normative claim rather than an
empirical observation, yet it is one that can be crafted within the narrative of
cohesion funding to focus on a place-based interpretation of environmental
justice that focuses on both social and environmental concerns of both
people and places.
9.4 A new EU paradigm for a place-based interpretation
of environmental justice
For environmental law this raises the question whether claims for environmental
justice within the EU, characterised by principles of solidarity and territorial
cohesion and working within an acknowledged spatial environmental law,
offer any hope to alter ‘business as usual’. Does the conceptualisation of
territorial cohesion as importing a sense of spatial justice or territorial soli-
darity have the potential to bring environmental justice into closer reach? Or
does it still perpetuate the differential allocation of both environmental
goods (access to clean water, sufficient energy and places of nature con-
servation) and bads (risks of environmental damage, pollution, degradation
of amenity and place)?
One highly effective way to improve environmental quality is to continue
the environmental law project on harmonisation and cohesion funds that
already focuses intensely on implementation. The sums involved are sig-
nificant. In the third (2000–06) budget cycle cohesion funds provided for
(supplemented by Member State funds in accordance with the principle of
additionality) 828 environmental projects with an average project cost of
€29.5 million that included 266 waste-water projects, 190 urban/industrial
waste projects and 127 water supply projects as well as 294 transport projects,
113 of which were rail projects and 104 road projects.81 This was set to
be exceeded in the fourth (2007–13) budget cycle, which has allocated
€133 million to the ‘green economy’, including implementation for environ-
mental protection. This is coupled with a growing awareness of the impor-
tance of evaluating the environmental impacts of cohesion projects82 and
together the European Environment Agency and the European Network of
Environmental Authorities have begun to create a framework for ex post
evaluation of the negative effects of structural and cohesion funding on the
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environment. The interrelationship of the Lisbon Strategy and the Sustain-
able Development Strategy is clearly making its mark, with the EEA
emphasising the EU Sustainable Development Strategy’s call to gradually
eliminate environmentally harmful subsidies, criticising, for example, the fact
that ‘road projects across the EU continue to receive disproportionate fund-
ing compared to other more environmentally friendly investments’.83 These
projects address some of the substantial failures to implement environmental
legislation within the EU, where initially ‘a conspiracy of silence prevailed’84
about non-compliance, which has beset old and new Member States alike.85
These existing initiatives are now supplemented with new opportunities
to pursue spatial environmental justice through the concept of territorial
cohesion, which suggests that location should not be a disadvantage. Such
a formulation of spatial environmental justice is congruent with the holistic,
integrative approach that territorial concerns bring to cohesion policy and
the requirements of sustainable development, particularly an interpretation
of sustainable development working alongside a principle of solidarity. Ser-
iously engaging solidarity as a principle for guiding thinking about territorial
cohesion and its implementation in policy, beyond the solidarity conditions
for equality of access to services and equal participation in entrepreneurial
activity, would suggest the need for some reframing of the concept to include
ideas of interdependence, shared responsibilities and burdens and even redis-
tribution, but, most important, the possibility of sharing a set of common
values – as well as ‘concerns’ – at the EU level. This extends the concepts of
solidarity and territorial cohesion to environmental concerns: reflecting that
notwithstanding the presence and perception of ‘competitive Europe’, ‘ …
the Europe of solidarity and co-operation already exists, embodied in the
economic and social cohesion policy’.86 From this perspective, territorial
cohesion and territorial co-operation – and perhaps territorial solidarity –
can still give a new impetus to EU integration, not as an abstract ideal, but
as the best way to pursue the common good of all EU citizens.
This more holistic, integrative approach to cohesion is clearly compatible
with a philosophy of social environmental justice applied beyond the urban
pollution context, extending to the ability to access environmental ‘goods’, for
example, under the ‘right to roam’,87 access to decision-making in respect of
natural resources such minerals or forestry88 and access to essential environ-
mental services, including electricity, clean water or sanitation.89 In this context
it is worth remembering that there are still an estimated 100 million Europeans
(not all within the EU) without access to safe drinking water and adequate sani-
tation.90 Environmental justice claims must reflect their locality and there is
growing acceptance that the content of environmental justice will be at least
partly locally dictated, that it is ‘as a concept and practice … locally grounded’
and cannot be universalised even though ‘the local definition and use of the term
are dependent on its construction at avariety of scales’.91 The aim here is towork
backwards, considering what ‘just sustainability’92 might entail in situ.
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These calls for a spatially and socially situated form of environmental
justice interpret environmental inequity as part of the broader pattern of
difference and differentiation. While EU regulators must remain alive to
inequalities in siting, especially where because land is cheap or resistance is
limited, there is a real opportunity to use cohesion policy to try to build ‘just
environments’93 from the ground up. There is a clear overlap here between
social and environmental concerns: empirical evidence suggests that the
‘everyday concerns’ of environmental justice can include fuel poverty, lack of
safe outdoor space, social exclusion and concern about pollution.94 Cohesion
funding is well placed to adopt a holistic approach; the premise of differ-
entiation that underpins funding allocation and the principle of solidarity
that is closely allied to cohesion’s rationale provides ample political and
philosophical support for intervention.
Lastly, but significantly, if environmental justice is conceptualised as a
means of comparing and improving environmental conditions between places,
then a procedural strand would play a part in this.95 The US place-based
discourse of civic environmentalism holds some possibilities here in its focus
on local, devolved decision-making engaging with local communities parti-
cularly to make land use decisions, often relating to natural resources, that
are themselves at the root of some of the most intractable environmental
problems.96 While civic environmentalism is not limited to conflicts between
private property values and public values, these are typically the situations in
which top-down regulation loses broad popular support and civic envir-
onmentalism may have a role to play.97 In the United States there is genuine
excitement about the potential for collaborative land management to stimu-
late local civic engagement in environmental affairs,98 where participants are
said to transform their affection and local knowledge of a place into a force
for sustained change. Its strength is said to lie ‘in tapping the creative abilities
of citizens to solve the problems of a place that matters to them’.99
Yet as with all participatory mechanisms, involvement can only be effective
if barriers to participation are truly overcome.100 Possibilities for participa-
tion and involvement need to challenge the interests of decision-making and
environmental elites who have traditionally not included the more excluded
communities or individuals.101 Civic environmentalism is itself limited by the
disparate resources available to developers and local stakeholders102 and the
difficulty of applying its tenets to large-scale, complex environmental pro-
blems.103 Like environmental justice, the civic environmentalism discourse
has itself been characterised by sharply divergent views on public involve-
ment, distinguishing between participation to improve existing decision-
making processes and legitimise government and a more radical approach
that is deeply sceptical of the promise of stakeholder governance.104
Just as the environmental justice movement in the United States criticised
existing environmental lobby groups for focusing on the interests of the elite,
so it is important that the NGOs monitoring the implementation of cohesion
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funding also take into account the interests of the most environmentally
disadvantaged within Europe. This should supplement campaigning for
those interests that appeal to the more powerful, notably climate change and
the protection of biological diversity after all, ‘if you’re only concerned with
clean streams and whales, then that limited view smacks people of color in
the face’.105 Clearly, there is no need to distinguish needlessly between the
two: both improve environmental quality.106 The outstanding and vital issue
is how to interrelate such evaluations with socio-economic criteria such as
‘quality of life’ or a ‘decent standard of living’ so that, for example, enhan-
cing biodiversity may be recognised as one means of fostering a positive
sense of identity with a place, or that visions of that place in the future may
flow from local knowledge and a desire to conserve. There is, in other words,
the possibility of a meaningful type of territorial cohesion, alert to local
conditions, and rooted in community. But clean technology, home insulation
and fuel poverty, safe open spaces, access to clean water and waste and
sewerage regulation are also key concerns of environmental justice as
implemented through the principles of solidarity and territorial cohesion.
9.5 Conclusion
The evaluation of cohesion policy suggests that there are real substantive
advances in the transposition and implementation of EU environmental
law.107 The promotion of environmental justice is more difficult to measure
but includes not only the advantages of greater economic development and
growth, including equal opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activity
and to receive services, but also a concern for an equitable distribution of
environmental protection and access to environmental services, pursued and
made meaningful locally.
These new claims for environmental justice flow directly from the emerging
EU territorial project. The narrative of territorial cohesion invokes the
notion of EU territory and EU places, creating a new way of visualising the
European Union, amplified by cohesion funding. This level of activity on
matters spatial and territorial suggests a departure for the EU in terms of the
development of concepts and policies and ‘the acknowledgment and valor-
isation of knowledge on spatial issues’.108 But then, the entire EU project
has always been defined by space and territory because its primary intent is
to override boundaries, be they legal or physical impediments to the free
movement of good, peoples, services and capital. From this perspective, the
EU’s spatial planning project, now presented as directed towards territorial
cohesion, might be viewed not so much as an indicator of an organisation
latterly seeking to impose a purposeful grip on the environment of its terri-
tory, but rather a reasonably successful attempt to co-ordinate (and repack-
age) its existing and persuasive, though admittedly indirect, influence over
spatial matters and development, for example through structural funding
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decisions. Such a spatial approach overlaps with an understanding of envir-
onmental justice, at least within the EU, as being place-based and in situ
rather than characterised as a claim for individual rights.
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Chapter 10
Heterotopias of the environment
Law’s forgotten spaces
Andreas Kotsakis
We do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and
things.
M. Foucault
A spatial paradox dominates environmental law. As a discourse employing a
host of geographical terms, such as territory and jurisdiction, and advocating
the need for spatial transformation as an important component of the
required change in individual and collective conduct, it nevertheless refuses
to venture beyond the limited Cartesian spatiality of quantifiable, fixed on a
map, empirical, ‘absolute space’; in environmental discourse, the external
landscape to social action, the precarious background to humanity’s folly,
the empty canvas to which environmental law gives shape.
At first instance, this spatial paradox may be easily attributed to an inherent
positivism born from the descent of environmentalism from within the natural
sciences and more specifically biology, as well as its later espousal of economic
doctrines. At the same time, however, the paradox is equally a product of legal
thought itself. The struggle for recognition of environmental law as a separate,
autonomous legal field might have left a residue of disciplinary anxiety, which
serves to accentuate the requisite ‘assertion of legal closure’1 that all legal
fields engage in. This closure appears as foundational for the creation of an
autonomous, self-sufficient and clearly delineated legal ‘territory’ or domain,
with its own internal logic, structure and principles that lift it above the fluc-
tuations of politics and the uncertainties of social norms. For a legal field,
such as environmental law, not only struggling to establish itself, but always
straining to keep at bay the highly value-laden and politically charged social
fields of environmentalism and political ecology, the adoption and staunch
defence of legalistic characteristics, such as rational structure, formalism and
objectivism,2 are conditions sine qua non for its constitution.
These characteristics enable environmental law to ‘survive’ by mapping out
its legal domain, with an internal discursive structure to guarantee coherence,
and by delineating strict boundaries that shelter it to a certain extent from
political interests, value judgements and power struggles that take place
within environmental discourse. This is especially the case when environmental
law touches upon and ventures into highly politicised areas such as interna-
tional aid and development, demography and population control. When
environmental law is under siege, it falls back on its ‘fort’ of legal rationality
and objectivity from which it also mounts ‘attacks’, aiming to prove law’s
practicality, social usefulness and necessity. The strong base of the legal
domain allows for the rest of social space to be controlled and shaped by
legal practices like an empty canvas.
10.1 The space of critical environmental law
At the very moment of environmental law’s extension into the field of inter-
national law, the limitations of the spatial paradox are exposed. Existing
spatial arrangements are proving problematic and insufficient, especially
since the transboundary aspect of most environmental problems equates success
in environmental law with the achievement of global consensus and global
impact on the environment. Thus, the effectiveness of environmental law
largely depends on its globalisation, but this aim increasingly cannot be
reached in the neo-liberal economic sense of exporting a single, universal
model. A succession of counter-narratives have contested the globalisation of
Western environmental ideas and constructions,3 arguing for more pluralist
ethics and inclusive practices manifesting geographically as a heterogeneous
multiplicity of social and cultural emplacements capable of being adapted
according to contextual narratives of locality, identity and difference.4 The
cartography of the legal domain, with its emphasis on coherence, isolation
and fixed space and its association with ‘Western metaphysics and its tribe of
grids, binaries, hierarchies and oppositions,’5 cannot accommodate this het-
erogeneous mosaic of differently scaled and marked maps, as persons and
things resist being arranged according to a fixed Western topology.
This introduction is already filled with spatial metaphors, which further attest
to the centrality of spatiality within legal thinking. Nevertheless, it is important
not to confuse such counter-narratives that seek alternatives to Western mod-
ernity – by way of seeking alternatives to environmental government – with the
simple attempt to finely balance the brutality of globalisation from above with
the romanticism of localisation from below, a binary formulation already under
examination, at least within socio-legal circles.6 From this narrower socio-legal
studies perspective, the engagement with space is a geographical concern about
how we can better understand law contextually and ‘by reference to its place
and relationship to economic, political, and ecological systems’.7
Instead, the critical legal project has often been connected with a search
precisely for alternative articulations that do not ignore the heterogeneous
spatiality of law. It does so by opposing itself to the perceived need for legal
closure: ‘the drawing of the conceptual boundary of law and the hoisting of
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the flag of legal theory over the terrain is not an innocent act’.8 Once this
project ventures into the field of environmental theory and political ecology,
this articulating task for critical environmental law becomes even more com-
plex: weaken the walls separating the legal domain, situate law in its geo-
graphical, historical and social context, while at the same time acknowledging
the social and historical construction of nature.9 In many ways, the starting
point of such a critique would be that environmental law has failed in its
objective of raising itself above the ethical, political and cultural fray over
nature and the environment. In addition, the spatial paradox of discussing
geography while ignoring spatiality has exposed a ‘double fault’ in environ-
mental law: not only does it consider nature as the ‘inert background for the
unfolding of the human saga’,10 but it has also appointed itself as the sole
cartographer of the background and arbiter of the lopsided saga. In other
words, environmental law must open the gates of the meticulous fort it has
built for itself and wander the sprawling streets, or slowly wither away inside.
Twenty-five years ago, Lyster discussed the danger of ‘sleeping treaties’ in
International Wildlife Law.11 Ignoring the spatial turn in social theory today
is tantamount to ignoring a host of narratives regarding the deficiencies and
injustices of environmental law as an instrument for the arrangement of the
socio-natural world according to Western modernity. This will result in a
sleeping field, starving itself to death on account of its irrelevance. Therefore,
instead of an analysis that focuses on constructing a coherent internal
structure, indeed an analysis that is always ‘self-conscious’ and that seeks to
rectify the inadequacy of the boundaries of environmental law as an auton-
omous legal field; instead of such an analysis, and in an attempt to construct
a porous relationship between law and society, I propose here an analysis that
allows and encourages environmental law to internalise dispersion, discontinuity
and difference.
In this task set out for critical environmental law, the sometimes over-
looked Foucauldian geography, and more specifically the concept of hetero-
topia with its spatiality of difference, can make a productive contribution.
The following section discusses the concept of heterotopia, linking it with
Foucault’s work and clarifying some difficulties encountered in its applica-
tion to the legal and environmental fields. The final section applies this het-
erotopology to three specific spaces that have, at times, enjoyed increased
attention as the defining sites for the implementation of environmental law,
namely the natural reserve of Western environmentalism, the local commu-
nity of participatory development and the ethno-botanical institution
encouraged within the biodiversity discourse.
10.2 Finding heterotopias
Understanding space as the product of constantly reformulating relations
amongst sites,12 Foucault distinguishes both heterotopias and utopias as
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‘sites … that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other
sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralise, or invert the set of relations
that they happen to designate, mirror or reflect’.13 However, heterotopias are
the dark underbelly of utopias. Utopias, ‘sites with no real place’,14 reflect,
mirror, accentuate, designate and ultimately justify choices, preferences, laws
and society itself in their ideal, perfected and flawless forms. They represent
totality, completion, coherence, and in some ways efficacy and certainty of
purpose. On the other hand, heterotopias are real, ‘lived in’ places that
function as ‘counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which …
other real sites … are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted’.15
Armed with this peculiar spatial function, heterotopias expose and oppose,
invert and divert, disassemble and upset legal and political choices by casting
their preferred spaces in a different light. They represent dispersion, uncer-
tainty, discontinuity, difference and, ultimately, impossibility. Foucault briefly
examines a number of places that can qualify as heterotopias: parents’ bed,
garden tent, boarding school, rest home, psychiatric hospital, cemetery,
theatre, museum, festival, and the heterotopia par excellence of the ship.
‘Heterotopology’ then becomes a general ‘systematic description of these
different spaces, of these other places’,16 ‘finding out where, how and for
whom difference erupts and maintains itself ’.17
The concept enjoyed only a brief surge of interest in the early 1990s18 as
part of a rather marginally successful postmodern programme in geography.
Its resurrection, therefore, might initially appear a strange choice for con-
structing a critical enquiry into environmental law. The interest in locating
and enacting heterotopias, especially by geographers and architects, is
anchored in Foucault’s often-quoted declaration: ‘The present epoch will
perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity:
we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the
side-by-side, of the dispersed.’19 In the end, however, the application of
heterotopia did not result in any appreciable or sustained body of research in
geography. Two factors seem to affect this ‘hesitant’ development and patchy
history of heterotopias within geography and social theory more generally.
First, while widely considered a radical and insightful historian,20 Foucault’s
contributions to geography have received far less attention and only within a
limited group of Anglo-Saxon geographers.21 Secondly, the concept itself
enjoys a fairly unique and questionable status within Foucault’s oeuvre,
in that the text outlining the concept – essentially the notes for a lecture
given in 1967 – was never reviewed for publication and was first seen at a
Berlin exhibition in 1984. The interest in the concept arose after its English
translation and eventual publication in Diacritics in 1986.
While heterotopias are merely one single tool in Foucault’s famous ‘toolbox’,
they cannot be viewed in isolation. It is important that one takes into con-
sideration a number of different texts and sources, for otherwise, the tool
might prove to be blunt and ineffective.22 There are in effect three variations
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of the concept of heterotopia in Foucault’s work, along with some inevitable
and crucial variations created by the English translations. The first brief
mention of heterotopia can be found in the preface of The Order of Things,23
referring to discursive or textual spaces. The starting point of these parti-
cular discursive heterotopias is the disorder and the impossibility engineered
by a strange classification of animals described by Borges. The second man-
ifestation appeared towards the end of the same year (1966) in a radio
broadcast, part of a series titled Utopie et littérature.24 Here Foucault first
discusses the possibility of examining a range of different, other spaces cre-
ated by society to counteract and subvert the dominant classifications. The
starting point for these heterotopias that refer to actual social spaces is the
temporal and spatial subversive effect created by a variety of children’s
games, through which different interpretations of everyday places and
objects of ‘adult society’ are created. Finally, the third manifestation of het-
erotopia is also the better known and more widely employed in analyses. The
lecture was given to a group of architects in 1967, eventually translated and
published into English as ‘Of other spaces’ in 1986.25 This is the text that
most analyses of heterotopia draw upon.
It has been suggested that Foucault was never fully satisfied with the
analytics of space represented by heterotopology, and largely abandoned it in
favour of the geography of knowledge/power presented through the Panop-
ticon of Discipline and Punish.26 Evidence for this rejection is the fact that
Foucault only agreed to the publication of the heterotopias lecture – without
reworking it for publication – as accompanying text to an exhibition and
only as late as 1984, seventeen years after the actual lecture and shortly
before his death.27 However, to follow Foucault and abandon heterotopias
would constitute essentially a rejection of Foucault’s work, which he always
understood as ‘preparing a labyrinth into which I can venture … opening up
underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that
reduce and deform its itinerary’.28 For it is indeed the case that the attempt to
construct a more complete picture of heterotopia as an analytical tool for
critical environmental law can lead to the articulation of a subversive critique
against established notions of legal implementation and its social effects.
10.2.1 Impossible discourse and impossible spatiality
At first instance, one could distinguish between the heterotopia of the preface
in The Order of Things and the subsequent heterotopias lecture on the basis
that the former refers to discursive heterotopias, while the latter refers to real
places. But this distinction would not be precise enough. More careful
examination supports the notion that the preface constructs the origins of
heterotopology, which are then to complement the more specialist lecture. In
that sense, the heterotopic origins lie at the intersection between discourse
and space.
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The starting point is Borges’s quotation of a Chinese taxonomy of animals
(in itself a challenge to Western rationality) as well as the usual kind of
animal knowledge that supports the project of environmental law:
Animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed,
(c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs,
(h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable,
(k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just
broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.29
For Foucault, the Chinese encyclopaedia becomes a symbol of sheer impos-
sibility of perceiving and integrating such an ‘absolutely other’ system of
thought. ‘What is impossible is not the propinquity of the things listed, but
the very site on which their propinquity would be possible.’30 The juxtaposition
of real and imaginary animals engenders a disorder ‘in which fragments of a
large number of possible orders glitter separately in the dimension, without
law or geometry’.31
This incommensurable system of classifying animals represents a primary
example of a discursive heterotopia. This function, however, is possible only
through its impossible spatiality, the simple observation that it is ‘impossible
to imagine a coherent space that would contain such a classificatory
scheme’.32 It is impossible to find a location common to all these fragmented
and different ‘orders’, a topos that would hold all these proposed animal
types and forms. If this paradoxical encyclopaedic listing constitutes a dis-
cursive heterotopia, it suggests that heterotopias can be different and ‘other’
spaces, lying outside the coherence that both discursive and spatial systems
strive for. To take this interpretation further: a heterotopia challenges the
discursive and spatial systems (such as law or geography) of Western mod-
ernity through its becoming ‘a sort of compass [with which] to redraw maps
and to rediscover the logic of those forms that remain hidden behind the
tabular forms of modernity’.33
This heterotopic potential for redrawing the maps of modernity can be
very productive in environmental law’s task of engaging with its own multi-
ple spatiality of difference, as set out in the opening section of this chapter.
Being very close to Massey’s proposition that ‘we understand space as the
sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity in the sense of con-
temporaneous plurality,’34 the examination of heterotopic spaces serves to
bring forth the possibility that many different environmental constructions
can and – more importantly – have already multiplied side by side within ‘this
sphere of coexisting heterogeneity’.35 In this sense, heterotopia constitutes a
place contingent on difference; a place produced by social practices so as to
illustrate a necessary contemporaneous heterogeneity. Environmental law has
encountered its own particular ‘Chinese encyclopaedia’ in the politics of
place and difference, the indigenous struggles for territory, the issue of
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environmental justice, the bio-piracy narrative and other categories of social
action that the orthodox international environmental law of treaties, states
and jurisdiction finds impossible to adequately incorporate. The effect of
creating and accepting difference makes heterotopia a productive tool for
engaging with the impossible spatiality of these concurrently ‘place-based’
and transnational discourses. Consequently, the identification of such envir-
onmental heterotopias can be seen to expose the spatial ignorance of envir-
onmental law; an ignorance that is anchored by the necessity of a coherent
and value-neutral legal discourse as separate from the rest of social prac-
tices – and usher in a spatiality of coexisting difference that serves to end this
legal isolation. The preface of The Order of Things illustrates that the dis-
placing effect of these different spaces that can be identified as environmental
heterotopias can arise from the dual impossibility of forcing the legal domain
to hold too many contradictory elements (ecology and development, utilisa-
tion and stewardship, etc.), as well as of finding one single real place that can
adequately represent this mixture. As the internationalist and globalist pres-
sures of environmental law strip it off its spatiality to the point that legal
closure becomes a hollow structure pursuing imaginary utopias, heterotopias
remember the impact of environmental laws on the ground and the material
practices that shape alternative environmental subjectivities.
10.2.2 Subversion and counter-spaces
Heterotopias are imperfect and deviating mirrors; they cannot function in the
manner accomplished by utopias, embodying untroubled, and unreal, images;
instead they expose memories of imposed orderings and subvert the language
used to identify them. They are called ‘effectively enacted utopias’36 or, alter-
natively, ‘localised utopias’, as in the 1966 radio broadcast. This primary
subversive function is given more emphasis in that radio broadcast by Fou-
cault, where he states that heterotopias are something ‘that children know very
well’, going on to list a number of places where children’s games take place:
the garden, the attic, on or around the parents’ bed etc. In this way, ‘the chil-
dren’s inventive play produces a different space that at the same time mirrors
what is around them. The space reflects and contests simultaneously.’37 The
covers of the bed are sheets made out of wool, but they can also represent the
blue sky. The garden can be a dark forest in which to hide. The children’s
discourse produces a different space that is at the same time real and unreal,
but usually fantastical, contesting the parents’ more mundane reading and
everyday use of the same space. The subversive fun lasts until the parents
come home and restore logical coherence. With this example, heterotopias
illustrate that other, different places are not only possible, but their unforeseen
and subversive effects necessary – for the sanity of both parents and children.
In the lecture, this elementary example of heterotopia disappears and is
replaced by the mirror, perhaps in some ways lessening the political and
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subversive heterotopic impact. This may be attributed to the fact that the
mirror illustrates more clearly the confusion that heterotopia engenders. For
heterotopia is a dual place (or object), encompassing two interconnected
conceptions of space: the mirror itself – a real place inside reality; and the
virtual space created on the outside of real space. Nevertheless, the example
of the children’s play implies the existence of certain agency in the setting of
heterotopias, whereas the more oft-quoted lecture resorts from the outset to
the obscure and difficult totality of ‘society’ as both the creator and the focus
of the oppositional relation with heterotopia. This hypothesised societal
whole that heterotopia is thought to contest, has been associated with the
simplistic conception of fixed space that heterotopology seeks to overcome,
leading to the characterisations of ‘problematic geographical structuralism’38
or ‘myopic sociological functionalism’39 that underpin the criticisms of
attempts to analyse the spatialisation posited by heterotopia.
This is especially pertinent to the application of the concept to environ-
mental matters. What is the virtual whole that environmental heterotopias
are neutralising, subverting, opposing? The example of the children’s games
can be used as a metaphor describing a principle of plurality or multiplicity that
must characterise environmental law, but it also hides the danger of the pater-
nalistic binary between ‘parents’ as the legal centre and ‘children’ as the social
periphery of resistance (or even more detrimental and near-offensive the
North as parents and the South as children) – precisely what the spatial turn
seeks to avoid and a return to world arrangements according to the grids
and hierarchies of modernity. Are these heterotopias simple indications of
opposition to legal environmental discourses or to economic globalisation;
are they indications of the fragmentation of international (environmental)
law; a more complex challenge to the predominance of the Western moder-
nity; sites for the formulation of alternative governmental rationalities
through a resistance to their spatialising effects; or indeed all of the above?
To further analyse the role of these ‘counter-spaces’, the analysis shifts to
more concrete examples of places where the ‘mapping’ of environmental law
has been concentrated.
10.3 Enacting heterotopias
The natural reserve is a symbol of the American invention of wilderness, of
primal, ‘untapped’ nature with intrinsic, aesthetic and utilitarian values. The
local community is the site of a tightly local group, possessing shared beliefs
and value systems, emphasising the shift to participatory schemes of envir-
onmental government. The ethno-botanical institutions40 are spaces where
the economic and cultural restoration of problematic Southern states and
communities takes place. By placing people and things, by demarcating and
dividing the sites of their everyday lives, by transforming the space of their
collective social action, the environment will be healthy and wholesome
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again tomorrow. In this utopian promise, the environment is the fixed and
homogeneous space of the neutral canvas and the Western map; a unified
and quantifiable totality which environmental law attempts to arrange
and govern.
Environmental heterotopias first and foremost disturb this utopian fixation
of environmental legal practices. Heterotopias are social formations that
counteract the abstraction of legal utopias that drives environmental dis-
course. They are located both outside and inside the global space assumed
by environmental law. They contest both the legal practices that are sup-
posed to emerge within legal discourse, as well as the spatialisation that these
practices seek to disseminate. Eschewing the ‘task’ of the utopian embodi-
ment of environmental ideals, heterotopias are places that both reflect and
contest, subvert and alter environmental and legal narratives, ethics, aesthetics,
or norms regarding the correct individual and collective conduct towards the
environment. Viewed from this heterotopic perspective, both their formal
‘appointment’ as exemplary governable spaces and their discreet ‘abandon-
ment’, once the narrative they supposedly embody falls out of favour, are
events that point to historical shifts in the ways societies expect law to
address environmental issues. Environmental heterotopias remember the
forgotten spatialisations that did not function as planned, but are also real
places illustrating this failure to their inhabitants and visitors on a daily
basis. A failed place is harder to hide than a failed legal agreement. The
establishment of such different trajectories can then become the compass for
redrawing the grids and tables of modernity.
In order to enact fully this heterotopology, one first has to locate difference,
dispersion and overall ‘strangeness’41 of certain sites that exist both outside
and within the society that environmental law is addressing. Foucault offers
six observable traits that characterise heterotopias. These principles will
assist in analysing the heterotopic functions of some common places of
environmental discourse.
10.3.1 Natural reserve: distanced crisis and ritual purification
The setting aside of natural reserves, the ‘walled-off’ protected areas and the
designation of official wildlife parks, widely considered a primary indicator
of social awareness and concern over environmental issues, has already been
a staple objective of environmental law. Early environmental discourse, from
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring to UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention,
sought to transform the previously empty, value-neutral physical space into
an aesthetically pleasing and thus intrinsically valuable landscape. This new
landscape imposed a preservation mandate that was rooted in the aesthetic
sensibilities of Western modernity. Once designated, these sites assume a
privileged status, reserved for endangered nature, which is allowed to ‘run
wild’ and reacquire its ‘pristine’ character within the borders of these areas.
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They constitute crisis heterotopias, ensuring that this rejuvenation ‘takes
place elsewhere’,42 so as to not interfere with continued urban development
and its by-products, such as pollution and overpopulation. By providing this
‘guarantee’ of an outside buffer space against complete degradation, the
landscape of a protected area becomes a horizon that allows sustained
development and continued urban living while maintaining a reserve to be
used for future restoration.
This heterotopia reflects the simplistic character of the early spatialisation
proposed by environmental law, which erects a barrier between the outside
space of nature and the inside space of humanity. The environment was
descending rapidly into a state of crisis due to destructive social practices,
and the proposed solution was to lock it away, to prohibit interaction with
the rest of society until that crisis state is surpassed. In a social context,
similar places, according to Foucault, were the boarding schools (for girls)
and military service (for boys). Any ecologist would be quick to point out
that this isolation of the protected areas is no longer considered the best
policy. This refers precisely to the first principle of heterotopology as out-
lined by Foucault: the replacement of crisis heterotopias by heterotopias of
deviation, which alters the perception of the crisis, turning it instead into a
problem of deviation from normal conduct. This is the case with the het-
erotopias of the local community and the botanical institution, which will be
analysed below.
Another principle that can be observed in the function of the protected
area is the link to slices in time or ‘heterochronies’.43 As an attempt to
recapture the utopian wilderness aspect of nature, the heterotopia of the
protected area is the de facto extension of the natural history museum and
the botanical garden, the precedents of environmentalism in Western culture
of the nineteenth century. The natural reserve is an attempt to manage ‘a
sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile
place’.44 It appears as though environmental discourse suggests that there
should be one space for natural history to unfold, and another, separate one,
for human history to do the same.
Thirdly, ‘heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing
that both isolates them and makes them penetrable … the heterotopic site is
not freely accessible like a public place’.45 Access here is not necessarily
meant in the strict legal sense, but such a system does exist in all the spaces
examined in this chapter. The protected area represents a dual, physical as
well as conceptual, ‘walling-off’ of nature from humanity. To enter the natural
reserve, one needs to have embraced specific ethics, to speak a certain
truthful discourse: environmental scientists are allowed in the Alaska national
park, but resource economists prospecting for oil are not so welcome. Agro-
tourists interested in organic produce or wine are welcomed in the Tuscan
heartland around Florence, while tourists that require unsophisticated plea-
sures such as beer, bars and pools are frowned upon. The (post)colonial
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safari is alive and well around the Kenyan wildlife parks, while poaching
bans are actively enforced. Such places cannot accommodate false and
inappropriate discourses.
The spatial function of the protected area is similar to the example of the
Muslim hamam cited by Foucault: ‘one must have a certain permission and
make certain gestures’.46 As the purification sought in a hamam is partly
hygienic and partly religious, the ecological restoration occurring in the
nature reserve is borne partly of necessity due to environmental crisis, and
partly because of ethical reasons – the aesthetic value and beauty of nature
as a counterpoint to the alienation of modern, urban life.
The primacy of such crisis heterotopias has been subsequently contested
by the idea that preservation should be paired with the sustainable utilisation
of natural resources, by the notion of sustainable development, as well as by
the renewed focus on local and indigenous communities. These new principles
transformed the contrived wilderness of the nature reserve into a much more
crowded place – a different heterotopia signalling a different period in
environmental history.
10.3.2 Community: required deviation and the ‘otherness’ prison
The increased prominence of the local and indigenous community due to
legal instruments, such as the Biodiversity Convention and Agenda 21, is
another spatial transformation engineered by environmental law in order to
remove some of the limitations of the focus on protected areas. The wild and
empty space of the protected area was no longer sufficient to arrest environ-
mental catastrophe. The participation of adjacent communities, previously
ignored or considered a contributor to environmental degradation, became
an essential element of sustainable development, also giving rise to the sta-
keholder narrative. For the developing world, this localisation was linked to
issues of empowerment and poverty reduction, through the recognition of
land claims and the protection of traditional and indigenous lifestyles and
their local knowledge. The new paradigm supported the notion that local
populations were to be given incentives in order to protect the environment,
to participate in environmental governance, instead of being forced to
remain outside the borders of the protected areas. The primary incentive was
economic: the promise of sustainable development.
According to this narrative, the local community is a site of inclusion into
national society, into the market, into the global economic development, into
environmental ideals of resource management.47 As well as a beneficiary of
the social goods of sustainable development, it is also an owner and an
‘author’ of alternative, traditional or environmental, knowledge that should
be integrated into the mainstream of techno-scientific environmental knowledge.
There are certain spatial requirements for this ‘idiom of inclusion’48 to be
materialised. Within the context of fixed and absolute space, these localities
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generally have to be divided in small geographical units, with a homogeneous
internal structure and shared social norms,49 small dots on the grand map.
This is even more pronounced if the community happens to belong to a
recognised indigenous group. For environmental law, the inclusion of these
communities adds legitimacy to institutions and measures, incorporating
ecological with social justice.
The perspective changes radically once these communities are viewed as
heterotopias, as real places that carry the burden of implementing the privi-
leged texts of environmental law. They are expected to perform the role of
utopia, to become places that are stable, harmonious, long-lasting, the rural
or indigenous character hiding wisdom and balance, defined in opposition to
the modern dystopia of the urban, the developed, the West. Instead, they
only reflect a nostalgic slice of time, a ‘heterochrony’ of difference and
otherness that becomes a fixed image of how societies view them. Instead of
the indefinite accumulation of time sought in the designation of the pro-
tected area, local communities are places where time has strangely stopped
building up; they are refused the right to ‘accumulate time’, to evolve, to join
other social groupings or networks. Rural populations have to maintain their
authenticity and indigenous populations have to maintain their ‘contrived
ethnicity’,50 constituting an ephemeral festival, a spatial and temporal prison
with a very strict system of compulsory entry.
This can lead to bizarre and irrational outcomes, much alike the dis-
continuous and incongruous classification of the Chinese encyclopaedia.
Writing on the US government-funded ICBG51 genetic research programme,
Hayden finds a monolithic commitment, from the part of US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) that run the programme to ‘the territorialised
local community as the bundled-together source of (semi-)raw material and
destination for future benefits’.52 Once the Mexico-based research programme
decided to move away from this restricted conception of community (pre-
cisely because the utopian model of the clearly delineated community did
not constitute an actual real location in Mexico due to the history between
indigenous and Hispanic peoples) and adopt different ideas of plant sample
collection from alternative sources, discontent arose at the NIH for ‘breaking
the link among people, plants and benefits’.53 These communities have to
constitute observable and verifiable spatial units and beneficiaries of quanti-
fiable social goods from sustainable development. When they expose and
subvert the imposition of this fixed and external ‘otherness’, when they dis-
locate themselves from their supposed tight tribal structure and shared belief
system, these communities end up neutralising the legitimacy sought by
environmental law and its adoption of sustainable development. There is no
colony to receive the teachings of the Christian missionary.
In direct contrast to the crisis aspect of the natural reserve, local and
indigenous communities may thus be regarded as heterotopias of deviation,
i.e. places ‘in which individuals whose behaviour is deviant in relation to
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required mean or norm are placed’.54 This is a necessary deviation, to be
attended to and studied, but never fully rectified, much like the situation in a
prison or a rest home. Environmental law requires a sacrifice in order to
grant inclusion into the legal domain, but the sacrifice ensures permanent
exclusion. The meaning of the revalorisation of community in environmental
discourse is quite clear: through the legal practice and process, we are going
to protect you and include you, if you maintain your rural/indigenous character.
You will no longer be on the outside. But once a community ceases to con-
form to the utopian ideal and fixed image imposed from above, no method
of integration is available. By uncovering this process of marginalisation by
inclusion (by way of a closely monitored system of entry), this environmental
heterotopia illustrates the possibility of a place that is both inside and outside
spatial and discursive orderings.
10.3.3 Ethno-botanical institution: understanding
environmental deviation
The incompatible requirements of the empty protected area and the lived-in
community are addressed in a third space, the ethno-botanical institution,
much favoured in recent times and especially in biodiversity discourse. These
institutions that have spread around the South are heterotopias ‘capable of
juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces that are in themselves
incompatible’, much like Foucault’s example of the theatre as heterotopia.55
First, nature was to be left alone; then it had to be managed and protected
by people in close proximity. Then, the aesthetics of the landscape had to be
meshed with the rhetoric of sustainable development and ideas of social
justice. One ‘stage’ where this hybridisation takes place is the ethno-botanical
institution.
These institutions began being established in the South on the eve of the
Biodiversity Convention’s designation of biodiversity as a national resource
and abandonment of the common heritage doctrine.56 Arguably their idea
and set-up descend from the prototype that is the market-oriented private
INBio of Costa Rica, a brainchild of American conservation biology57 and
arguably the first of its kind.58 Such institutions, even under their more
recent and successful guise as public agencies, are information nodes, acting
as ‘clearing houses’ of knowledge, licences, contracts, policy and, ultimately,
conduct towards the environment in order to bring into being locally
informed sustainable development models.59 Their spatial role is that of a
conduit: they gather and relate local and traditional environmental knowledge
to global scientific discourse, while at the same time disseminating the tenets
of global environmentalism to even more localities.
From the heterotopic perspective, these ethno-botanical institutions are
relatively recent additions to the spatialisation effected by environmental law.
The objective is precisely to merge together spaces that are considered
Heterotopias of the environment 205
incompatible. In contrast to the previous fixations with protected areas and
local communities, these are instead ‘active’ sites, their hybridising spatial
properties putting forward various projects of ecological, cultural and eco-
nomic restoration, through the training of environmental behaviour. They do
not constitute passive receptacles of the mandates of the privileged texts of
environmental law agreed and passed elsewhere, but instead rely on the
social construction of norms that contain elements of multiple sources and
spaces; a multiplicity of ‘people, plants and justice’.60
The crisis aspect of the protected area has been almost fully co-opted by
the possibilities opened by these institutions, whose emergence in some ways
complements the role of the local communities examined above. There is
considerable overlap between the two spaces as regards the participation of
the same persons and the arrangement of similar resources. In the case of the
ethno-botanical institution, the point is made even more forcefully that their
involvement in environmental government goes beyond reproducing or for-
cefully imposing binding standards and prohibitions. It embraces and seeks
to ‘understand’ any deviation from the norms of environmental law and
policy as set out by biology and economics, while the heterotopia of com-
munity simply sought to contain it in a fixed time and place. It forms part of
a process of alternative and diversified making of environmental subjects in a
Southern, decentralised setting of ‘intimate government’.61 While both con-
stitute deviation heterotopias, the function of botanical institution appears
similar to that of a psychiatric hospital – rather than the communal prison of
contrived ethnicity. The romanticised but ultimately incomprehensible indi-
genous ‘monster’ existing outside the space and law of modernity is recast as
an ‘individual to be corrected’,62 within a more conventional setting where
‘deviant behaviours are established in the very moment of their analysis’.63
And these ‘patients’ are allowed to roam and formulate their own ‘games’
and interactions, assisted in their self-formulation as environmental subjects
while simultaneously being ‘trained’ to participate in the normativity of a
global society of markets and development.
In terms of taking into account multiplicity and heterogeneity (as outlined
in the previous sections), there is little doubt that such institutions do repre-
sent a break in environmental law’s spatial arrangements. In contrast to past
environmental and developmental interventions, the botanical institution is
not a remote centralising institution located in a distant country or a conference
of the parties of an international treaty, but is located near the areas in the
South that have been problematised especially by the concept of biodiversity.
Thus, the overall legitimacy of a legal domain that can create and delegate
authority to such institutions is ultimately raised, precisely because of this
acknowledgement of spatial difference and engagement with local adaptation.
Nevertheless, this proximity raises the important and controversial issue of
incentivising environmental protection through the promise of development,
which relates to the ‘system of opening and closing’ of these heterotopias.
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The ‘gates’ of the botanical institution are presented as holding the promise
of development; thus the power that is exercised by such institutions is
increased by virtue of becoming a ‘gateway’ to a better life. The ‘permissions
and gestures’ required to enter are eagerly performed by individuals and
communities wanting to escape marginalisation and poverty. Irrespective of
the gap between expectations and realities, ‘the will to improve’64 is a con-
stant and ‘stubborn’ rationality for shaping environmental subjectivities and
practices. But of course such an opening always ‘hides curious exclusions’:
entering those sites is ‘only an illusion: we think we enter where we are, by
the very fact that we enter, excluded’.65 A step forward in the recognition of the
politics of place66 no doubt; but restrictions still exist. Botanical institutions
secure the participation of stakeholders in conservation and development
activities, not right holders or property owners, and of providers of raw
material for a global industry of biotechnology.67 Agreeing to ‘enter’ these
botanical institutions is an acknowledgement of a poverty-stricken Southern
identity and a submission to a constant analysis of that identity. On the
other hand, these sites engender possibilities and pluralities in ways rejected
by the processes of designating protected areas and of recognising local and
indigenous communities, especially when viewed in isolation from each
other. If these knowledge clearing houses are in fact fully fledged counter
spaces at the heart of the legal domain, permitting ‘acts of counterwork by
locals’,68 then the question (which cannot be answered here) becomes: are
they producing alternative modernities (adaptations of Western modernity to
Southern conditions) or alternatives to Western modernity itself ?69
10.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a heterotopic overview of the three spaces of the
natural reserve, the local community and the botanical institution, all of
which are much discussed in environmental law. The list of sites and objects
that can be subjected to this form of spatial analysis is potentially large.
Thus, one could also investigate the ephemeral festivals of self-congratula-
tion that are the conferences of the parties; the transboundary but also local
networks of farmers’ associations and other similar movements; seed and
gene banks; natural history museums; botanical gardens; those prized urban
parks; farms (organic versus industrial); whaling ships and so on. While this
chapter included a presentation of the theoretical framework, thus leaving
little room for detailed analysis, the application of heterotopology arguably
yields more insights if applied to specific places as opposed to spatial cate-
gories.70 Finally, it is obvious from the above that heterotopology is a
method of analysis suited to the particular spatial turn required of environ-
mental law. These caveats aside, the concept of heterotopia can produce a
critique of the illusions and fixations of environmental law, in particular in
its international manifestation.
Heterotopias of the environment 207
There is one last trait of heterotopias that has not been included in the
above discussion of the three places. By maintaining an outside/inside spatial
distinction the aim of all three heterotopias is to compensate for the envir-
onmentally problematic and already globalised product of development: the
urban space of the modern city. From the perspective of modernity, the
objective is always to construct a different space, ‘as perfect, as meticulous,
as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled’.71 When that
utopian dream is suspended, one is left with the very real counter-space
of heterotopia. Instead of the West’s addressing its past failures through
environmental law, it is for ever projecting them on to new localities, spaces
and sites.
One of the starting points in ‘Of other spaces’ is the realisation that space
itself has a history that cannot be disregarded. Environmentalism in general
exhibits a profound dislike for historical arguments, especially if they relate
to the history of environmental concepts and movements themselves. The
impending ecological crisis calls for solutions, not introspection. This chapter
contests this belief by showing, through the comparison between the different
spatial uses of three places, that a historical examination of environmental
ideas is also an important component of critical environmental law. This
short and site-specific spatial history nevertheless uncovers the illusions of
official policies, forgotten other places that subvert their utopian beginnings
and remnants of failed law that no one wants to engage with. Instead of the
impenetrable fort of law ruling over space, law becomes another part of a
heterogeneous space ‘in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in
which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs’.72
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Chapter 11
Majesty and monstrosity
Deleuze and the defence of Nature
Mark Halsey
Through effective environmental and visitor management, Parks Victoria is
dedicated to preserving the natural and heritage values of the parks, bays, and
waterways, including full protection of sensitive areas. Preservation is our highest
commitment.1
Parks remain the most taken for granted and unexamined regulatory forms in
north American society.2
11.1 Introduction
In his brief but quite brilliant essay ‘Of other spaces’ Michel Foucault focuses
his attention on places which are ‘unlike ordinary cultural spaces’. These
heterotopic spaces, as he terms them, are simultaneously outside the state
and yet fundamentally ‘connected with all the sites of the city state or
society’.3 In a similar way, and reflecting many of the principles of hetero-
topic spaces outlined by Foucault, I would argue that National Parks are
‘unlike ordinary cultural spaces’ and that they connect in complex and
unconscious (or at least unspoken) ways to the spaces, persons and things
around them. Indeed, drawing on Foucault’s4 sixth principle of heterotopic
spaces, I would argue that the National Park (as ‘perfect’, as ‘meticulous’, as
‘well arranged’ space) is produced directly by and in opposition to the city
state (and, to invoke Foucault’s terms, its corresponding ‘messiness’, ‘ill con-
struction’, and ‘jumbled’ dimensions). It is a space, which, like the attempt to
found a new colony, or to found a new religious order in distant lands, is
constituted by the state as ‘compensation’ for and protection against the
damage done to Nature in the initial forging of the city state.
In this chapter5 I explore the vicissitudes of this particular brand of com-
pensation. Specifically, I pose and respond to the following three questions:
(1) What conceptions of the ‘social’ and ‘natural’ are National Parks (and
their variants) aligned to? (2) In what kind of ‘truth games’6 are particular
discourses (law, science, conservation) implicated with regard to the invention
and management of National Parks? (3) What can one rightfully claim to
experience or bear witness to in such places? My intention is to respond to
these questions through an examination of the (un)remarked significance of
preserving and visiting National Parks, and, more particularly, significant
trees. I argue that the prescribed beauty, rarity, or ‘majesty’ of such places or
trees should in fact be read as a type of monstrosity. Throughout the chapter
I will refer to two kinds of monstrosity: the monstrosity arising from treating
Nature as endless copy (signalling the violence of representation) and the
monstrosity born of the collision of two distinct chronologies – industrial
time and geological time (signalling the violence of speed). The two, of
course, intermingle and will be treated in such a manner. This idea of mon-
strosity as sign has been appropriately discussed by Torkild Thanem, who
writes:
The words monster, monstrosity and monstrous all emerge from [the]
Latin monstrum, which means portent, omen or sign, and from monere,
which means warn. Moreover, they are related to monstrare, which
means to show, demonstrate or prove … [A] monster embodying unu-
sual and irregular features was seen as punishment of past sins, prodigies
(i.e. monsters found so horrible and fearsome that they would terrify
humans) even announced greater punishment to come and not seldom
the end of the world … Monsters such as hermaphrodites were outside
the course of Nature: prodigies such as a child born with a dog’s tail
were completely against Nature, results of abhorrent acts of bestiality …
Both were outside or contrary to Nature because of their heterogeneity,
which disrupted the boundaries between beings that should be kept
apart.7
There are some (un)timely consistencies concerning the etymological/historical
dimensions of monstrosity and what National Parks – more specifically, sig-
nificant trees – can be taken to signify. In particular, these trees certainly
appear on the physical and psychic landscape as remnants of ‘past sins’ (the
result of colliding with Earth too intensely, at too great a speed, for too long)
but equally, and counter-intuitively, they appear as ‘outside or contrary to
nature’ in so far as they are remarkable exceptions to the general use and
abuse of Earth. And, perhaps most critically, they permit a problematisation, as
Thanem puts it, of ‘the boundaries between beings that should be kept
apart’. As monstrous beings – as heterogeneous bodies simultaneously the
object of and manifestly beyond past and current industrial activity – such
trees force us to think about the mixture of practices occurring in close and
distant proximity to them.
Monstrosity should not be read as synonymous with the ugly, the inap-
propriate or the unbearable. Instead, I deploy the term in the Deleuzean
sense of an encounter – of that which impacts the senses in ways not immediately
amenable to pre-assigned or preconceived categories. A monstrosity is that
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which lingers in the space of the acategorical – that which refuses to be
assigned (signed) a particular meaning or value and yet nonetheless is inter-
preted to be a sign of something, or some reckoning, or some critical
moment. As Deleuze puts it:
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object
not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter … In whichever tone,
its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed … [T]hat which
can only be sensed … moves the soul, ‘perplexes’ it – in other words
forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign,
were the bearer of a problem – as though it were a problem …
[Encounters involve] an unlimited qualitative becoming … [a] mad
becoming.8
Art offers an appropriate way of thinking through the distinction between
recognition and encounter. When first viewed by the public, Jackson Pol-
lock’s Blue Poles provided its audiences with, arguably, an encounter – its
meaning was not evident in traditional ways of interpreting and talking
about art. Very simply, it imploded the will toward representation and confoun-
ded the process of recognition. But in time Blue Poles moved from some-
thing acategorical (something which could only be sensed and not spoken of)
to something categorical (something which should be interpreted and enun-
ciated within the frame of modernism or abstract expressionism). Similarly,
Mona Lisa – often described as the most famous artistic work of all time –
is, or has become, instantly recognisable. There is little, if any, capacity for
an encounter with the image, its story and meanings having been told and
retold countless times. The Mona Lisa is the image where the form and
content of portraiture assume universal and seemingly timeless qualities. This
is to be contrasted against Brett Whiteley’s self-portrait, Art, Life and the Other
Thing, which forces the viewer to undo the preconceived and well established
versions of faciality9 they carry with them. Deleuze and Guattari write:
concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are
engendered by an abstract machine of faciality … The head, even the
human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when
the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by
the body, when it ceases to have a mulitdimensional, polyvocal corporeal
code – when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be
overcoded by something we shall call the Face.10
The “face” in Whiteley’s work is both Whiteley and not Whiteley. It is a
portrait of self and other and something besides within the one frame. It is a
becoming monstrous in the sense that it sounds a warning to those who dare
to think portraiture in categorical terms (where it could, in any case, only
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implode under the weight of its lifeless repetitions). Whiteley’s work – just
like those of Picasso or Van Gogh – stands, in short, in opposition to the
image of thought which would have us believe in the one face, the one iden-
tity, the one interpretation or ‘judgement of the image’.11 Hence the primary
questions which frame this chapter: What can one rightfully claim to
experience in National Parks? or What kind of encounter is it possible to
produce in National Parks or when making a pilgrimage to ‘big’ or ‘ecologi-
cally significant’ or ‘historically significant’ trees? What, more pointedly, is the
problem to which such trees direct us toward or encourage a reckoning with?
11.2 Law and the defence of Nature
In order to respond to the aforementioned questions it is necessary to briefly
explore what law (typically) does in its efforts to ‘defend’ Nature. That is,
I think it important to make known the relationship between (Western) law
and Nature generally before proceeding to ask how law envisages or codes
aspects of the environment more specifically. The most obvious way in which
law defends (protects) Nature is by regulation of human behaviour in parti-
cular domains (ticketing, signage, rules of conduct) and by the prosecution
of bodies who contravene various regulations (instances of air, water and soil
pollution, and so forth) in such areas. However, beyond these measures
(beyond the command-and-control approach), I would argue that the pri-
mary means by which law attempts to secure good environmental outcomes
is through the classification of terrestrial, aquatic and marine environments
and the activities permitted therein. Law, in short, upholds particular
regimes of value (environmental, economic, social, cultural, historical, etc.)
which in turn afford various degrees of protection (World Heritage area,
National Park, conservation park, special protection zone) to particular
spaces. In effect, law demarcates the proper and improper use of Nature and
is typically taken to occupy a space beyond the damage it is charged with
negating.
In her classic work Purity and Danger Mary Douglas insightfully observed
that ‘where there is no differentiation there is no defilement’.12 I take this to
mean that the act of naming and dividing the Earth, whilst perhaps an
inevitable event, is nonetheless one of immeasurable ethical weight, heralding
not only many advantages but countless dangers as well. As Douglas puts it,
‘[T]he yearning for rigidity is in us all. It is part of our human condition to
long for hard lines and clear concepts. When we have them we either face the
fact that some realities elude them, or else blind ourselves to the inadequacy
of the concepts.’13 To ask law to do our bidding with regard to environ-
mental protection (to ask law to be that ‘hard line’ between ecological
integrity and ecological damage) is a hazardous enterprise for all kinds of
reasons. For one thing, law tends to pay scant regard to the epistemologies
and ontologies on which its demarcations are built. Nietzsche14 warned
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many decades prior to Douglas of the dangers adhering to a steadfast (reified)
belief in the idols (binaries: National Park/industrial zone) we ourselves erect.
Not just the idols of God, or Right, or Good or Evil, but equally and espe-
cially those of the sacred, taboo, species, individual, ecologically rare, ecolo-
gically common, high-risk, minimal-risk, wet forest, dry forest, eucalyptus
regnans, eucalyptus nitens, and so forth. To quote Nietzsche,
All the knowledge which is of assistance to us involves the identification
of things which are not the same, of things which are only similar. In
other words, such knowledge is essentially illogical. … The omitting of
what is individual provides us with the concept, and with this our
knowledge begins: in categorizing, in the establishment of classes. But
the essence of things does not correspond to this: it is a process of
knowledge which does not touch upon the essence of things [ … ].15
The tendency for language to conflate what Deleuze16 terms ‘individual
difference’ with the ‘differences borne by individuals’ is something I will
return to later, since this is, to my mind, at the heart of the majesty/monstrosity
debate. For the moment, let me simply venture that, for Deleuze,17 there can
be no defence of nature, for Nature18 is that which has already been selected
and coded – some might say, axiomised, by the socius. Nature is written and
spoken (represented) in such a way as to sublimate what Deleuze terms the
‘deep disparity’ of the world. Nature (like justice, violence, democracy, sus-
tainability) is an abstract machine marking out ahead of time what it is
possible and not possible to say and do with respect to ‘the environment’. To
use one of Deleuze’s19 phrases again, Nature is in the order of the image of
thought – it is part of the plane of organisation where striated space (full of
known bodies, known points and known risks) and royal science (as opposed
to local/nomadic knowledges) predominate. For Deleuze, Nature is some-
thing conjured through the belief in the resemblance of species and terrains
as well as the repetition of the discursive frames which present these species
and terrains as having always already been there (lying in wait for science to
‘discover’, name and organise them and for law to give force to such dis-
covering, naming and organisation). As Deleuze urges, ‘Nature must be
thought of as the principle of the diverse and its production. But a principle of
the production of the diverse makes sense only if it does not assemble its own
elements into a whole.’20 For Deleuze, therefore, what needs ‘defending’, what
needs engaging, is the plane of consistency (the acategorical) in all its complexity
and vitality, and in its refusal to be pinned down by the categorical.
Law, to be clear, cannot defend Nature because ‘nature’ – in the pri-
mordial sense – is a flow of intensities and formations incapable of being
assigned a definitive and proper place by any exterior force. Following the
lead of Susan Chaplin, law positions itself as the force or line designed to
keep chaos – in this case, the unpredictable or dangerous elements of
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Nature – at arm’s length. As Chaplin remarks, ‘[L]aw exists only as th[e]
“dividing line” that serves to exclude filth.’ More important, ‘filth exists not
“in itself” but only with reference to “a boundary [ … ] a margin” … The
law – the “inner and outer boundary” of this symbolic economy, the
permeable margin between the sacred and the abject – is itself that which
jeopardises the integrity of the community and its members.’21 This clearly
echoes Derrida’s call to be consistently aware of the ‘co-implication of vio-
lence and law’.22 This co-implication – the illusion of the neutrality and
innocence of the line dividing filth from cleanliness, pollution from purity,
violence from non-violence – goes to another of my key claims: that the
partitioning or delimiting of the more ‘majestic’ aspects of Nature is to
admit to the basically violent and intrusive character of interactions ‘beyond’
these places. The islands of wildness (or, more accurately, of (re)presented
beauty) which law names and places to one side, are conceivable only on the
basis of an ongoing and generalised ecological violence. National Parks are
carved literally out of their antitheses (the non-park terrain). In short, why
privilege and preserve particular places (forests, marine environments,
deserts) if not for the fact that something fundamental and enduring threa-
tens from without? But the issue goes much deeper than that. Specifically, I
would argue that the ‘force of capitalism’ (the violence which founds and
preserves the social and physical machinery of industrial society) is or has
evolved to be a more trenchant force than the ‘force of law’ which portends,
on occasion, to restrain it.23 There can be few better examples of this than in
the curious relationship or juxtaposition of intensive industrial activity
within or immediately abutting National Parks and/or World Heritage areas.
Here, the ‘co-implication of violence and law’24 – law as ‘the permeable
margin between the sacred and the abject’25 – is manifested in stark fashion.
11.3 Law, industry, World Heritage
Of the seventeen World Heritage areas in Australia, eleven appear on
account of their exclusively natural values. At least three of these sites permit
large-scale intensive industrial activity within or very near their borders
(mostly in locations excised from actual World Heritage status). Shark Bay,
located around 800 km north of Perth in Western Australia, and covering
almost 22,000 km2, ‘is one of the few World Heritage properties inscribed for
all four outstanding natural universal values: showing the earth’s evolu-
tionary history, ongoing ecological and biological processes, superlative nat-
ural phenomena, and important habitats for in situ conservation of
biodiversity’.26 In spite of its outstanding ecological features, ‘Mineral tene-
ments (and applications for mining leases and exploration licenses) present
within or adjacent to the World Heritage Property include those for gypsum,
mineral sands, shell coquina (see section 4.3.19 Basic Raw Material Use) and
salt (see section 4.3.18 Salt Production)’.27 In 2003–04 over 1 million tonnes
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of salt were produced at Useless Loop with an export value of around
$17 million. Coquina shell is also mined for use in footpaths, roads and
concrete mix. Farming of sheep, goats and cattle on pastoral leases within
the Heritage Area also occurs.28
A second example is provided by the Great Barrier Reef, which was
declared ‘a World Heritage Area in 1981, [having been] internationally
recognised by the World Heritage Committee for its Outstanding Universal
Value’.29 The World Heritage Area ‘[c]over[s] 344,000 [km2] and stretch[es]
2,300 km along the north-eastern Australian coastline. [I]t is the largest coral
reef ecosystem [and largest World Heritage area] in the world’.30 The philo-
sophy underpinning the management of the park is one of multiple use,31
with some activities arguably posing an ecological threat to the integrity of
the area as a whole. One such activity is the high volume of oil tanker traffic
permitted within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. The Marine Park
Authority acknowledges that ‘Since 1987 over 700 shipping or marine pol-
lution incidents have been reported in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
Authority’s marine incident database.’32 In fact, from 1987 to 2004 there
have been 313 confirmed spills from vessels, 157 unconfirmed spills of origin
and type, 84 instances of ships running aground on the reef, and 114 sink-
ings, including collisions and capsizings.33 In January 2006 the largest Great
Barrier Reef oil spill in thirty-five years occurred as a result of a tugboat
colliding with a ship in the port of Gladstone, releasing around 25 tonnes of
oil into the park’s waters.
A third and perhaps most controversial example of a World Heritage
area being threatened by intensive industrial activity is Kakadu National
Park, Northern Territory (first inscribed in 1981, with extensions of its
boundaries occurring in 1987 and 1992).34 The area contains three extensive
mineral leases devoted to the mining of uranium. Each of these leases ‘were
always enclaves, legally excluded from KNP [Kakadu National Park],
although surrounded by it’.35 Ranger uranium mine is the most intensive of
these and has featured prominently in public debate for three decades with
‘[t]he first drum of uranium oxide … produced on 13 August 1981’.36 This
mine has expanded exponentially in size and production output since that
date with, for instance, ‘A total of 19.78 million tonnes of ore’ mined in 1994
alone. There is no sign of activity abating, with mine operator Energy
Resources Australia (ERA) announcing in October 2006 that ‘Ranger mine’s
reserves’ are sufficient to ‘add[ … ] six years to the predicted operational
life’ of the mine, meaning that it will be active until at least 2020.37 The
Australian government, in typically bureaucratic and measured tone, has
stated that ‘The operation of a uranium mine and mill in a region which is
World Heritage listed, subject to seasonal extremes in rainfall typical of
monsoonal climates and which represents at least forty thousand years
of habitation by the Aboriginal people, provides many environmental
challenges’.38
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There are, I would argue, at least two ways in which companies wishing to
undertake major industrial activities within or near World Heritage areas
work to neutralise opposition. The first involves making various claims
regarding the scale of operations (the industrial footprint) in relation to the
overall area of the heritage area in question. This explains the prominence in
various reports of statements such as ‘The Ranger mine is on a 7860 hectare
lease which is surrounded by the World Heritage listed Kakadu National
Park of 1.98 million hectares. About 500 hectares is actually disturbed by the
mining and milling activities (0.025 per cent of the total area)’.39 The con-
cept or trope of vastness is of central importance to the logics of mining and
its (possible) relationship to environmental damage. Vastness is called upon
in order, inversely, to establish the smallness of the site in question. If some-
thing is small (industrially speaking) then it must be of far less urgent con-
cern. Smallness of scale makes possible (and logical) the discourse of benign
conduct. This in turn permits an arguably intrusive and ecologically dama-
ging activity to be rewritten in terms of its insignificance. Ecological dis-
turbance is, ironically, then discussed in terms of the impact to areas
adjacent to or abutting the mine site (as if the originary ecological and cul-
tural value of place and space taken up by the mine itself never existed). So
‘[a]bout 500 hectares is actually disturbed’ but 1.98 million ha are not. The
trope of vastness defuses the threat posed by the more traditional trope of
synecdoche. The part (mine site) is made to bear no relation to the whole
(World Heritage area). It does not stand for the whole, is not reducible to it,
and cannot be considered as integral to the ‘surrounding’ area’s ongoing
integrity. This is in strict contrast to Nietzsche’s aphorism that ‘Nature is
acquainted with neither shape nor size; only to the knower do things appear
to be large or small’.40
The second manner by which opposition is neutralised, related to the first,
is a more direct discussion of the risks (and their mitigation). Take the fol-
lowing statement: ‘ERA has been recognised for its world-class environ-
mental management, achieving ISO 14001 certification in 2003 … No
process or other contaminated water is released from the site.’41 I mentioned
earlier that law considers itself to occupy a space beyond the damage it is
charged with negating. Related to this, law tries to ascribe ecology a safe
place within which to reside. Law, in short, sets itself the task of ensuring
that the monstrous and the majestic do not mix. Here, ‘authentic’ Nature,
Nature at its ‘best’, need only be secreted away within law’s domain in order
to survive intact and in perpetuity. In one sense, this is how law procures its
legitimacy in the arena of environmental protection. (Its great concession to
industry, of course, is the sanctioning of the concept ‘multiple use’, which
many times threatens the very values law initially is called on to preserve.)
Mining companies also need to convince governments (and, to a lesser
extent, the public) that their activities will not result in the monstrous mixture
or intermingling of bodies. Toxic waste and ground water as well as
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radioactivity and human ill health are two ‘couplets’ which mining ventures
try desperately to contain within separate universes. A mine in the middle of
a World Heritage area – even if given the status of a ‘legal enclave’ – must
present as an activity unto itself (as a closed circuit or loop with no deleter-
ious effects beyond its borders). Indeed, it must treat its borders more in the
manner of impermeable walls – as fail-safe barriers through which nothing
passes except where intentionally permitted to do so by those operating the
site. This, of course, is merely a desired state of affairs masquerading as an
indisputable and eminently achievable scientific and industrial reality. As
Ulrich Beck42 and others have shown, there is no such thing as zero risk or a
closed loop in Nature (hence the importance of Deleuze’s concept of flow).
Only by thinking and writing the world as a knowable ensemble of causes
and effects is a venture or monstrosity such as the World Heritage Ranger
uranium mine possible.
Of course, in ecological terms, there is no such thing as a closed loop.
Nature is composed of an infinite array of interrelational flows. The movement
of debris from ships in the northern hemisphere to the currents of the
southern hemisphere is stark evidence of this – as is the weather more gen-
erally (with, to name but one interaction, the ceaseless cycle of high and low-
pressure systems generating so-called daily temperatures). World’s best
practice – ‘achieving ISO 14001 certification’ – does little to eliminate
hazards and in fact ensures their presence within and beyond the operational
period of particular projects. Three brief media extracts regarding recent
problems at Ranger uranium mine illustrate this idea.
Posted 6 March 2002
A URANIUM leak at the Ranger Mine – which sent water contamination
levels soaring to unprecedented levels – has prompted calls for a review of
mine operator ERA. It was one of four breaches of the company’s reg-
ulations since January, which included the first sign that contaminated
water at the Jabiluka site could be tainting pristine water systems in the
World Heritage-listed Kakadu National Park. Incorrect stockpiling of
low-grade ore in a catchment area at Ranger is believed responsible for
the contamination of Corridor Creek, which is within the lease and
connects to the Magela River system used by Aborigines. According to
tests taken by ERA early last month, but not reported to stakeholders
until later in February, uranium levels in the creek reached almost 2000
parts per billion – 4000 times the drinking water standard.43
Posted 31 August 2004
… The Ranger uranium mine in Australia’s largest National Park
was shut down today because of water contamination. In March, workers
at Ranger drank and showered in water contaminated with uranium
levels 400 times greater than the maximum Australian safety standard.
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Twenty-eight workers became ill as a result. … The mine has a troubled
history with 120 leaks, spills and operating breaches since it opened
in 1981.44
Posted 15 March 2009
The Northern Territory Government says it will speak to mining
company ERA and the office of the Commonwealth Supervising Scientist
about contaminated water leaking from the Ranger Uranium Mine.
About 100,000 litres of contaminated water is seeping from a tailings
dam at the mine every day. Environmentalists are calling for the mine’s
planned expansion to be put on hold. The Office of the Supervising
Scientist and ERA say the water is not seeping into Kakadu and there is
no reason for concern. NT Resources Minister Kon Vatskalis says he is
concerned, but the mine is well monitored. ‘The Ranger Uranium Mine
is one of the most strictly regulated uranium mines in Australia and the
Office of the Supervising Scientist is controlling, is supervising, very
strictly the mine,’ he said. ‘I’m prepared to talk with the Office of the
Supervising Scientist to find out exactly what’s happening, why it’s hap-
pening and how the scientists and the company are going to address this
issue,’ he said.45
These events are plain (and tragic) manifestations of what Paul Virilio has
termed ‘the specific accident’:
Every technology produces, provokes, programs a specific accident. For
example: when they invented the railroad, what did they invent? An
object that allowed you to go fast, which allowed you to progress – a
vision à la Jules Verne, positivism, evolutionism. But at the same time
they invented the railway catastrophe. The invention of the boat was
the invention of shipwrecks. The invention of the steam engine and the
locomotive was the invention of derailments. The invention of the high-
way was the invention of three hundred cars colliding in five minutes.
The invention of the airplane was the invention of the plane crash.
I believe that from now on, if we wish to continue with technology … we
must think about both the substance and the accident – substance being
both the object and its accident. The negative side of technology and
speed was censored.46
The invention of uranium mining is the invention of risks to public and
ecological health. The specific accident is not incidental but fundamental to
particular technological advances. It is always on the cusp of returning or
being actualised. Safety itself implies the omnipresence – not the displacement –
of risk (and harm). Let me return momentarily to Douglas’s cautionary
remark that ‘[T]he yearning for rigidity is in us all. It is part of our human
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condition to long for hard lines and clear concepts. When we have them we
either face the fact that some realities elude them, or else blind ourselves to
the inadequacy of the concepts.’47 If the juxtaposition of World Heritage
areas and industrial activity within their boundaries demonstrates anything
at all, it is that we have surely become blind to the wholly provisional and
dangerous nature of the concepts used to govern activities in these areas.
More than this, the type of monstrous couplings on display here – essentially,
the coupling (or clash) of geological and industrial chronologies – shows
that the interior of law, far from being a place to shelter from violence, is a
place of turmoil and damage. In this sense, Chaplin is indeed right in her
comment that ‘law – [as] the permeable margin between the sacred and the
abject – is itself that which jeopardises the integrity of the community and its
members’.48
To briefly recap, then, I have surveyed the way in which law threatens
particular areas from ‘within’ – examining World Heritage areas whose
values continue to be placed at risk by activities which geographically occur
inside the borders of such spaces. It is of course necessary to acknowledge
that various sites of industrial activity exist as legal enclaves in World
Heritage areas (permitting them to be (re)presented as ‘outside’ the ambit of
the World Heritage Convention). But, to my mind, location takes primacy
over categorisation in such instances. Indeed, in one sense it is not about, for
example, whether uranium mining occurs within or outside Kakadu
National Park so much as about how the debate about uranium is con-
tinually conducted in relation to where it should occur rather than whether it
should be permitted at all. I want now, though, to change the register of the
analysis a little by focusing attention not on the meanings associated with
the protection of large regions or ecosystems but on the protection of ‘indi-
vidual’ organisms, namely big trees. This narrowing of focus will help to
bring a new – if related – range of critical issues to the fore.
11.4 Law and the majestic
In this section I want to critically discuss the legal ‘protection’ extended to
two particular ‘majestic’ trees located in different parts of Australia – the
Ada Tree in Victoria, and El Grande in Tasmania. I use the term ‘majestic’
to connote the existence of a body or bodies which induce an ineluctable and
chiefly unconscious reverence on account of their perceived beauty, rarity
and location. The respective fates of the Ada Tree and El Grande are quite
distinct, with the former still living and ‘on display’ in a dedicated reserve
and the latter, although earmarked for protection by authorities, having been
accidentally killed during a post-logging burning operation. Despite the fact
that one of these trees still survives, there is, as I will suggest, little majesty
and much monstrosity residing in both of these scenarios. Virilio is again
relevant to this point and writes:
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[T]he dimension of the accident has changed, and we are faced with the
emergence of an unprecedented accident. All technical objects brought
about accidents that were specific, local and situated in time and space.
The Titanic leaked in one place, while the train derailed in another. As
for us, we have created the possibility of an accident that is no longer
particular but general … [T]here is an accident brewing that would occur
everywhere at the same time: … a global accident that would affect if not
the entire planet, then at least the majority of people concerned by [ … ]
teletechnologies.49
National Parks and the protection of individual big trees can in many
ways be viewed as a form of ecological insurance against the general accident
of ecocide. They work on the basis that what is earmarked within their bor-
ders is simultaneously unique and representative of species and processes
occurring beyond their boundaries. On this logic, the Ada Tree and El
Grande – as ‘single’ organisms afforded legislated protection – stand (or
were earmarked to stand) as insurance against the specific accident of the
loss of forest giants (the loss of majestic remnants). The question is, how
good is this insurance? More particularly, what risks does such a strategy
(however appealing at first glance) carry with it?
A giant eucalyptus regnans, ‘El Grande was located adjacent to the World
Heritage Area in the Florentine Valley and was discovered [by volunteers] in
June 2002’.50 About 400 years old and 80 m in height, the tree was by no
means the oldest or tallest in Australia, but according to the International
Society of Arboriculture Australia Chapter (ISAAC), at around 400 m3 in
weight, and with a girth of 18.75 m, it was believed to be the largest in terms
of volume.51 Under its ‘Giant Trees Policy’ (August 2002), Forestry Tasmania
had an obligation to protect the tree from logging and all associated inten-
sive activities (such as impacting of its root system from heavy machinery).52
El Grande was indeed placed on the list of giant trees but, shortly after a
‘regulation’ forest-burning exercise conducted by Forestry Tasmania in April
2003, the tree made world news for all the wrong reasons. On 5 June 2003
the UK Guardian asked, ‘Is El Grande really dead?’ On 10 December 2003
the BBC News (Asia Pacific Region) reported that ‘Forestry officials admit
killing biggest tree.’ And, finally, on 7 March 2007 the Wilderness Society
(Australia) reported, ‘El Grande, Australia’s most massive tree, topples.’ It
had, in short, been killed (literally ‘cooked from the inside’, to use the words
of botanist Alan Gray) by a bureaucratically sanctioned fire that ultimately
proved to be uncontrollable.53 Forestry Tasmania (in a statement dated
7 March 2007) put the following gloss on this series of events:
El Grande, the largest known eucalypt in Tasmania’s forests, has unfor-
tunately been blown over by the recent high winds coursing through the
Derwent Valley. It had been noted many years ago that El Grande had a
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hollow core, which had weakened it structurally. Fortunately, the progeny
of El Grande are growing near by from seeds Forestry Tasmania collected
from El Grande during the harvesting process. These saplings are now
three to four metres in height and are doing very well. These El Grande
saplings will carry the ‘giant tree’ gene and, over time, grow to be forest
giants. There are thousands of ‘large’ trees in Tasmania’s State forests –
the tallest and largest of which are protected under Forestry Tasmania’s
Giant Trees Policy. People interested in Tasmanian giant trees can also
consult the Giant trees register at www.gianttrees.com.au … 54
Excepting the reference to its ‘hollow core’ (which is typical of most healthy
old-growth mountain ash trees), there is no mention here of why El
Grande – after 400 years of vigorous growth – suddenly ‘blew over’. The
truth is that logging operations – the clear-felling of all trees around it for
some substantial distance – exposed it to winds that it would have been
sheltered from since the time of the Great Fire of London in 1666. The
prescribed burn that finally destroyed the tree is standard practice in the
forest industry in areas where eucalyptus regnans are logged. Very few if any
trees could have survived the temperatures of such a fire. The press release
issued by Forestry Tasmania speaks of what Deleuze calls the primacy of a
‘field of individuation’ (where individual trees are expendable because iden-
tical specimens can be found or permitted to take root) as opposed to the
‘differences borne by the individual’55 (where each individual differs not on
account of some internal uniqueness but on account of its irreducible – never
to be repeated – place in the ‘ocean of dissemblance’56). Deleuze writes, ‘The
highest generalities of life … point beyond species and genus, but point
beyond them in the direction of the individual and pre-individual singula-
rities rather than towards an impersonal abstraction … It is not the indivi-
dual which is an illusion in relation to the genus of the species, but the
species which is an illusion.’57 On this count, the progeny of El Grande count
for very little, since they are, in this instance, concomitant with the destruc-
tion of the singularity of unique animate and inanimate forces which com-
posed the body of El Grande proper. The species may live on, but El Grande
cannot be replaced – something which Forestry officials have never admitted.
This is a monstrous course of events which resides as an omen to those
interested in the fate of big trees. It shows that the individual organism
cannot survive separate from a particular kind of milieu – that of old-growth
eco-systems. Such a milieu cannot be artificed into existence or recreated
within a politico-economic environment aligned to largely industrial chron-
ologies. Forestry Tasmania, however, is attempting such artifice through its
commitment to now ensure that ‘groups of trees’ are preserved around each
individual tall and giant tree on its register.
In Victoria – the state due north of where El Grande once lived – a very
different story of big tree conservation has unfolded. This story centres not
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so much around biological death as aesthetic decline and state-managed ruin
of large tracts of forest. The Ada Tree is located in the Yarra State Forest of
the Great Dividing Range about 80 km due east of Melbourne (the capital
city of the state of Victoria, Australia). Like El Grande, the tree is an
example of the eucalypt species known as mountain ash (eucalyptus
regnans), renowned both for their size and, more recently, their rarity. They
are the tallest flowering plant on earth and are generally accepted to have
once grown taller than the redwood forests located on the west coast of the
United States (specifically California and Oregon). Prior to its top being
destroyed by wind or lightning, the Ada Tree was estimated to be around
120 m (400 ft) in height. At such a height it would have been the world’s
tallest known tree – exceeding the very recently discovered coast redwood
(sequoia sempervirens) named Helparion estimated to be around 114 m or
380 ft tall.58 Today the Ada Tree stands at a comparatively ‘short’ 76 m
(253 ft).59 Unlike its counterparts in the United States (where redwoods are
aged up to 3,000 years), the Ada Tree is thought to have germinated around
1727 – making it a ‘mere’ 280 years old. Still, at the time the Ada Tree was a
seedling the ‘discovery’ of Australia by Captain James Cook would not
occur for another sixty years. (Indigenous people had, however, lived in this
land for some 40,000 years.) In a world replete with industrial intrusion it is
somewhat astonishing that the Ada Tree remained secreted from public
knowledge until 1986, when two brothers, prospecting for gems, stumbled
upon it.60 With a girth of just over 15 m at breast height, and weighing more
than 220 tonnes, the Ada Tree is, in mass terms, one of the largest trees and,
by default, one of the largest living terrestrial organisms in Australia.61 In
1997 the Ada Tree was given legislated protection within the Ada Tall Trees
Reserve.62
Counter-intuitive and heretical as it may sound, the Ada Tree is as much a
monstrosity as a unique or remarkable specimen of eucalyptus regnans. By
this I mean that reverence for the Ada Tree is born out of and inextricably
tied to both the past and ongoing violence perpetrated upon eucalypt forests
more generally. Just as Derrida63 has written that ‘the parliaments live in
forgetfulness of the violence from which they are born’, in the same way do
big trees stand in a displaced place – a place disconnected from the violence
which, in fact, informs their ‘majesty’ and ‘significance’. As the location of
recent logging activity clearly shows, what is important about the Ada Tree
is that the violence which preserves this organism is ongoing and proximate.
There is, in short, an inverse and highly problematic relationship between the
aesthetic, ecological and even ‘spiritual’ value ascribed to the Ada Tree, as
against the rate and type of destruction occurring to the forests (ecological
communities) in close and even distant proximity to it. It is in this sense that
the fascination with the Ada Tree (indeed, with giant trees generally) stems
from quite monstrous, even dangerous ‘origins’ and events. The Ada Tree is
a body whose presence is made possible by the absence of countless other
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trees. To stand before the Ada Tree, then, is to witness something magnificent
and abhorrent.
Like all designated conservation areas, the Ada Tree reserve is a manu-
factured space – a space where the striations and blockages are not so dif-
ferent from those confronted (or endured) in the city. In one of their most
insightful passages Deleuze and Guattari write:
One of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over
which it reigns, or to utilise smooth spaces as a means of communication
in the service of striated space. It is a vital concern of every State not
only to vanquish nomadism but to control migrations and, more gen-
erally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire ‘exterior’, over all of
the flows traversing the ecumenon. If it can help it, the State does not
dissociate itself from a process of capture of flows of all kinds, popula-
tions, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc. There is still a
need for fixed paths in well defined directions, which restrict speed, reg-
ulate circulation, relativise movement, and measure in detail the relative
movements of subjects and objects.64
State law folds the smooth space of ecological processes into its generalised
will to striation (or capture). It forces, in other words, the complexities
of geological slownesses into the unidimensional frame of industrial speed.
National Parks (conservation reserves and the like) are in this sense the
remnants the state cedes in order to have greater control of the terrain
beyond and abutting such areas. More than this, they are places made in the
image of the state – places where the dimensions and uses are given by
the state for the state.65 The logic of late capitalism – even and especially the
capitalism devoted to ecological sustainability, ecological integrity and eco-
logical diversity – produces, at best, a particular kind of ecological value.
The state does all it can to subdue wildness, and, primarily, wildness is sub-
dued by giving it a place, by ascribing it boundaries, by giving it dimen-
sions.66 This is the sense in which the Ada Tree is a monstrosity. Or, perhaps,
it is more accurate to say that the ‘zone’ in which the Ada Tree is permitted
to stand is a monstrous space. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘the Smooth
[i.e. smooth space] is both the object of a close vision par excellence and the
element of a haptic space (which may be as much visual or auditory as tactile).
The Striated [i.e. striated space], on the contrary, relates to a more distant
vision, and a more optical space … ’67 To my mind, this perfectly captures
the logics of ‘emparkment’ and nature conservation generally.68 In short, the
state cannot afford to look too closely at Nature. For to do so would require
one to admit, as Deleuze so forcefully and beautifully argues, that life (earth)
is characterised by a ‘deep disparity’.69 It would, in short, expose the unre-
marked violence of seeking to make one or a number of bodies stand for all
such bodies.
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This last point goes directly to the heart of the matter. Whether the focus
is on oil tankers in the Great Barrier Reef, uranium mining in Kakadu
National Park, salt mining in Shark Bay World Heritage area, or on the
conservation of particular trees or stands of forest, the central problem
remains that of representation – which is, as Deleuze writes, ‘a site of trans-
cendental illusion’.70 What holds the earth together – what permits it to
press upon the senses, what permits encounters instead of recognitions – is
difference (deep disparities), not resemblance. James Williams, commenting
on Deleuze’s work, cautions that ‘difference is not a limit that stands as the
origin or the end of a process of identification … Rather, difference is that
which turns all representations into illusions – identity is only a cloak thrown
over deeper pure differences.’71 Again, in Deleuze’s words, ‘the problem of
classification was clearly always a problem of ordering differences. However,
plant and animal classifications show that we can order differences only so
long as we are provided with a multiple network of continuity of resem-
blance.’72 Resemblance is the expression of the image of thought – of being
ill prepared to negotiate the way forward in a world where, quite plainly,
there can be no foundational or immutable division between the ecologically
expendable and the ecologically unique, or between forest types (wet, dry,
damp) and forest species (eucalyptus regnans, eucalyptus obliqua, eucalyptus
nitens), or between this tree aged 300 years as against that tree of 150 years,
or between this tree of 100 m in height as opposed to that tree of 90 m in
height.
The division between National Park and state forest (or non-park) is, of
course, a largely arbitrary one. But the division is nonetheless productive –
and what it produces is the idea of Nature as excess. This is a dangerous
idea, for where Nature is in excess – where there is too much Nature – there
seems little wrong with consuming its surplus. This surplus – this super-
abundance of Nature – enters the frame only on the basis that we portend to
have mastered the art of representing and protecting species, and that we
have struck upon the right formula for determining the minimal dimensions
of the habitat needed for their survival. Whereas National Parks are often
thought to be organised around the notion of rarity, they are in fact mostly
conceived with regard to the politics of representativeness. This is why, for
instance, intensive industrial activity is permitted to occur right up to and
along the borders of such places. On this basis one can mine, cut and clear
Nature in good conscience, because the boundary between park and non-
park is a scientifically valid one and anything mined, cut or cleared has its
copy – its double – in the patchwork of parks and reserves established by the
state. For Deleuze, this logic is based on a highly spurious notion of species
and individual (and, specifically, the privileging of the former over the latter).
More to the point, it takes things which are deeply disparate from one
another and ascribes them the power to be the substitute or double of the
other. Deleuze writes:
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We invoke a field of individuation or individuating difference as the
condition of the organisation and determination of species. However,
this field of individuation is posited only formally and in general: it
seems to be ‘the same’ for a given species, and to vary in intensity from
one species to another. It seems, therefore, to depend upon the species
and the determination of species, and to refer us once more to differ-
ences borne by the individual, not to individual differences. In order for
this difficulty to disappear, the individuating difference must not only be
conceived within a field of individuation in general, but must itself
be conceived as an individual difference. The form of the field must be
necessarily and in itself filled with individual differences.73
It is this ‘field of individuation’ which makes the monstrous juxtaposition
of industrial zones and conservation zones possible (of chainsaws or mining
activity within earshot of a proscribed ecological rarity). Here, the state
adheres to the belief that this field is indeed, as Deleuze says, identical for all
species. It is this belief in turn that permits the violent and hazardous idea of
Nature as endless copy (mimesis). Complete with its types and numbers of
species, rates of reproduction and replenishment, thresholds of resilience and
tipping points, the field of individuation sets in train the ‘science’ of repre-
sentation. Where copies abound – where Nature as mimetic force is the order
of the day – it no longer matters if a particular part of this field is ‘lost’
(to the workings of the chainsaw), for it can always be found. And the place
in which late capitalism returns to find ‘Nature’ is in its ‘representative’
system of parks, reserves and gardens. With this field of individuation,
the violence of carving out a place for wildness within discrete and ecologi-
cally significant units begins. ‘The primary – and one might say, critical –
consequence of constructing a field of individuation (equivalent in many
ways to the plane of organisation) is that it enables [the state] to classify the
world according to the distribution and repetition of so-called like groups
rather than, as would seem preferable, in terms of the differences borne by
individuals.’74
The Ada Tree, although still standing, and, for that matter, El Grande,
although recently disappeared, are very much testimony to the ways in which
various machines (political, legal, social, scientific) have recast the deep disparity
of the world in terms of its similarities and resemblances (as constituted by
phylum, genus, species, and so on). As an event, the Ada Tree speaks of the
consequences of withdrawing from the close visioning of the world. Only by
surveying from a distance (by shutting out the possibility of a ‘“close-range”
vision’75) is one able to see similarities in, or, worse, copies of, this or that
environment (bio-region, ecological vegetation class, forest type, etc.). The
state – and its preoccupation with establishing an outside (chaos, wildness)
and an inside (order, civilisation) – does all that it can to avoid the intermingling
of the two. This is another way of saying that the state cannot afford to
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encounter singularities, or, more accurately, that, when it does, it must
rewrite singularity in categorical terms – in ways recognisable to the bodies
who venture to them, and thus in ways which attest to the careful and sus-
tained displacement of a close visioning of Earth. It is not, therefore, a
matter of revering or resenting the Ada Tree. It is not a matter of caring
about or killing the Ada Tree or searching for another El Grande. It is a
matter of killing representation – killing the divisions between nature and
culture, between tree and forest, residing in our policies and laws – or, more
pointedly, as Deleuze puts it, residing in our heads.
11.5 Conclusion
At the outset of this chapter I briefly made mention of Foucault’s work on
heterotopias. In concluding, I want to return to this concept and in parti-
cular to that of the library and museum as heterotopias of ‘indefinitely
accumulating time’76 (see Figure 11.1). Recall that heterotopic sites are those
which ‘neutralise, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate,
mirror or reflect’.77 Foucault comments:
Figure 11.1 ‘Inside the museums, infinity goes up on trial’, Bob Dylan, ‘Visions of
Johanna’ (Blonde on Blonde, 1966). Witnessing the Ada Tree. Photo by
Mark Halsey
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Museums and libraries have become heterotopias in which time never
stops building up and topping its own summit … [T]he idea of accu-
mulating everything, of establishing a general sort of archive, the will to
enclose in one place, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of con-
stituting a place of all times that is itself outside of time and inaccessible
to its ravages, the project of organising in this way a sort of perpetual
and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place, this whole
idea belongs to our modernity.78
Does this not speak at least in part of the function of seeking to represent
Nature in National Parks? And does it not speak also to the penultimate
impossibility of doing so? Climate change would seem to categorically
demonstrate the futility of partitioning the planet into significant and insig-
nificant places. To my mind, National Parks and tall or big trees should be
made to function in the order of the ‘great criminal’ mentioned by Derrida
in his essay ‘Force of law’. As he writes, ‘The admiring fascination exerted
on the people by “the figure of the great criminal” … can be explained as
follows: it is not someone who has committed this or that crime for which
one feels a secret admiration; it is someone who, in defying the law, lays bare
the violence of the legal system, the juridical order itself ’.79 This is where
National Parks and their variants serve to ‘invert the set of relations that
they happen to designate, mirror or reflect’. Each park, each reserve, each
tree placed aside in museum-like conditions, are in a very real sense akin to
deviant figures. The Ada Tree, just like the Centurion Tree in Tasmania, or
Helparion in the United States, were not meant to survive. They should, by
rights, be fence palings, roofing material or the structural support for some
defunct gold mine. But they deviated from the norm. They survived by
chance or because the technology of the time was not up to the task of fell-
ing them. As much as their presence goes to the majestic, however, they also
stand as omens – a forewarning of the losses attending a particular mode of
envisioning, consuming and regulating earth.
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